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THAT NEXT WAR?

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THAT NEXT WAR?

MAJOR K. A. BRATT

Translated by

ERNEST CLASSEN

With a Foreword by

WICKHAM STEED

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PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

THE original edition of this book appeared in 1929. Much has happened in the world during that short time. Some promising developments in the question of war or peace have been recorded, mainly as a result of the English General Election, the adoption of the Young Plan, and the decision to evacuate the Rhineland. Owing to these developments some pages of the original edition have had to be revised for subsequent editions. When the English edition is read—perhaps on both sides of the Atlantic—a third development—also directly arising from events in England—will have claimed the interest of all civilised peoples: the Five-Power Conference of 1930. Will that Conference succeed? Or has it failed? If so, the darkness will again descend upon us deeper than ever. If no decisive step towards reduction of armaments at sea be taken, there will probably be no such reduction of armaments on land and in the air. And we should realise the implications of a *non-possumus* attitude: the imminence, sooner or later, of the inevitable collapse.

If we cannot interrupt the developments described in the first part of this book, an icy wind will blow through the world. And let us not forget that these developments are still continuing unabated in practice. The new movements have not yet succeeded in changing the historical *preparations* for war. Mighty currents are still setting towards war in the depths of the ocean of thoughts, wills, and forces. The military pressure which the Bismarckian age exerted on Europe has not ceased, despite its terrible effects. In spite of all we must remain optimists. If we do not succeed, "the inevitable" will descend upon us. This conviction and the knowledge

of the consequences may perhaps excuse a certain passion of appeal on the part of the author which some critics of his book have regretted.

STOCKHOLM
January 30th, 1930

FOREWORD

A SWEDISH Staff officer, who spent his best years in the scientific study of war; who followed up his study by personal observation of actual warfare; whom this experience convinced that, as a human enterprise, modern fighting is unworthy, and who therefore, in this volume, brings a trained imagination to bear upon *That Next War* of which fools in all lands glibly prate—such a man is Major K. A. Bratt, the author of this book. The original has been read, discussed, and quarrelled about from end to end of Sweden. I hope the English version may also stir up controversy and, still better, promote thought throughout the English-speaking world.

It is eminently a sane book, as free from pious hysterics as from the capitalisation of horrors. Major Bratt has found out that it is hard to think of peace save in terms of preventing war, because "non-war" and "peace" are wrongly assumed to be the same thing. Therefore, he writes more of war and its prevention than of peace. At the beginning of one of his chapters he uses a phrase which I like—"The strategic situation on the peace front". He conceives peace, rightly, as a conquest, a creation, a new state of being for mankind. For this conquest, this creation, a new strategy is needed. Moltke called strategy a "system of aids". Major Bratt writes that the strategy which aims at defeating war must be a system of the most varied auxiliaries, whose joint forces need to be of a magnitude at least as great as those of war, for it is a question of radically changing the course of history. "The abolition of war between civilised peoples is the greatest change history has ever known."

This is sound sense, which may one day be recognised as common sense. Major Bratt is likewise on the right path when

he associates the "technical revolution" in industrial production, "of which the complications are both serious and difficult to survey", with the corresponding mechanisation of war. He sees that "scientific warfare now threatens us with annihilation", and that we have, in effect, only the choice between a policy of reaction which, as he shrewdly observes, is everywhere "reaction towards war", and a policy of democratic progress in communities of which the very structure is being transformed by mechanical and technical methods of production.

Of these alternatives, the policy of reaction may afford a respite from inevitable ruin. A deliberate and open-eyed policy of peace must, on the other hand, involve great risks, yet it offers a chance of escape towards new and better conditions of national and international life. "The choice", Major Bratt says, "lies between a continued development of democracy and a most pronounced reaction. It is not without reason that the dictators lead the enemies of democracy. Thereby the struggle has been intensified in the extreme. It is a 'war' to the knife, for life and death. For it must be writ in large letters that the coming organisation of a lasting peace depends primarily on the life and work of the democratic forces. Peace cannot be achieved against democracy, only by its help."

The habit of mind which leads many hard-headed people to believe that, because war always has been, it always will be, tends to paralyse thought and action in ostensibly "conservative" quarters. These people do not deny that "the next war" will be infinitely more destructive than the last, but rarely do they admit that to put something else in the place of war may be a practical undertaking. "What is the good of all these peace pacts?", they ask. The answer is: "We do not yet know, but they may turn out to be something better than the certainty of annihilation through war."

When it was a question of "safeguarding" peace by huge armaments (which became in themselves, as they were bound to become, a contributory cause of war) these same "conservatives", or their progenitors, were always ready to "go the whole hog". *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, ran their hoary, self-stultifying adage. At heart they believe in it still. In their ears the motto of the new age: "Wouldst thou have peace, prepare for peace!" sounds as rank blasphemy against the Eternal Divinity of Mars.

To them Major Bratt shows the face of their god in a mirror. He is no "pacifist", nor does he flatter himself that the horrors of the "last war" will suffice to withhold forgetful peoples from plunging into a "next war". He has served at the altar of Mars, and he knows his history. He believes that the civilised nations of mankind can be saved from war only by political and economic action; that the abolition of war cannot, in and by itself, bring about the elimination of international disputes and conflicting interests; and that the prevention or the abolition of war is not possible without the creation of equivalent possibilities, on a different plane, of contest and of the means of settling contests. "The struggle for power", he writes, "will always exist. It is only the forms and objects of strife which can be influenced by progress. It is a question, as William James put it, of finding a substitute for war. . . . It would be of the greatest interest if we could determine this equivalent. But this can scarcely be done as yet. It is probable that it will be, in the main, economic."

Meanwhile the most urgent present task is to gain time for the development and organisation of the forces that make for peace. Time is necessary, because it is ludicrous to demand that the system represented by the League Covenant on the one hand, and the Kellogg Pact on the other, shall be capable of

achieving immediately a security against war which the old system of unlimited armaments persistently failed to achieve. Peace must be a conquest. The safeguarding of non-war may be the first stage in that conquest. Another stage may lie in the co-operation between the two great social and economic interests—labour and what Major Bratt calls "peace capital", as distinguished from the capital interested in promoting armaments and the war spirit.

What the ultimate forms of peace will be, no man can say. The study of peace as a positive state of being is still in its early beginnings. For ages war has been studied intensely. For a few centuries the possibility of non-war was vaguely dreamt of, and it has been tentatively organised since 1919. But the conception of peace as a lasting condition of mankind, albeit a dynamic not a static condition, is hardly older than the renunciation of war by the Kellogg Pact.

The chief merit of Major Bratt's book is that it fosters thought about peace thus conceived.

WICKHAM STEED

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I

THE MODERN WAR SOCIETY

CHAPTER I

Which is at once Preface and Introduction, and describes the purpose of the book whilst affording a glimpse of the background.

THIS book is not complete. In parts it is sketchy. It contains contradictions, repetitions, and errors. Too much has been grasped to be held firmly. It is in part a compilation. But in such matters, who can avoid repetitions? (And after all, we can do worse than repeat the words of wisdom of others.) The book aims at objectivity, but is nevertheless at times tendentious. It cannot fail to be criticised from diametrically opposed points of view. These reservations are necessary. The critical reader will perhaps bear them in mind.

The objections to the publication of a book with such imperfections may, however, be satisfactorily met—by reference to the present position of affairs. There is no time, in the questions here under discussion, to enter into academic discussion. War does not, it is true, actually lurk just behind the door, but there is no doubt that the attitude of mankind, of the nations, and of Western opinion towards war and peace will enter upon a decisive stage in the near future. Some of those who occupy themselves with such problems are content with abstractions and generalisations. Nor will we speak of the desire of that numerous species which, while the world is rocking, impatiently shifts its position in the arm-chair in order not to be disturbed in the enjoyment of its right to be left in peace whatever may happen. This book is not addressed to the "leave-well-alone" people, who have never been starved or frozen or burnt, or to the members of complacent men's and fortunate women's clubs, or to the solid indifference—like

a compact mass in the midst of society—none of these categories can be reached by words, be they ever so heated or ever so calm. They can only be awakened by the great catastrophe, if and when the whole structure collapses. So much it is necessary to make clear in order to avoid, at any rate, one disillusionment.

This is a book *about* war and *against* war. A large theme, so much is certain. There are, broadly, three ways of attacking this problem. The first consists in crying out with every possible variation and modulation of tone, "Down with war!" "No more war!" etc. However natural may be these exclamations, and the feelings to which they give expression, it must be admitted that they are a most ineffective method. Its effects are very soon lost. Indeed, they seem to be already obliterated in the present generation. Another method is to seek to analyse war thoroughly and scientifically, from the time when man first hurled stones at the head of his fellow-man until the present day—when much more dangerous things are hurled; to seek to penetrate deep into human nature, into the labyrinth of conflicting interests, without drawing any practical conclusions or suggesting any line of action. This, as a rule, is the long road of science and of isolated thinkers. It is extremely illuminating; but it is insufficient. The third method is a variant of the second, and builds upon its foundation, but does not necessarily exclude the emotionalism which characterises the first. It consists of a persistent attempt to discover the essential whilst discarding everything which distracts the attention or disperses energy. It represents a constant endeavour to combine its conclusions in a great but practicable course of action. This is the method which will be followed here.

There are, as we all know, very many nostrums for prevent-

ing war. Some of them were doubtless invented by wise old ladies. It must be evident under these circumstances that none of them is a real remedy. But there is much, on the other hand, which really deserves the name "nonsense". How is it possible in one chord to include something which affects practically the whole keyboard of human life—war, which runs like a bloody thread right through the past and present life of mankind and which will remain a problem even in the future? When we penetrate more deeply into the problem we find ourselves in a raging sea of questions: religious, ethical, philosophical, psychological, economic, biological, ethnographical, sociological, and—without suggesting any valuation in the sequence—of course also military. There is scarcely a single question of moment, scarcely a single one of human interest, which does not in one way or another arise, or is not reflected here. An apparently inextricable chaos, in which we are threatened with drowning amidst contradictions and conflicting opinions and demands. If we endeavour to consider these latter we find that there are as many points of view as there are speakers in any imaginary discussion. It is wrong to kill, therefore war must be condemned. Nature kills trilliards of lives every moment (religion, ethics, biology). Force is unjust and mankind unworthy. Force has played a tremendous and certainly a necessary rôle in human development (ethics, biology, history). It is uneconomic to wage war. Let us in the name of reason and of sound economics be done with it. There are private economic advantages to be derived from war and from preparation for war (world-economics, political economy, domestic economy). War has become of such a nature that it threatens the extinction of the civilised race. Mankind will adapt itself and will still discover an escape and counter-measures (military science, biology, history), etc.

The study of war and the struggle against it presupposes in fact a study of all these.

"Strategy", according to Moltke, "is a system of aids." The strategy which aims at defeating war, at achieving a Cannae or a Sedan, must therefore be a system of the most varied auxiliaries. But if, as here, it is a question of radically changing the course of history—the abolition of war between civilised peoples is the greatest change history has ever known —then forces must be set in motion which are *historically* active, and of a magnitude at least as great as those of war. Everything else will be as sticks and straw to be sucked into the vortex at the decisive moment. If we wish to lift a millstone it is useless to attempt to do so with the bare hands. Rather than wear out our strength in useless endeavour, we should seek for a lever or a system of pulleys which will furnish the necessary power. The fundamental principle of military strategy—that force should be concentrated in the right direction, in a centre of gravity—is another expression for the same thing. Unless we can find this centre of gravity and this line of direction in the fight for peace we shall seek in vain to prevent war. Nor is it sufficient in this case to speculate on an acceptable plan. Even if it were good in itself, it would be useless if the peoples did not follow it.

One thing we may agree upon: that from the interplay of all the various forces and currents there will inevitably arise the mysterious something which we are accustomed to call "history". One result will appear—history—which is the sum total of causes and effects. A great film on which opinion in the making is glimpsed on the white screen. Whoever wishes to abolish war must seek to fix the meaning of historical events in our epoch and to find a lever strong enough, in the question of war and peace, to influence events in the

direction of progress. If in this book we search for such a lever, we would not have it thought that we are making an application for a patent.

Civilised man ought now, it would appear, to have gained so much experience—especially after past errors—that he is ripe for a systematic adaptation of this experience to the greatest of problems, on which second-, third-, and fourth-rate problems depend. The view has also been expressed by people whose brains are above the average that mankind, the civilised races, and especially the "Atlantic" races, are now on the threshold of decisions of very far-reaching importance. Nobody seems to be able to explain convincingly why just at the present moment such gigantic decisions should be necessary. What is the purpose of these measures, and what is at stake? We see their proportions only intermittently illuminated, like a gleam on the waters at night.

At one point, however, we begin to see clearly. The "technical revolution" has automatically introduced in the West a system of production of which the complications are both serious and difficult to survey. And these mighty technical developments have at the same time, among other things, led to a revolution in the science of warfare, which now threatens us with annihilation. We may say what we please, but such is the fact. This fact in itself affords a glimpse of the importance of the decision, of the significance of the choice. But is it the synthesis?

"By terrible experience it may come to be proved that human reason is the offshoot of divine reason, of Logos, and that a departure from it is madness. Just as a madman ceases to be a man, so it may happen that mankind run mad will no longer be, except physically, what we mean by human. A new generation is growing up which only resembles man,

and its physiognomy is seen more and more in the present race. The battle-front stretches from the chemical formulae for poisonous gases, to be used in the next and even more terrible war, to the atheistic Soviet propaganda by which the sixth continent, the former Russia, is roused." The above sentence is a quotation from Meresjkovski's *Messias*. The old Russian writer and thinker here reads the signs partly from his orthodox Christian point of view, but equally from a still wider and deeper perspective. He also approaches Spengler. The perspective of both is as vast as their starting-points, and diagnoses of causes are sundered. If they read the signs correctly—like those others who, partly on other grounds, have come to the conclusion that Western civilisation is rotten to the core; that it does not deserve to live and therefore will not live—then we should be able to catch a glimpse of a process at once marvellous and monstrous by which this mechanicalised, technical, and soulless civilisation will come to its end by means of the very thing on which it most sets its heart; by which the foremost creation of Western man, technical skill, now mounting in a fantastic curve, will inflict on the white race a mechanical death. It will be destroyed by its own tool, which it is unable to control: technical skill, that spirit of the lamp transformed—like the mechanical giant of Frankenstein—into an inexorable executioner, as hard as the gold and steel which together have wrought this change. Modern technical resources, apparently as inexhaustible as the nebular systems are remote, and yet concealing within them, unseen by most, the instrument of the great annihilation. An internal combustion motor which explodes in the hands of the inventor. A well-trained servant who, before the very eyes of his master, takes the gleaming pistol from the drawer and delivers him by a shot through the head.

We can scarcely be in doubt as to the forms which such an apocalyptic sequence of events will take. War, or bloody, destructive revolution—or both. First one and then the other. And if we read the writing to the end, to the last verses of Spengler's death-song: through inconceivable destruction, madness, blood, and chaos to the new Russian civilisation, shooting up like a gigantic poisonous flower on the untouched trunk of the tree of life. A nightmare! Yes! and yet how logical it seems at times. The civilised races eagerly raking and tending —their great cemetery. We cannot too long scan its horizons without the pupils distending until they burst. But even if we are sometimes convinced that there is no other choice, yet we *must* reject this vision as a fiction of the brain—at any rate so long as we wish to remain men of action and of free will. We must have faith in the power of reason and experience to determine the issue; faith that "history does not make itself, but that it is ideas which make history". And we must act as if our vision were only an hallucination, the offspring of a vast and ghastly imagination. Somewhere between the apparently purposeless jig-saw and crossword puzzles and the gloomy vision we must assume that even in the problem here under discussion there exists a line of progress. That line of action must be sought and found.

This book does not attempt—even if only for the reason that the author is not competent to do so—to analyse scientifically the causes of modern war. They will, however, be fragmentarily illuminated. Certain points of view which will scarcely recur in the following pages may properly be advanced here by way of introduction.

* * *

The causes of war would seem in the main to be a combina-

tion of ethical, psychological, and economic problems. We do not doubt, for our part, that on a broad and deep view the problem is ethical. Most men who on material and practical grounds are ruled by self-interest doubtless believe, on the other hand, that the motive of self-interest, with which one rightly associates that of self-preservation, is the sole determining cause. Norman Angell, in *The Great Illusion*, appears to lean to this view. Seydoux must be regarded as the extreme protagonist of this view when he says, "There exist no other problems than economic problems". Without pursuing this paradox, it must be admitted that even the comparatively few Westerners who are dominated only by ethical motives are unable to deny the predominating influence of self-interest in the great majority. Even those who are convinced that there is a spiritual anchorage and spiritual realities which manifest themselves in laws as logical as the physical manifestations cannot fail to observe that the development of these spiritual forces is interwoven with a biological process which for the present we have only been able to influence in an extremely small degree. Only in so far as this combined bio-spiritual development appears to assume political, economic, or social forms has it reached a stage susceptible to outside influence. In order to understand war we must observe this process. Even if finally the whole development might be regarded as based upon a spiritual and moral foundation—and even if the hegemony of these forces were indisputable—this book nevertheless considers primarily the political and economic phases of the problem, and naturally also its military and politico-military aspects. This implies a clear and conscious limitation of the immense subject. We give below one reason for this limitation.

Bertrand Russell, who has applied his mental acumen to

the problem of the causes of war, is of the opinion that it is exclusively instincts, and not self-interests, which are the deepest cause of war, even at the present day. If Russell is right we can draw no other conclusion than that there is no possibility of abolishing war, even among civilised races, until human nature—individuals with their deep-rooted instincts—has been considerably transformed (Russell, of course, does not accept the banal slogan that human nature is unchangeable). If, indeed, a victorious struggle against war presupposes a profound change in instincts, or the victory of the moral and spiritual forces over the passions, then we must conclude that the civilised world must still pass through many wars and periods of war—if it survives the next one! But the trend of thought in this book is similar to that of a number of thinkers and of certain statesmen—namely, that the white races, the civilised races, cannot survive the next great war, perhaps principally on account of the consequent revolutionary chaos in which the West will be submerged. Moreover this war may be so near—unless some preventive is found—that every thought of avoiding it, either by a change of instinct or by moral force, is beyond the bounds of possibility. Russell remarks, in *The Reconstruction of the World* (1915), that the problem we have to solve, if the future of the world is to be less terrible than the present, is the problem of preventing the nations from entering into the same state of mind as existed in England and Germany at the outbreak of the war. If this is the assumption, then the problem of preventing the next war is insoluble. But only two pages later Russell expresses a different opinion when he writes: "If war is one day to cease, we must devise means of attaining the results which are at present achieved by war." This indicates another point of departure. Here instincts, and human nature as a

collection of instincts, are set aside and the ascendancy is given to something which lies within the province and jurisdiction of reason.

We have wished to dwell on this point because it is of supreme importance in the selection of means for preventing the next war. And this is the question at issue. It is a question of postponing the outbreak of the next war until the deep-seated forces—moral, cultural, and psychological—have had time to prevent it. That the races of Europe no longer incessantly make war on each other may be due to the declining influence of the warlike instinct (the war spirit); but above all things it is due to the growth of thought, reason, and experience during a period of development which may broadly be called political, but which has strong economic, social, and other elements. For these reasons this book will not pursue the question either of the changeability or the unchangeability of human nature. These are matters which do not in any way affect the problem as we conceive it. Only by political and economic action can the civilised races be saved from the war upon which future developments appear entirely to depend. This is the thesis which underlies this book. It is its first axiom.

In order to avoid misunderstanding arising from the fact that the ethical and psychological aspects of the problem are not more fully investigated in the following pages it may here be emphasised that the abolition of war cannot bring about the elimination of disputes and conflicts of interest between the nations. The prevention or abolition of war is not possible without possibilities equivalent, though on a different plane, of continued strife and the means of composing it. The struggle for power will always exist. It is only the forms and objects of strife which can be influenced by progress. It is a question,

as William James puts it, of finding a substitute for war. There is reason to believe that there will exist more than enough grounds for strife. The human race is not so stupid that it will not be able to find adequate, methodical, and reasonable expression for its energy and combative spirit without having recourse to massacre and destruction. It would be of the greatest interest if we could determine this equivalent. But this can scarcely be done as yet. It is probable that it is in the main economic. Even if the economic struggle is bitter and tends to become more and more so, it need not necessarily imply economic "war", and it can scarcely under any circumstances lead to such devastation as war in the ordinary sense has always involved, and involves now more than ever.

* * *

This book seeks to show that in spite of certain evident brighter signs in the political field the weapons of a new war are being forged. It does not prophesy when it will break out, especially because it is imperative that the outbreak should be prevented! Evidence of the danger and of the nature of the danger is necessary, however, if both individuals and nations are to feel the instinct of self-preservation so compelling that they rise up to defend themselves; that they revolt and seriously seek to find the lever and hurl their weight upon it.

The nature of modern war is here only described in broad outline. The forms which the developments of modern warfare have assumed are of the greatest importance, especially as a driving force. But we contest the view which ascribes to technical inventions and their adoption by the military arm the character of an effective means for the preservation of peace. Human nature is in this respect without doubt so

plastic that it assimilates the new with comparative ease, however strange it may be, and adapts itself accordingly. This adaptation, this yielding, must be resisted. The nations must once and for all not acquiesce in the hell upon earth which the "Christian" races are now preparing for them. The new and terrible society which is forecast for the future must never come into being. It must be destroyed if humanity is not to go under. This is the second axiom of this book. But when we seek to find the path and the means to this end we are confronted with the most difficult problems. Even among those who seek the same goal, opinions differ widely.

In speaking of war and the new forms it is assuming we should not forget that horror, terror, and anger are easily blunted. Psychological instinct is necessary in order not to overstep the boundary beyond which this dangerous forgetfulness begins. Some books which treat of war begin by counting how many million fallen, how many million wounded or crippled, and how many widows and orphans must be put to the account of the last war. Doubtless terrifying figures. But the fault with them is that they are so terrifying that we are unable to grasp their meaning. Such mass statistics have scarcely any effect at all. We feel—it must be confessed—somewhat indifferent to such figures. They have scarcely more influence than any other cold statistics or mathematics. A town contains so and so many million bricks. In the trenches round the continent of Europe lie so and so many million skeletons of young men. A single case more easily stimulates the imagination and creates impressions which burn themselves into our consciousness. Thus, for example, where the Swede, Gustaf Janson, in his book *Lies*, lets single shots ring out and thereupon draws pictures of homes across the ocean to which the

son or the father will never return because of that shot. Or again, the genius of Zola in *La Débâcle*, when he describes the sufferings, the misfortunes, and the impotent struggles of the French Army of 1870–71 from the angle of view of a few individual soldiers. Or Barbusse, with his half-company in the trenches. And Remarque and Sherriff, with their little bands of comrades representing the whole youthful generation as destroyed — fates which grip us more than the whole tragedy of massed armies, more than the horror of the massed graves, more than battle-paintings and astronomical figures.

Distance in time and space alike blunt the sharp edge of our impressions. To some extent this is already true of the hecatombs of death and destruction in the world-war. If we wish to exercise any influence over men we must treat them as they are—not forgetting their lack of imagination. In order to conjure up a picture of modern war to an unimaginative person—that is to say, to the great majority of men—it would be necessary to place him in an immense dark room in which, by means of a mysterious sound film, he could see and hear what would happen to him or his. He would see himself leaning over the mass of graves, where he would recognise the remains of his own fine boy flung down with a hundred others, and hear himself crazily mumbling his beloved name. Wife and child lying hand in hand under the house destroyed by shell-fire, whilst the sound film, after the crash which shot the whole quarter to pieces, produces shrieks—both those which cease immediately and those which seem never to cease. In one case instant death and in the other death which refuses to come. Or a third picture, in which he recognises himself, though half of his face has been shot away by a splinter so that it retains no human feature, wandering about

amidst surroundings which it can serve no purpose to describe. If Dante alone was able to vivify the medieval conceptions of hell, so also it would require a master to paint a word-picture of modern war. The German, Ernst Toller, like some other post-war writers, has succeeded in Thomas's account of the last war as it was. But we also know what he thinks of the effect on the listener. Much the same as that described by a young English officer when, in bitterness at the fleeting interest displayed in the heroes and victims of the battlefield, he wrote: "I would like to paint a picture for them of a leprous world, strewn with the swollen corpses of young men. The hideous stench of rotting corpses, mingled with the sickening fumes of lyddite. Mud porridge across which the trenches are scratched like fissures. In the shell-holes lie the wounded, beside putrefying bodies. Screaming men in confusion. Mortally wounded, suspended on barbed wire, till a spurt of burning oil from the 'flammenwerfer' mercifully consumes them like flies in a flame." But these were mere words; the reader shuddered a moment, and then forgot all. This is the only terrifying description which occurs in this book. The truth about war as it is must be revealed in spite of all protests, though it is not only fear and horror which will make the nations suppress it.

One of the great gifts of mankind is the power of forgetting. Without that power mankind could not continue to live. But for the gift of forgetfulness we could never listen to the joyous song of life, to the eternal tones of the 'cello resounding through all things. But, on the other hand, it is not impossible, as some have emphasised, that just this ability to forget may occasion the collapse of all that superstructure of civilisation which man has created with the help of the qualities which distinguish him from the animals. It is a fact, which must under no circumstances be forgotten, that the memory of the last war is

already in process of fading away; that this vast frieze is already losing its relief and its definition. At the same time as the network of trenches which extended like a twin belt of death north and south across the greater part of the continent is now ploughed over and yields rich harvests.

An observer who has recently lived among French university students believes he is right in his interpretation of the times when he gives as his impression of them that three-quarters will troop out singing to the aerodromes in order to embark in the planes which will spread death and destruction over the centres of civilisation of Europe. This opinion only strengthens one's impression. But this impression hews in stone the inscription with which this introductory chapter concludes—one which is emphasised by, among others, Lord Robert Cecil, to whom this book is dedicated—namely, the fact that unless the present male generation, while still retaining its recollection of the great tragedy, has sufficient understanding and will to mobilise adequate force and talent to combat war and those who stand behind war, then a further catastrophe must inevitably ensue. The nations will then have to take the consequences. That is another starting-point of this book. It is the third axiom.

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We sketch below the outlines of the politico-military developments which led to the world-war and which are still active. We also deduce the manner in which this development, in combination with military-technical developments, will probably revolutionise warfare and society.

In "Six Danger Points" we further seek to present characteristic features of the present position, and to reflect the forces which, more or less consciously, promote war.

Finally we offer an analysis of the forces which, possibly, may prove strong enough to check existing developments and prevent the outbreak of the next and universal war. There we also seek the line of action of the future battle for a lasting peace and the road to reconstruction.

CHAPTER II

THE GREAT SHADOW

Mr. Lloyd George once succeeded in obtaining a majority of the English people by the slogan "Hang the Kaiser". There is reason to believe that he now regrets it. Even at the Paris Congress, when efforts were made to cool public opinion from boiling-point, he felt the power of his own slogan. In any case it shows how readily and unhesitatingly the post-war mentality shifted the responsibility for what had occurred to an individual or individuals. There was a desire to individualise the responsibility, to discover the villain of the piece. It is not altogether surprising that William II was thought of in this connection. The placing of the sole war-guilt on Germany by the Entente is a similar, more monumental, but in its effect more ominous, attempt to fix in one place the total responsibility for the collapse of world-policy.

Beyond all doubt individuals cannot plead innocent of an active part in the actual outbreak of the war. In this case we can certainly speak of personal guilt. If an international court had existed with executive power, and had passed judgment in this great conflict, we should encounter in the prison-yard for international criminals numerous well-known faces of the pre-war period belonging to highly placed and trusted men. We are not seeking to allot responsibility when we say that possibly we should recognise a larger number from the diplomatic circles of Vienna and Berlin than from other capitals. Indeed, from the statement that the causes of the great crash of 1914 are to be found among the representatives of the Austro-German statecraft of the period, it is a great step to the merest attempt to discover the real causes of the world-war.

At the distance of time in which we now live, and since the smoke of battle has disappeared, even the broader, educated public begins to understand that we are here confronted with a vast chain of causation which history alone can satisfactorily explain. To discover the chain would be tantamount to discovering the red streak running through the historical and spiritual development of Europe throughout the centuries. If in the following schematic and fragmentary inquiry we only concern ourselves with the period since the French Revolution, we thereby restrict our field and leave out of account extensive and important material. That the contemporary causes of the world-war are in part still more remote is clear from the mere mention of the incorporation of the two principalities of Lorraine under Louis XIV, which led in its turn to the occupation by Germany of Alsace and Lorraine, the starting-point and symbol of French *revanche*.

If we do not adhere too strictly to dates it may be said that the XIXth century began and ended in a revolution—the French Revolution in 1789 as an overture, and the Russian Revolution of 1917–18 as an epilogue. What the former signified and still signifies we have had the opportunity to discover since. But not so with the latter. Even if we designate the Russian Revolution as the close of an historical period, we do not deny that it may come to be regarded as the opening of a new period which will be strongly influenced by it. But in any event there is between them a striking analogy. In both cases the course of events was influenced by a foreign invading army—supported and stimulated by emigrant interests directed to the restoration of the old order. In France it was a question of restoring the Bourbons; in Russia the Romanoffs. In the latter case embittered creditors also expect to recover their milliards. These similar and parallel events develop in one and

the same direction. In France the revolution becomes militarised and leads to the introduction of conscription, though incomplete. In Russia, militarism sprang forth like a Jack-in-the-box, supported by those who had just made the revolution in order to end war. In both cases nationalism awoke to life. Just as the revolutionary French militarism set Europe rocking, so also the Russian Revolution stands at the gateway to the future as the most dangerous threat to the present and succeeding generations.

The French Revolution was not at first directed towards war. So much one may venture to assert. At any rate it did not aim at any expansion of power. In so far as it may be regarded as aggressive in character, it did not attack foreign nations, but only the absolute feudal régime which everywhere held the peoples in bondage. It was only later that it became annexionist. Carnot points out in his work *The French Revolution* with what mathematical precision the advance of the revolution towards violence and war corresponded to definite and contemporaneous measures against the republic by the allied princes and *émigrés*. Thus, for example, the storming of the Tuileries, the September massacres, the execution of the king, and the *levée en masse*. When Napoleon characterises the French Revolution as "an idea which formed a million bayonets" we have reason to denounce the causes by which the revolution actually produced so many bayonets. It was not the idea which produced them; they were placed in the hands of those who had the idea as a result of the violence to which it was exposed and of the endeavours to suppress it. When the millions sprang to their bayonets they did so from an imperative demand of which only the pacifist thought of a later age will deny the justice. But that is also the reason why the XIXth century deserves the name

"the century of bayonets". There is reason to nail up this thesis on the wall.

When this transformation of the revolution and of its whole nature had proceeded a certain distance there arose from the uncertainty, the confusion, and the chaos a figure which was to leave its mark not only on the succeeding generation but on the succeeding century at least. Napoleon completes, in the revolution, the transformation which had been so successfully initiated by the emigrant armies and the dynastic interests. Long after the close of his life in the small Atlantic island his shadow rested on Europe. It grew heavier over the generation of the world-war. Napoleon wrecks and crushes the revolution. He poisons its fruits. He restores the tainted feudal despotism. His memory, associated with the victories of French armies on the ancient battlefields of Europe and on new ones, enters into a mystic union with the mentality of the French race, and creates the spirit which may one day prove its undoing. The posthumous Napoleon flits ghostlike through French policy during the whole of the century. Once impregnated with, divided and torn between, royal and imperial legitimacy claims, the French democracy was unable to achieve anything. Even as late as 1852 the mere name was sufficient to lead Napoleon III to the "throne of his ancestors". By his policy and that of his consort he fostered and completed the ominous developments which were simultaneously in progress east of the Rhine. To the French people, with their unexampled receptivity, *la gloire*, which had its origin under Napoleon, became, in the sequel, the glamour of bayonets, of those which until now have kept watch east of the Rhine. During the third republic *la gloire* made many attempts, much more convulsive than successful, to pass from words to deeds. After '71 it fuses with and is stimulated by thoughts

of *revanche*. But all is submerged in the Panama scandal, in the morasses of the Boulanger affair, and in the Dreyfus scandal. Boulanger, *le Général revanche*, Deroulède, and Rochefort are scarcely taken seriously. But the more strongly the undercurrents of the world-war make themselves felt, the more the Napoleonic traditions come to life. The phantom beneath the dome of the Invalides leaves its sarcophagus. French nationalism, nourished on such traditions, sees its dream fulfilled. Maurice Barrès, the foremost regenerator and leader of this nationalism, lived to see the war he wished for lead to the goal which he had dreamt of since his early youth. He lived to see the reincorporation of Alsace-Lorraine, reconciliation with the Vatican, the occupation of the lost bastions in the east, the advance across the Rhine, the revival of the Napoleonic traditions for which one of his forefathers fought in the Grand Army of 1812. He beheld the fall of the enemy and was able to place his foot on his throat. It may be added that the generation of Maurice Barrès is not so old but that it may also live to see that which all Europe at this moment has to fear as a consequence of the peace dictated by men of the Napoleonic tradition. That which in its turn, if fate is unkind, will make France once again the battlefield, and perhaps the graveyard, of all Europe. In this connection we may perhaps view this development against the background of the words of Briand: "Every time France has been isolated and shown its military strength it has brought us misfortune. Waterloo with a Napoleon. Subsequently in a new militaristic age it is again isolated. Sedan!"

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Modern psychology has not seriously interested itself in the psyche of the Great Corsican. His fate has been left for the

most part to panegyrical historians, most of whom were caught like fishes in a net in the spirit of megalomania of the XIXth century. But a scientific analysis would certainly lead to remarkable results, even more significant than those of Lanfrey and Taine. Yet even the latter detect in the brilliant façade and the splendour of external events only boundless ambition, treachery, and demonic violence. The latter discovers in Bonaparte's unparalleled egocentricity an inheritance from the *condottieri* of the Renaissance, from the Corsican brigands. Through his instrumentality these characteristics affected subsequent world-developments. This view finds confirmation in Buckle's opinion that Napoleon's life was one growing attempt to suppress human liberty, and that his immense abilities exhausted themselves in a struggle against the tendencies of a great age. In contrast to Richelieu, Napoleon never had a proper conception of the spirit of his age.

Napoleon, who spent the remaining years of his exile in imagining ideal motives for his actions, has been credited in certain quarters, on the ground of these fictions, with the intention of becoming, in the guise of Emperor, the world's peacemaker. A Napoleonic empire of peace with subject nations. A new *Pax Romana*, a resting on bayonets in an age when the nations were struggling for freedom and when the masses were about to enter on the struggle for equality! In the name of human progress let us be thankful that all this was only revealed in his posthumous papers. It would in all probability have meant for the XIXth century very much the same as the hegemony of Wilhelm, with Ludendorff as promoter, would have meant for ours. On the other hand, it is not impossible that there is reason for the view that the Napoleonic era, extending up to and beyond the world-war, may become the

indirect source of a permanent world-peace in so far as it gave the impulse to a forcible reaction against it.

An investigation into the Napoleonic inheritance will primarily concern itself with two leading motives. Firstly: What was the influence of that inheritance on the shaping of the democracy which emerged from the French Revolution? Secondly: What was its influence on developments in Germany? Both questions are too involved to be more than briefly touched upon here.

If we wish to maintain—with some justice—that modern democracy cannot be regarded as a real guarantor of peace, and if in support of that opinion we point out that the "democratic" age of the XIXth century witnessed more extensive and violent wars than the preceding century, there is reason once again to emphasise the circumstances under which that democracy came into being and which compelled violent armed resistance to the reactionary attempts to destroy it. These must not be forgotten. We should be blind to the relation between cause and effect in history if we did not also understand the significance to the new age of the leadership of a genius such as Napoleon's, with all its defects, during a baptism of blood lasting for more than a decade. At the moment when the world was in the melting-pot—exactly as it was a hundred years later—all that was necessary, as Wells has said, to alter the course of so many things was a noble, creative imagination combined with the genius of a Napoleon. That democracy is to-day what it is may sometimes cause surprise, and the responsibility for the influences to which democracy and the movement for liberation have been exposed during the first stage of their development may be equally divided between the legitimate and princely offensives and the reaction against them which was led by Napoleon.

In referring to the influence of Napoleonic policy on developments in Germany we approach, beyond doubt, an important phase of the complex causes of the world-war. The ramifications of Napoleon's influence, to be seen for example in the consequences of his oppression of Italy, which contributed to the hereditary hatred of Northern Italy for France, cannot be pursued here. (It would take us too far if we were to follow everywhere in modern Europe the tracks of Napoleon's white charger.)

At the beginning of the XIXth century the German nation had, thanks to a number of great poets, philosophers, scientists, and composers, become the spiritual great power of Europe. It will surely be one of the most interesting psycho-historical problems to elucidate the causes of the transition of this spiritual great power—much more important than that of Napoleon—to the new power-worshipping materialistic Germany of Wilhelm II. Russell attributes this transformation entirely to Napoleon's occupation of Prussia and to his oppression of the Prussian people after the victory at Jena.

The disarmed country, insulted by the usurper, still filled with the memory of its military greatness, secretly, as is known, reorganised its defences under the direction of such men as von Stern, Boyen, von Schön, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau. The Hegelian philosophy and Fichte's burning *Address to the German Nation* constitute a ferment in this development which made the national sense of liberty flourish. But the very manner in which the reorganisation of the Prussian fighting forces was effected indicates to some extent the hesitation between two courses: the democratic and the autocratic. Von Stern and von Schön represent the former tendency in this conflict. Gneisenau and Scharnhorst the latter, chosen by the monarch. The significance of the choice appears from Scharn-

horst's words: "The whole nation must learn to understand that the maintenance of the national existence can only be achieved by the maintenance of its national honour." Whose is the ghost? This emphasis on national honour—a comparatively new conception for the people, whether uttered in German or French—was the ominous godparent's gift to the young nation. But one cannot be surprised that the German nation was forced into this path. Napoleon's grip could not be shaken off except by force, or at any rate no other course of action and no other development was conceivable at that time.

Just as the revolutionary ideas of liberty gave way in France to the glorification of honour, thanks to the Caesarian hegemony of Napoleon, who was its personification, so also his treatment of Prussia was the chief cause of the military leanings of Young Germany. During the decades immediately after the wars of liberation the German people were again confronted with the choice. But the seed that was sown and the circumstances in which it grew up were too strong for the spiritual ideals. Henri Bergson writes, in his *Struggle between Life and Matter*, "There came a day when the German people was compelled to choose. How was it to choose?" Bergson synchronises the time of the decision with the appearance of Bismarck. We have already referred to the influence of Hegel and Fichte at the beginning of the process. In them the German philosophy of power has its inception. In his thoughts on the State and its aims and functions Hegel had revived Machiavelli, whose political Jesuitism (we admit that the word does not do him full justice) had been disputed by the philosophers of the *Aufklärung*. In the new Germany, in which philosophers wrangled over conceptions of the State and finally adopted the fundamental dogma of the State as an individual, with its

own power as its object, the Machiavellism doctrine of power again came into esteem.

The Napoleonic statecraft had prepared the way for its appearance in European developments. After Bismarck it became supreme. *Realpolitik*, which until the war was the lodestar of European statesmen and diplomatists, and still is so to a large extent, rests on a Machiavellian foundation, with Napoleon and Bismarck as the archpriests of the doctrine. (History will never forget that he is the originator of the most terrible of all slogans, "Only with blood and iron can the great problems of the age be solved".) But Bismarck gave the doctrine its modern form and ritual. There is need to emphasise here that this Machiavellian *Realpolitik* led France to the deepest humiliation, and Napoleon to St. Helena. And Germany? To the giant Sedan of the world-war and to the Peace of Versailles! To the disintegration of its territory and a burden of debt of an indefinite number of milliards! It led Germany's last ruler to Doorn. And what of Europe, which more or less voluntarily accepted the same policy? This is how the account of XIXth-century policy stands at present. To elucidate what is concealed behind this policy is not the same thing as to refrain from a rational survey of political phenomena. This reservation may perhaps be made in passing.

Bismarck's policy led Germany, via the war with Denmark—which to him had two objects: to create a cause of conflict with his ally Austria, and to "test" the new Prussian army—and the sixty-six years war with Austria, to the victory over France, symbolised by the imperial proclamations in that very hall of mirrors at Versailles which, fifty years later, was to witness the signature to a French peace of *Realpolitik*.

During the Bismarck régime the system of a nation in arms

was perfected. It has survived the great collapse, and the peace of Europe still rests upon it. Its supporters and admirers did not, and do not, perceive that *das Volk im Waffen* signifies the nations in arms against each other. This system is the foundation of the War Society in the modern sense.

It may be objected that Bismarck's policy was inevitable, that Germany without it would never have been united, and that this unity persists. This inevitability is also concocted in the secret laboratories and studies of *Realpolitik* and the philosophy of power. It is an unproved assertion. And what has been the price of this unity, not only for Germany, which was possibly willing to pay it, but for Europe and the world? Bjerre, the well-known Swedish psycho-analyst, says on this point: "A people which can only be unified by war is as fundamentally disrupted as is the man who must commit a crime in order to become conscious of his ego." That is the German position brilliantly stated. United Germany was, in fact, disrupted to the roots. Therein lies the tragedy. And was not this inner disruption the deepest cause of the external defeat? In emphasising Bismarck's "later" peace policy—intended to perpetuate the settlement—we must not forget the "earlier" policy which sowed dragons' teeth in the European vineyard. It was fifty years before the harvest was gathered in streams of blood and a hail of iron.

If, before Bismarck, German thought may be said to have led developments, yet after the great and decisive victories it trailed behind the triumphal chariot. With few exceptions it ceased to inspire and began instead to interpret and explain. Theories and philosophies became a superstructure on practice; the successful Bismarckian philosophy of power led the spiritually live part of the nation to an increasing toleration of the internal suppression and the growing urge to expansion.

After 1870–71, and until the world-war, German thought indulges in orgies of adoration of power, force, and the glorification of war. A host of minor commentators attaches itself to the greater prophets, seeking to outbid the latter. It becomes difficult in this nationalistic conceit to see where the boundary lies between sound thought and complete madness, overflowing with conceptions of force. A fantastic blending of power romanticism, race mysticism, fanaticism, cynicism, and religiosity. Treitschke must certainly be considered one of the thinkers, however indigestible he may appear. Nietzsche (to whose deification of the State and of power they refer, despite the fact that he describes the State as *das kalte Ungheuer* and lets fall the unjust words "so long as Germany expands it destroys culture") does not belong here. At the zenith, or rather the nadir, stand Lasson, Sombart, and General Bernhardi. The book of the latter, *Germany and the Next War*, was in particular of no little importance in determining the attitude of the English nation to Germany. By its brutality it showed, perhaps more clearly than anything else, that Germany was the mighty citadel, and that its garrison was prepared at any moment to overrun the frontiers at a nod from its leaders. Everywhere these developments had dangerous results. Germany sowed the wind and must ultimately reap the whirlwind.

The technical revolution enters at an early stage into these developments. It produces two results. The technical aptitude of the German people leads to a mechanical progress unparalleled elsewhere. It creates German industry and increases economic competition at a murderous pace. The second result is to be seen in the field of military technique. Every scientific or technical discovery which can be employed in war is incorporated in the military machine. German science becomes the faithful servant of militarism. "Spirit and intelligence were

militarised for the perfection of the machinery of murder" (Beneš). Did not everything which made Germany strong, feared, and mighty promote the happiness of mankind, of which Germany was the destined leader? Together with universal conscription, which created the massed armies, this technique made of the German Army a cast-iron monster, to all appearance invincible. When it fell to pieces it was because something went wrong in the clockwork behind the front. The German leaning to mechanisation also created that peculiarly rigid system of military education which almost all nations automatically hastened to copy. This mechanisation was the greatest defect of the German military system. It was just as much mechanised as German policy. It, together with materialism, constitutes the reason why modern war (as appeared of late) has developed into a war of material and production; into war as business, in which the soldier is a cog in a vast machine, a workman who with every possible technical aid exercises his vocation with daily increasing skill. How well does this describe the deep fall of Germany, of Europe, and of mankind.

From this threefold development of Germany—spiritual, economic, and military—springs the Pan-German policy which William II introduced. It manifests itself in different ways. Rarely does it reach the appointed goal. It reaches its undesired goal when in its ὕβρις it succeeds in unifying practically the whole world against it. "From the Skaw to the Adriatic, from Boulogne to Narva, from Besançon to the Black Sea" was one of its slogans. Another drew the limits of German power at Antwerp and Baghdad. There was indeed scarcely a neighbour or a country in Europe which was not affected by this programme of Pan-Germanism.

When the bonds between nationalism, militarism, and

industrial capitalism—the great three—were securely tied the new Germany, guided by weak diplomacy, with an unbalanced ruler at its head, was ready to assume the Napoleonic inheritance as the breaker of the European peace. But perhaps one thing was lacking. God's blessing. Not at all. The Church was ready to give absolution in advance. God's chosen people, with the Kaiser by God's grace, would not be deserted by the Lord of Hosts. But this calculation went wrong all the same. Perhaps the explanation is similar to that given by Victor Hugo of the fall of Napoleon, whose shadow we perceive in this development—"God grew tired of him".

If we look more closely at the silhouette of this great shadow we shall become aware that it is not single. We see the lines of the familiar three-cornered hat, but beside it, and merging with it, another not less characteristic head-dress, the German *Pickelhaube* over a pair of bushy eyebrows.

The developments of the XIXth century did not lead, via Napoleon and Bismarck and through the system of the nation in arms, to the world-war alone. The same policy is still in the main pursued by European statecraft. One may perhaps assert that this development could not be avoided. One thing is certain, and should be writ in large letters: if it continues, the next Great War cannot be prevented.

The problem to be discussed in the next chapter—modern war-psychosis—is the direct outcome of these developments. It must be treated, even if only superficially, in this connection.

CHAPTER III

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARMAMENTS

When a sceptic writes that it is more necessary to find the reasons why the nations sometimes remain at peace with each other than to find the causes of war—an entirely unnecessary task, since they are as clear as day—he is surely propounding a paradox. But nevertheless there is something to be said for the point of view. It is possible that by starting from peace we may achieve a point of view which we should never achieve by the contemplation of war. Possibly it might prove a double task which would only reflect the same object from two different sides.

To say that the causes of war are as clear as day is perhaps a very hazardous assertion. In fact there is scarcely any phase of human life of comparable importance of which we know so little, or which has been the subject of so little systematic investigation, as that of the causes of war. Man has waged war as long as he has existed, but he has found it so natural to do so that it is only in recent times that he has begun to speculate on the causes of war. We do not indeed as a rule reflect why we eat or breathe. Even in the post-war period our attempts to penetrate into the causal connections of war have been very hesitating. We have traversed the ground like an idler who wanders about a country-side which does not specially interest him. Nicolai has written *The Biology of War*. Thinkers have long concerned themselves with the philosophy of war, but usually in a one-sided manner, or else to throw light on other problems, principally on that of the State and its functions. We cannot speak of any really methodical and scientific attempts to examine the complex causes of war.

Science is more or less silent on this subject. It almost seems as if men of science were content to sit in peace over their retorts, their manuscripts, and their integral calculus.

By the progress of psychology, however, we may hope to penetrate into some of the unexplored territory of war. But as yet very little progress has been made in that direction. It is indeed remarkable that ten years after the termination of the Great War no work on the nature of war-psychosis has yet appeared. Bertrand Russell, it is true, has touched on the subject in his works on the reconstruction of the world. Similarly McDougall, but otherwise there remain only white expanses on the map, unexplored continents, where a luxuriant flora of slogans and unproved assertions flourishes.

The attempt we now make to analyse the psychosis of war, its nature and causes, makes no claim to be scientific. We only envisage one phase of the problem, for to seek haphazard the general causes of war is like looking for needles in a haystack. A large part of the hereditary warlike instinct of war in man does not concern us here. The inherent lust of battle may be admitted as a fact, though we must ignore it for the present. This lust of battle—an atavistic inheritance—the instinct to kill and destroy, is doubtless deeply rooted in the animal man, but is probably only liberated by war-psychosis, at any rate in Western man, and it is of him we speak here, and not of people who still dwell in, or on the edge of, the jungle.

In order to understand clearly the human emotions which impel us at certain moments to abandon our usual peaceful habits, and which create, or contribute to the creation of, war, we may endeavour by a kind of spectral analysis to split up these emotions in the same way as we split up white light into the spectrum by means of a prism. If we do so we shall scarcely be wrong in the assertion that the emotions, quali-

ties, or whatever we choose to call them, which are of real importance in an investigation of the real causes of war are the following: acquisitiveness, lust of power, envy, pride, hate, and fear, as well as variations and combinations of these. Suspicion is a variant of fear, vanity of pride. An exaggerated national sense in its extreme form of chauvinism is clearly not fundamental, but is a combination of lust of power, hate, acquisitiveness, and vanity in the guise of exaggerated national pride. On the other hand, the spirit of liberty cannot easily be regarded as an expression of any one of these qualities or of any combination of them.

Having thus exposed the most prominent spectrum—the emotions—we may be permitted for the purpose of our investigation to analyse them into their component parts, and to combine them, by a thought-prism into two main components: the power component and the fear component. The remainder may be co-ordinated with, or subordinated to, these. Hate is the complement of fear. It cannot belong to the power component. The sense of power does not create the sense of hate. The sense of superiority and the sense of inferiority do not blend. Nor can it be doubted that vanity and pride, and especially acquisitiveness, lean towards the power component. Envy may without injustice be ascribed to both. It is found everywhere. An exaggerated patriotism is clearly an extreme result of the power-complex emphasised by chauvinism. The spirit of liberty stands alone.

Without doubt, fear and the sense of power are blended in every individual and in every nation. Everywhere they exist side by side. Both manifest themselves in every rank and class of society. But at the same time it is equally true that their centres of gravity are different. Fear and its complement hate proceed from slavery, through political and social oppression, from un-

certainty as to the conditions of life throughout the chain of development, and they are found principally in the lower classes of society. The real *bourgeoisie*, which in olden times was also comparatively defenceless against attack and against war and plunder, is in this respect near to the lower classes. The sense of power, on the other hand, is inherited especially by the ruling classes, the upper classes. That fear of war has, broadly speaking, been concentrated in the middle and lower classes since the beginnings of civilisation is certain. The peasant has always feared and hated war, as does the workman of to-day.

Among the representatives of power, fear has as a rule been forced into the background. The ruling classes have not avoided war, neither have they feared or hated it. The desire for power has for long been the real psychological impulse to war. Men evidently, as Norman Angell remarks, fought for power, for dominion over subjects, for territory: in a word, for tangible things, for booty in one form or another.

The extraordinarily important change which occurred when fear seriously entered into the equation occurred, curiously enough, just about the time when the democracy made its appearance. When those classes of society which especially feared war because they always had to bear its burdens and experience its sufferings without enjoying its advantages became a factor of power, we might have predicted a reaction, an historical break. But it did not occur. The cause is highly complex. The fact is that war, whilst not diminishing in frequency, thereby increased in extent and intensity. We have already indicated some of the causes of this phenomenon, and we shall now proceed to throw light on the problem from another point of view.

The facts are these. About the same time as democracy

acceded to power in the middle of the XIXth century, technical developments, in combination with the growth of armies, began to complicate warfare. It became increasingly necessary to prepare for war in times of peace. Those preparations, assuming the form of various armaments, army organisations, and fleets, came to be the deciding factors in war. But armaments in the democratic State came to be more or less dependent on the will of the majority. This was true even where theocratic feudal government still survived, as in the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern empires. The power-complex was thus dependent on the fear-complex for its armament preparations in time of peace. Or, to express the matter more simply, the rulers could not obtain the necessary funds for armaments unless they succeeded in awakening the fear of the people.

This is the key to a number of otherwise inexplicable phenomena. It helps us to find a path through the confusing labyrinth of the causes of war. Rulers were obliged, when these changes were stabilised, to take into account national fear. Even if this was not always done consciously—a number of variations are possible, from pure cynicism to honest and convinced patriotism —yet developments among all the European peoples were, until the outbreak of the Great War and until the present day, characterised by this exploitation of national fear. This development is the offspring of the system of the nations in arms.

The system of armaments, which was developed in Europe to breaking-point, has been one of the fundamental causes of the wars of the later XIXth century and of the world-war, and fear must be regarded as the foundation on which the system was built up and maintained. We know that the reciprocal effects of fear and armaments, armaments and new fears, constituted a kind of cage in which all Europe tramped

around looking in vain for an opening to escape. When it was unable to find one it could only increase the tempo until it became so rapid that nations and Governments lost all sense and reason. It was impossible to distinguish any longer the wires of the cage. It was no longer possible to distinguish cause from effect. Fear was the fundamental cause of armaments, and these in their turn became the fundamental cause of the persistence of fear. There is nothing new in this statement.

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In the competition in armaments between Germany and France in the second half of the XIXth century, when every army corps, every new cavalry division, every new invention on one side of the Rhine was countered by an equivalent on the other side—even though France fell behind somewhat in this military marathon—we have the clearest proof of this thesis. That the idea of *revanche* also played an important part after the war of 1870–71 does not alter the situation. It only created and fostered fear in Germany. It may indeed appear that the German nation was not inspired by fear, but this emotion was only camouflaged by bravado and by rattling of the sabre. If fear had not dwelt deep in the recesses of the German mind, and if Germany had not felt in the depths of its soul that retribution was at hand by inevitable law, it could scarcely have been driven along the path chosen by its rulers. The sensations of power and of fear form in this case a peculiar alloy. Before the war the current saying in Germany, "Better an end with terror than terror without end", is eloquent of the real position.

The relations between Germany and England at, and after, the turn of the century reveal similar features. Until then England had regarded France as its real enemy: a conception

supported by history and tradition. In addition there was also the colonial jealousy which culminated in the Fashoda incident of 1898. The countries were at that moment on the brink of war. But France was compelled finally to yield to the Empire.

But German industry becomes a world-power. When it entered upon its imperialistic development, supported by the growing power of Germany, it cut across the trade-routes of England. Then England's fears awakened. With the adoption by the ruling powers, and by the Kaiser himself, of the Tirpitz naval policy, the acute stage was reached. Hitherto England, with its overwhelming navy, and Germany, as the strongest Power on land, had scarcely had any occasion to fear attack. But the whole picture was transformed when Germany began to arm at sea. English imperialism was now in a position to represent the German threat at sea as a threat to the British Isles. The rulers, in their fear for their world-wide dominion, were enabled—and with some justice, as events showed—to enlist the support of the English nation through its fear of being starved and of losing its status. This fear might be converted into new naval armaments. That German financial circles also understood the danger of the new naval policy appears, among other things, from a letter from the German financier, Schwabach, to one of the Rothschilds, in which he says: "For financial and other reasons it is desirable that naval armaments should be curtailed or slowed down. But this is so extraordinarily difficult that we may well describe it as impossible." The attempts which were made to find a *modus vivendi* foundered on the opposition of the imperialistic forces in both countries. On both sides of the North Sea, as on both sides of the Rhine, these forces succeeded in nourishing and fanning into flame that fear in each of the peoples which was the necessary foundation of their policy and of their interests

The growing German imperialism, economic and military, led to a *rapprochement* between England and France, out of which grew the Entente. It forced England to feverish efforts, in the years immediately preceding the war, to strengthen its naval arm and to increase its fighting power. Nothing else could be done. The process had gone too far for any reaction or settlement to be possible. No other development was conceivable than the one chosen. It led dynamically to the catastrophe in Germany, England, and France. What happened in Serbia was only secondary, even though it was earlier in time and was the spark in the powder magazine.

Similarly in Russia fear existed, though there was no occasion for it, and was directed—after Bismarck's pro-Russian policy had ceased—towards Germany. Russia knew its comparative weakness. But in Russia the rulers had another ground of fear. Fear of the internal enemy affected the armaments of the country in so far as its rulers always had in view the necessity of distracting the attention of the people by means of war from disorder and dishonesty in the Administration and from the criminality of the political system. That the colossus should have inspired fear in its neighbours was quite natural. But where was the driving force for its famous desire for expansion, and its threat to its neighbours? Was it perhaps to be found in the ninety million poor peasants? Was it in the so-called people? They had no interests in new conquests and they feared war, but they obeyed the orders and ukases of the "little father". But whose orders did the "little father" obey? Those of the grand dukes, the generals, the diplomats, the popes, the bureaucrats, Society, and the *salons*.

Since the war so much has been written and such strong language has been used about armaments that it is doubtful whether anything really pertinent can still be said on the

subject. But those statements which help to draw the veil from the heart of the machinery have great value. Kenworthy's words on the British Admiralty, quoted below from his book *Will Civilisation Crash?* are of this kind. "It is necessary that the position and influence of this department should be understood. For three hundred years the English nation has been educated by unceasing propaganda to believe that its future is on the sea, that its bread and butter depend on the power of the Navy, and that only an overwhelming fleet can guarantee England's prosperity and even its existence. During the reaction after every war the Admiralty has found it difficult to secure the necessary means from an empty Treasury to maintain this supremacy. In order to obtain grants from Parliament it has been necessary to point to a threat to England's sea power. At the beginning of the century it was France. Yesterday it was Germany. Who will it be to-day? During the years after the Armistice, as to-day, the Admiralty automatically pointed to America, the strongest sea Power, as the possible enemy. The policy of the Admiralty is simplicity itself. Its sole object is to maintain a fleet in being which will be in a position to defeat any rival. The collective sense of the Admiralty singles out America as the rival. It required the whole force of the British Government to compel the Admiralty to participate at all in the Disarmament Conference in Washington in 1921, and it is a fact that the Admiralty as a rule is in a position to impose its will on any English Government." The author then continues to develop his view that this policy of the English Admiralty will, sooner or later, with the assistance of the Admiralty and the Big Navy Party in the U.S.A., lead to the "unthinkable" war between England and America. Exactly the same thing is going on in a more or less pronounced form all over the world. The system must lead to the conse-

quences which Earl Grey of Fallodon indicates when he says in this connection: "Fear passes into suspicion and distrust of all parties, so that every Government regards it as a criminal betrayal of its own people not to take prudent steps, whilst every other Government regards all such steps as evidence of hostile intentions."

The system leads to the great dilemma which appears in the words of Earl Grey—namely, that it is considered criminal not to make the necessary military preparations, though at the same time we now know by experience that these very measures collectively result in what States and Governments signatory to the Kellogg Pact declare to be a crime—war. It is clear that there is something in all this which is contrary to human reason. That this system must be abolished is the only conclusion we can draw. We state our opinion already now that it cannot be abolished by the abandonment by certain peace-loving States of their defensive armament. We shall state the reasons for this view later.

On the outbreak of war (conceived not as a moment in time, but as a period during which thoughts of war accumulate) it is possible to distinguish two different psychological stages: the stage before war is regarded as inevitable and the stage when its inevitability is accepted (even though it is not possible, of course, to define these stages and though there is a constant fluctuation of mood and opinion). In the first stage fear is clearly in evidence, and preponderates. It seizes practically the whole of a civilised nation. Uncertainty and fear in the presence of a monster whose features are imagined but not known. At the moment when we are confronted with the inevitable, the mysterious transformation takes place. Other emotional forces assume the leadership, and disguise or decrease our fear. The deep-seated inherited war-instincts

break through the thin shell with which peace has covered them. Fear passes over into hate and frenzy. We surely make a mistake when we so commonly say that the urge to war, the lust of battle, is highly developed in modern civilised peoples even in peace-time. It seems more correct to say that it is liberated on the outbreak of war; that it is only then that it appears in all its force, and that it only becomes dangerous when it is developed in war-psychosis. This is important, for we must consequently seek before all else the causes of war-psychosis instead of seeking the broader causes of war.

Everything seems to point to the fact that fear is the strongest emotional element in this psychosis. When it takes possession of the masses they also move towards war. But it does not take possession of them unassisted. It is the constantly recurring statement that the masses, the nation as a whole, desire war which has not been reduced to its proper value. In this respect the unorganised masses are abandoned, willy-nilly, to what we may call—with McDougall—"organised opinion within the nation". It is this which gives the signal, and sounds the attack. It is this which finds expression in the greater part of the Press. It is the representatives of organised opinion who speak in clubs, at meetings, and in restaurants. They are more or less disguised tools. If we would compile statistics—which we cannot—of the cases in history in which what is called "the people" has cried out for war or has forced its Government to declare it, we should certainly make some remarkable discoveries. "The Parliament of the Street" would probably be found to have consisted of persons who are certainly not otherwise included in it—with the exception of hooligans, who may easily be induced to fraternise for war, or who are always present when there is trouble in the air. The real masses of the people are not represented there. In the first place the

peasants are not to be found in the streets and market-places of the towns, where war-psychosis first spreads. And the working classes? Neither in 1870 nor in the Crimean War in 1854 is there any proof that it really was the people which originally wished for war. Between the people and the Governments there existed even then groups which understood how to whip up the chauvinists and the shriekers. As Kenworthy says: "If suitable appeals are made to turn the mind of the masses to war, and if the right slogans are scattered abroad at the right moment, the masses will want to fight." But who makes these appeals? The same persons who everywhere in Europe's imperialistic countries—and also in others—appeal to and create fear in the hearts of the people. The same persons who so arranged things that the danger became real. So long as these persons retain influence the result will be the same. Fear will become war-psychosis, and by means of the latter it will be possible to develop the warlike instincts in the name of anything whatever. At that moment it is only necessary to wave a two- or three-coloured rag from any balcony. The intermezzo between Bolivia and Paraguay in December 1928, when war was imminent, affords a classical example of how these things are done. We only need to read the telegrams of the most anxious days; they are like illustrations to our text.

It is a common mistake in discussions on the abolition of war not to pay sufficient attention to war-psychosis. Once set in motion it is the most powerful force in existence. Pacifism does not appear to take much notice of it. To seek to measure mankind with a yardstick of peace when mankind is afflicted with war-psychosis may lead to fatal errors. It is nations suffering from war-psychosis which have hitherto considered treaties as scraps of paper and which have torn them to shreds without scruple. In times of peace the public can read the newspapers

and their headlines, even if they are two inches high, with a certain amount of criticism. We reflect whether they are exaggerated or not. But during war-psychosis our capacity for reflection vanishes. The headlines become trumpet-calls and drum-beats. We are no longer able to distinguish between lies, fiction, and reality; and it is the Press itself, demanding sensation at any price, which is first smitten with war-psychosis and then infects public opinion.

The great military apparatus resembles a trembling motor with its immense flywheel, the rotations of which increase in tempo as the decisive moment approaches. Automatically it casts aside the forces making for peace in order that strategic interests shall not be neglected. Fear in the people—now under the influence of war-psychosis—and in the Government is now converted into anxiety lest the military machine should fail to function, lest the strategic calculations should go amiss. All thought becomes strategic. The process is thus completed —as we can clearly see from the black week in August 1914— and nothing remains to be done. *During those fateful days Germany was obliged to make use of every hour to protect itself against the system which it had itself organised in Europe.* In a single week, in a few short days, the developments of a whole century were concentrated and reflected. The position is in the main still the same. Europe still reposes on a bed of strategic calculations, and if war-psychosis breaks out anew the system will develop a similar eruption.

And what of war-psychosis on the outbreak of war in this age of gas and air attacks? Will the prospect of a war of technique, with the air arm and poisonous gases developed to the highest point, and the fact that war is directed against the whole population, prevent future war from fear of the consequences? It may appear so. But we are sceptical of this hope.

If events take their course as in the past, and armaments continue to grow with the sole difference that the centre of gravity is gradually shifted to the air and to chemical warfare, then to all appearances the added fear which will result from these developments will only form the foundation of a more intense war-psychosis and of greater violence. Major-General Ashmore, in *Air Defence*, published in the autumn of 1929, expresses his opinion that owing to air armaments and the danger they will cause to the population, "the decision for or against war will be made in a calmer atmosphere than heretofore, to the great advantage of the chances for peace". We do not, for the reasons stated, agree. The eminent officer appears to have entirely overlooked the part played by fear in the great aggregate of war-psychosis before the outbreak of war. In another place we shall return to another conclusion of his work.

Further, the rapidity with which the air arm strikes cannot fail to increase and intensify war-psychosis. If in the past it was of primary importance for the military command to seize the initiative, this will be ten times more necessary when the decision lies with the mobilised air squadrons. If hitherto it has been a question of days, it will in future be a question of hours or minutes. The expression "press a button", which has hitherto been used of the setting in motion of the cumbrous machinery of mobilisation, will in future relate principally to the rush into the air of the air squadrons and the immediate commencement of air operations. Those who bear the military responsibility will be able to say that if they delay a single hour all will be lost. And when war-psychosis has been nourished by accumulated fear, the people may demand that the air weapon shall operate at once in order that they may have a chance of escaping catastrophe. There will

scarcely be any reflection as to whether or not anything will be gained by doing so.

From these new dispositions we can only expect that the war-psychosis developed in the XIXth century, and especially typified at the outbreak of the world-war, will be intensified. The structure of modern society, the nervous life and the restless energy of the great cities, the desire for sensation, the Press, the whole of the discontent of modern man in modern society—all these furnish an impulse and magnify the risks. It is important not to undervalue the importance of these factors, however irrational and indeterminate they may be, in judging the prospects of war and peace and the strength of the defences of civilisation.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW STRATEGY

The study of war and warfare is now in all countries undergoing a process of crystallisation.

In consequence of the pronounced conservatism of military thought this process is a very slow one, not least owing to the method of study. For ten years past, the vast mass of experience derived from the world-war has been sifted. We sit and examine details with a magnifying glass instead of following developments as a whole or attempting to discover the great chain of causation. It is like looking at a picture through a microscope. In those quarters in which every effort to lift a corner of the veil over the future is resisted and attention is directed only to the present, it is not understood that the beginnings of great transformations have never been discovered or even suspected by such a method; that the real significance of events can only be revealed by a wider view, by the logically creative imagination. Such an imagination perceives clearly that the motives now shaping developments are so strong that they must take a certain direction. It is these motives which require elucidation. There is much truth in the statement of the American General Mitchell, concerning air power, that development must be regarded from the future and not from the past. Not that which has happened, but that which may be expected to happen, must be the foundation of judgment. General Mitchell's remark presents a phase of the problem different from that already referred to by Major-General Ashmore, who says: "There is no necessity for us to go out into the distant future to look for the problems in air defence; present and near-future conditions provide plenty of

scope for our efforts." The American and the English general evidently represent two different schools of thought and practice. We agree with the former that a broad view of developments as a whole is necessary to a sound judgment in this question. Where do we at present stand? What does the future hold?

The system of the army *en masse*, which coincides with the latter half of the XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth, led to a form of warfare which in its latest manifestations occupied four years without mass strategy accomplishing any clear decision. Only at the end of this period did the reactions of the war—i.e. not the strategy itself—produce in some of the belligerent countries such a physical and psychological exhaustion of the people that it was possible to impose peace. This kind of warfare led not only to the loss of millions of lives but also to material and economic destruction beyond measure. And this destruction fell on both sides. America, which was only present during a part of the hostilities, escaped for that reason these consequences. We know these facts.

Even if, in a future war, the political grouping is different, this form of warfare—in a European explosion—can scarcely have any other result. The great nations in arms would then, as now, be able to pack their frontiers with men and machines, with mighty armies extending from sea to sea. The stultification of strategy, a phenomenon of which the first serious symptoms were revealed in the Russo-Japanese War, appeared in the last war a few months after the outbreak of hostilities. In the next war the fixed front will immediately and purposely be developed by the army which finds itself unable to take the offensive. The marshals will have even more effective and powerful technical means than they had before for stabilising their front. And where strategic encircle-

ment is excluded, the possibility of setting the front in movement will depend upon breaking through. But during the world-war the machinery of attack was only able to effect more or less insignificant tactical inroads in the enemy's front. There is very little prospect—even with considerable developments in the use of the tank—that there will be any new method which will make the strategy of exhaustion more successful than it was when it was last employed with such terrific losses. There exists no door in the wall of the armies of millions, and if we wish to hack one through it is such a slow process that, warned by the blows of the axes, the defenders will have time to build a new wall in the rear, and if necessary two or three. With the great development of transport of troops by motor there is a very small prospect that in future a break-through will achieve better strategical results.

But the essence of warfare is movement. With a clear perception that by movement alone can the military forces advance to the objective of which the possession or destruction will enforce peace, the leaders of armies have, except during certain periods, striven for movement, for speed. Nowadays movement has been made more or less impossible by the growth in the size of armies and by technical developments. There are, and there will be, exceptions, but the science of warfare does not, and cannot, construct its principles on exceptional conditions. European strategy must envisage European war. If it fails to do so it ignores the political foundations on which it rests. It would appear that this motive—the *necessity of movement*—is already strong enough to produce a deviation from the XIXth-century tradition of land strategy.

In what direction will this motive—taken by itself—compel developments? What will be the probable direction of the deviation?

If we seek to answer this question we must clearly understand that the mass army comes into being only after mobilisation and concentration—measures which, in an army of millions, cannot be pressed into a period of less than a week or two. The minimum limit has already been reached. But with the probability of rapid motor transport a means is at hand whereby forces fully prepared, but limited in strength, may be hurled at an enemy who still attempts to achieve victory by the enormous weight of masses. If not protected by invulnerable fortresses the assault of these masses may be delayed or prevented. This circumstance gives us a glimpse of two stages in future land warfare. The first is characterised by the throwing out of large, strategically independent advance-guards by motor. The second consists of the assembling of further forces in the rear. There is reason to believe that developments in land warfare will follow this course in order that freedom of movement may be restored and that the attack may recover the superiority which in principle belongs to it. In an incomplete form we can see this development in the fully-prepared parts of the French Army and the small, select, mechanised army of the Germans. So far as land forces may be assumed to prove decisive in the next war there is reason to believe that the procedure here sketched out will be characteristic.

Spengler, the German prophet of power, expresses his views on the military developments which he expects, in the second part of *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*: "By the calling up of the armies during the four years of the world-war, conscription, which originated in the French Revolution, and which is in principle revolutionary, has been superseded. Instead of massed armies we shall in future have professional armies, consisting of volunteers and professional soldiers. New tech-

nique and new tactics will be brought into play against each other."

We are, however, confronted by another strange phenomenon which Spengler did not appreciate. At the very moment when the manner of warfare of a certain period reaches the peak of development and becomes rigid, new elements, transforming and destructive, develop out of the "technical revolution". Technique, which itself so largely contributed to the culmination of strategy, simultaneously prepares, through the conquest of the air, entirely new lines of development.

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Before we draw our conclusions from the latest contribution of the technical revolution to warfare we must again dwell for a moment on the strategy which at the beginning of the XIXth century represented a codification of Napoleon's experience.

This strategy premised three objectives in war, in the following order: the armed forces of the enemy; the territory of the enemy; the will of the enemy. Without doubt this order of importance of the strategic objectives has been correct up to the present. Even if, as is immediately apparent, the third objective—the will of the people—includes the two former, yet in the preliminary developments the fighting forces on land and sea were maintained as a shield to protect this will. Without crushing or subduing these fighting forces it was impossible seriously to influence the will of the enemy. But if the shield was broken and the rifle struck out of his hand, then as a rule his will collapsed also.

The English military writer, Captain Liddell Hart, has criticised Clausewitz on the ground that he did not, by a

different valuation of the strategic objectives, emphasise more the will of the people as the first objective in war. This criticism is perhaps not altogether just, but on the other hand we may endorse the view of the English writer that the whole picture is now radically changed, and that the world-war was in part responsible for the change. Neither opponent on that occasion succeeded in directly penetrating the shield, or in striking the rifle from the hand of the other. And as this became evident, the will of the people became the objective of war. A new kind of warfare then began: the battle on the home front, energetic and systematic propaganda, German submarine campaign versus English blockade, hunger and starvation. And to achieve a decision, which despite all these methods tarried all too long, the Entente resolved on the campaign of 1919—which never took place, as the fruit was ripe—to bring the war to an end by attack from the air on the undefended towns and industrial centres of Germany. *This decision—to make war on the whole population behind the front —is the most important experience of the world-war.* It introduces a new epoch in war and the science of warfare. Already there were glimpses of a new strategy, aimed at the heart of a country and its population, over the head of armies and navies, over the thousand-mile fronts, over the minefields, and over the blockade.

Military thought cannot fail sooner or later to draw the ultimate conclusions from the logic of developments. That it is slow to do so is due not only to its conservatism but also to the peculiar character of the new phenomenon whereby the modern science of war is enabled to set in motion forces which may threaten the existence of the whole military system. But nothing can prevent the transformation of strategy, and if there is a new competition in armaments the centre of gravity will

be transferred to the air, to the aerial arm, and to the fighting services which support it. To draw conclusions on the basis of the present-day situation, of the present magnitude of the air arm, of present budgets in different countries, of the present relation between expenditure on armies, navies, and air forces, is absolutely foolish. Budgets are effects and not causes. If we regard this transformation as the consequence of a long chain of causes there is nothing at all fantastic in assuming, in a not too distant future, air fleets consisting of thousands of machines instead of the present hundreds, despite the growing cost of every single modern instrument.

There is little use in speculating how much time the transformation will require, for it is purely guesswork. But if, nevertheless, we should hazard a guess we should say that perhaps ten years will elapse before the new conditions will be fully recognised, and another ten years before the transformation is complete. Towards the middle of the century, therefore, if the course of development remains the same, the great age of the air fleets will be reached.

These are the outlines. But the proof is by no means complete. Further details, derived from a study of the influence of the new arm on the operations of armies and navies, are necessary. Especially important, as being the most characteristic feature of the new strategy, is nevertheless the possibility of attack on the vital centres of a country.

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What, then, is our thesis?

It is that supremacy in the air will decide the issue of a European war, and that the possession of such supremacy is the same thing as general military supremacy. At the present

moment this is not altogether true. As regards certain countries it will be true in the future only in a modified form.

In order to throw light on the new situation as it affects armies, we must revert to our starting-point, to the mass army, and survey the question from the air perspective. At first the army, especially the army of millions, is dependent, as is well known, on a developed railway network for its mobilisation and concentration.

There appears to be no reason to suppose that an enemy possessing supremacy in the air would be able to prevent or seriously to oppose mobilisation. Difficulties might be created, but we have reason to assume that the dispositions for mobilisation, with the assistance of large-scale motor transport, would on the whole operate even during an attack by a superior air force. In this case no decisive influence might be expected from the air weapon.

The concentration of an army is effected in a certain direction or directions determined by the strategical situation. In order to effect it with the rapidity which has hitherto been necessary, concentration requires a mighty volume of railway transport, day and night, along the lines leading to the battle-front. These lines are worked to the utmost. Easily discovered as they are, they must constitute an important objective of attack to superior air forces. There may be some doubt as to their vulnerability, but for our own part we believe that it is considerable, and that if the lines of concentration are to be defended against attack from the air the necessary defences would have to be so extensive as to be impracticable. It is scarcely possible to prevent a superior air force from hindering the concentration of troops, if it is systematically employed for that purpose.

But the railway system serves in a double capacity. It is

also primarily responsible for supplies. If these are not secured, a modern army is of no more use than a walking-stick. It is not worth while even assembling it unless sufficient quantities of various supplies can be furnished. And supply in this case means mass supply—and regular mass supply. Even if the supply service does not burden the railway system as much as does the transport of troops for concentration, yet the apparatus behind the great army is, nevertheless, enormous. Judging by the calculations of the French Colonel Culman, the transport requirements of twelve divisions amount to 3,000 railway trucks and 4,000 motor conveyances in constant movement behind the front. A real mass army of 60 divisions would require for its maintenance 15,000 railway trucks and 20,000 motor-lorries. If, with Culman, we add a further 6,000 railway wagons and 5,000 motors for operative movements of troops, we arrive at a total transport material of 20,000 railway trucks and 25,000 motors for an army of this dimension. One must be singularly lacking in imagination if one does not realise what, in a short time, in spite of all protective measures, the position will be behind such a front when a superior air force attacks it day and night. One must possess very little insight into the foundations of operative success if one believes that under such circumstances this massed army could retain its value as a real instrument of war.

But this is not all. The belligerent who loses the supremacy of the air must be regarded as blind in comparison with the belligerent who retains it. With aerial reconnaissance—the strategic telescope—broken in his hands, the modern general is playing at blind-man's buff. Cavalry may do its best until the horses stampede; it cannot—save under exceptional circumstances—affect matters either way, especially against a quick mechanical opponent. The mass army under these con-

ditions is helpless and blindfolded. For this reason alone it is more or less doomed, and can in no case proceed to a decisive and victorious offensive.

At this point we should pause to consider the fourth factor upon which the mass army is dependent, the apparatus of industrial production (war industries); but this cannot be done with advantage until we have noted certain circumstances in the next chapter. For the present we merely point out that even if the organisation is perfect it will be of little avail unless there exists behind the army an immense and intact industrial organisation capable of supplying all the requirements of the army in respect of ammunition, arms, etc. If this organisation functions badly, or ceases to function altogether, the mass army is again no more than a walking-stick. The "industrialisation" of war is not an empty word. General Herr estimates that the French artillery alone in 1917 consumed 9,000,000 tons of cast steel. This figure gives some idea of the magnitude of the issue.

We may, in this connection, pay attention to the words of the former chief of the Italian Air Force, Giulio Douhet, in the course of a polemic with Admiral Bernotti. "If", he says, "we assume, like Admiral Bernotti, that it is possible, by means of the air force, to prevent the strategic advance of the mass army, to restrict its freedom of operation, to destroy large centres of population and industry, to damage flying-bases, ports, etc.—all of which are operations easily conducted without risk, once supremacy of the air has been acquired, of active counter-measures by the enemy—then it must be clear as day that an army or a navy will suffer very heavy losses from the moment that its air force is defeated." General Douhet is certainly right. The only comment we make on his remarks is that they are not sufficiently strong, for it is not only, as he

says, a question of very great losses when air supremacy is lost. All the circumstances above referred to—the difficulties of concentration, of maintenance, supply, and reconnaissance, in fact the total weakness and inferiority in all these decisive functions—lead us to the conclusion that the army which loses supremacy in the air loses at the same time its ability to initiate successful operations against an enemy who retains that supremacy. In plain language, *an army which is really inferior in the air is useless as an instrument of war, and the strategy which is based on it is abortive.*

So much for operations on land. It is more difficult clearly to demonstrate the extent to which the activity of the naval arm is restricted by inferiority in the air. There appears to be general agreement that it is not affected in the same manner or to the same extent as are the land forces. But even so, the influence of the air force is considerable. An air force which possesses supremacy can threaten the naval bases of the enemy and can force a navy to keep at sea. In spite of their air defences, depots and workshops can also be damaged or destroyed. But above all things, as in the case of the land forces, the supremely important function of aerial reconnaissance is destroyed and the admiral in command is stricken with a strategic "cataract". The smaller craft—the naval cavalry—cannot take the place of aerial reconnaissance. The belligerent who can most rapidly survey the disposition of the opposing forces will be able to concentrate for an attack. This is the decisive point. The importance of aerial reconnaissance does not appear to have been sufficiently noted by "Neon" in *The Great Delusion*, in which he attempts to show that the importance of the air arm has been exaggerated.

Even though we cannot speak with the same certainty of the influence of air supremacy on operations at sea, yet there is

reason to suppose that here also the new weapon will revolutionise warfare in so far as *lost supremacy in the air may prevent the use of the naval forces in their essential functions.*

Both on land and sea, supremacy in the air will be a condition precedent to strategic success, or, as we expressed it before, *supremacy in the air will decide the issue of a war.*

What are the consequences? They are evident. That so far as this truth is recognised, preparations for war will in the future be directed to the maintenance of supremacy in the air, at any rate so far as the great armed States are concerned. Present-day air armaments must be regarded as a beginning and nothing more.

The critical reader will, however, at this stage ask himself: Can supremacy in the air really be obtained?

It is certain that any division of the air forces between the army and the navy, or for offensive, defensive, or local purposes, would involve the loss of supremacy if the enemy maintained his forces undivided. The most important principle of strategy, the concentration of force, must also apply to the air. Sooner or later division leads to disintegration. The suggestion to establish local air-defence forces appears, therefore, to be idle talk. Can England, for example, create air squadrons not only for the protection of London but also of other great vulnerable centres and of sensitive industrial areas, and at the same time maintain fighting forces sufficiently strong to retain the initiative in an aerial war against a Continental Great Power? The idea is fantastic, and the opinion of General Ashmore that by defending London he practically defends the other great centres of England seems not convincing. General Douhet, whom we have already quoted, is clearly right in his opinion when he insists on the necessity for concentrated action by the air arm. For no other

weapon is this principle of such importance as for the newest one.

To the question whether it is possible to obtain supremacy in the air, General Douhet answers unhesitatingly "yes". Even if we are willing to bow to his authority, yet we cannot omit one reservation. Douhet appears to contemplate the possibility of obtaining air supremacy by surprise attacks on the permanent air bases of the enemy, by destroying them or seriously damaging them. But there is reason to doubt whether this will be possible in the future. So soon as strategy takes this possibility into account all countries will take steps to prevent it. The protection of the air bases will be their first care. For centuries fortresses were built round the central depots. In proportion as it is realised that a decision in war depends on wresting the supremacy of the air from an enemy, no nation will run any risks as regards the defences of its air bases. These will become strongly fortified places, furnished, as far as technical science will permit, with bomb- and gas-proof underground shelters for the squadrons and workshops upon which this arm depends. This development is already in progress. We have no right, it would seem, to assume that in the future it will be possible to destroy the enemy air force by attacking it in its den; just as little, indeed, as it has been possible for the navies to base their strategy on the capture of the enemy fleet as the English captured the Danish fleet in 1807.

The battle in the air remains, therefore, the means of obtaining supremacy.

There is no practical experience to support this opinion, but the view is held that it is possible to bring about a battle in the air if both parties desire a decision. We are justified in assuming that aerial reconnaissance will devise, if it does not

already possess, methods of avoiding error even in the great spaces. One cannot be positive, but strategy must more or less build on hypotheses. For our part we do not doubt that between opponents, both of whom seek the offensive, battle will be joined in the air somewhere on the line which joins the objectives which both air fleets seek to attain, most probably in the line joining the two capitals. Air strategy in this respect will scarcely modify the strategy which has almost always hitherto led to a decisive battle somewhere on the same line. Sooner or later battle will assuredly be joined in the air.

If we interpret the air experts correctly they would seem to be in accord that when the air fleets come into conflict, and the battle in the clouds is joined, the issue will be completely decisive so far as the flying-arm is concerned. The vanquished will have a very poor chance of escaping from this battle with a whole skin. In the air everything appears to depend more or less on one card to an even greater extent than was the case in battles at sea, though at sea the decision between victory and defeat usually depends on one throw of the dice. Whilst armies may struggle for months and years with varying success, yet a day or a part of a day may be sufficient to decide the fate of even the strongest fleet. The famous battles of Trafalgar and Tsushima were fought in a few hours only, and in the Battle of Jutland it was only special circumstances which prevented the destruction of one or other of the opposing fleets. "Unless the weather prevents it," says the German Hauptmann Ritter, the author of *Der Luftkrieg*, "a battle in the air will always end in complete victory or complete defeat." The former signifies supremacy in the air, and the latter the loss of such supremacy, and nobody can successfully maintain that supremacy, once lost, can be recovered

by new formations. The rapidly ensuing consequences of defeat would prevent it.

Whether we consider that the decision in the air will take the form of a strategic battle, or whether such decision is postponed because one side avoids battle and awaits an opportunity for an ambush, it may be said that the air fleet which assumes the offensive will be able to station itself in the neighbourhood of its objective—whatever it may be—before the army has even begun to mobilise and before the fleets have been able to accomplish anything. It would show a poor sense of reality to suppose that the party superior in the air would on the threat of war wait for the opponent to make the necessary preparations. The supremacy of the air will be obtained by the party which can wrest it from the enemy at the earliest moment after the outbreak of war. The influence of this supremacy will therefore make itself felt in all its force from the very beginning of the war.

This conclusion brings us to a decisive point.

The air force can begin operations against the vital parts of a country before the other arms are able to effect anything. *This is primarily due to the superior capacity of the air force for quick strategic concentration.*

If the above lines have been read with attention, and if it has been noted how under all circumstances the side which is inferior in the air is restricted in its operations or is unable to operate at all, it must be clear what an additional weight is thrown into the scales in favour of the superior air power. These combined circumstances cannot fail to exercise a decisive influence on strategy, and we are therefore justified in speaking, with other writers, of a new strategy.

It depends on circumstances which objectives the superior air force will select—great cities, industrial centres, communica-

tions, naval bases, etc. It may happen that the civil population will have a shorter respite where the armed forces are organised in peace-time for immediate battle, as in that case the enemy would be compelled to attack them immediately during concentration. Such a procedure is unnecessary against the old-fashioned mass army, for there is plenty of time to reach it and its communications. There is much to indicate that air strategy will in the first place contemplate direct attack on the large fixed objectives, especially the large centres of population.

Systematic air strategy differs from land and sea strategy in that the former, where operations against fixed objectives are concerned, can go into much greater detail. The manner of attack can be determined years before the outbreak of war, and the details of the attack can be fixed, just in the same way as, in the past, in attacks on fortresses.

As regards attack on fixed objectives, the result will finally depend upon whether the air arm can achieve tactical decisions against them, or, to express the matter differently, upon whether it is able to compel defensive measures. Such an investigation, however, requires a chapter to itself.

As a conclusion to this outline of future developments in war and strategy, in which the starting-point was the choice between mass army strategy and small army strategy, we may fitly adduce a fragment of a discussion between General von Seeckt, formerly Chief of the German Army, and the French General Castelnau. General von Seeckt had expressed the view that the day of the mass army was, for technical, economic, and, in the case of some countries, political reasons, over. He referred to the last war of exhaustion, and emphasised the fact that it did not lead to a victory which was worth the sacrifices. General Castelnau replied that every battle, whether of hours,

days, or years, necessarily constitutes a period of exhaustion by which the way is prepared for a decision. He sees in the four years of war only a preparation for the final, irresistible Entente offensive of the summer and autumn of 1918, which did not need to be driven home owing to the Armistice. The view of the French general is representative of the military thought which still prevails in every country, and is often quoted as authoritative. No further comment is required. But in order further to illustrate the views put forward in this chapter we may imagine that Germany, with a free hand militarily, and with its war forces organised on von Seeckt's principles, is at war with France, armed in accordance with those of Castelnau. The difference implies that Germany would utilise the money which would have been spent on other armaments in the creation—side by side with a smaller, mobile, mechanised army—of a strong air force equipped with chemical weapons; whilst her neighbour would expend equal sums on a large army, a navy, and an air force which must under the circumstances be much inferior to the German air force. Under these circumstances Germany would be able to secure supremacy in the air. With its air force and its large mobile advance-guard it could attack the French mass army during concentration, and by a series of air operations planned in time of peace it could deliver mortal blows at the vital centres of France. What would the Castelnau strategy of exhaustion be worth under such conditions? A grey theory and nothing else! What would remain of his assumptions? Nothing! It would be as General Douhet says of the Italian military problem: "What can the strongest Italian army assembled in the Alps, or the strongest fleet ploughing our seas, achieve against an enemy who would destroy our trade and industry and our communications; who would aim at crushing the

national and spiritual resistance of the nation? Nothing! That is the only answer to such a question. The evasive answer that the air attack might fail of its objective is childish nowadays, when we see the possibilities of the air weapon and the means of destruction at its command."

CHAPTER V

THE FIGHT FOR THE AIR FORTRESSES

WHAT do we mean by the fight for the air fortresses? We mean the fight for the vital centres of a country, especially the centres of population—the most important objects of aerial attack—and the attack upon and defence of them.

Before we study the forms of aerial attack on the centres of population it may be desirable to consider the general question of the probability of such attacks. In reality the question need scarcely be raised. There can be no doubt that if present military developments continue they will come in the next war. The air weapon will be employed whenever a war breaks out in Europe. The remark of the German expert, ex-Squadron-Leader Sachsenberg, that the introduction of the aeroplane as an instrument of warfare means that immediately after the outbreak of hostilities there will be a campaign of destruction against the centres of population, is merely the statement of an indisputable fact. Here at any rate we shall waste no more words on the subject. This formidable fact merely represents a logical continuation of previous military developments in the age of the flying-machine. However much we may dislike this development, our regrets can be of no use in time of war. They are merely wasted energy. We cannot clip the claws of the full-grown Shere-Khan if once it is let loose. It would be of great advantage in the battle against the monster if the peoples would clearly realise that war can no longer be humanised, and if they understand what this implies. In this connection it may be emphasised once again that it is a mistake to imagine—as did, for example, the famous Swede, Alfred Nobel—that in the development of technical science and of the means of

destruction there is a probability of preventing war and of making it impossible. We do not at all believe in such a thesis, unless we interpret it to mean that in view of the increased power of modern engines of war, and the terribly increased effectivity which more and more violent technical developments have created in the service of man, the peoples will at the sight of the guillotine find strength to escape the knife. Horror of modern war technique will not itself achieve this result; only the organised reaction of mankind can do so. Only in this sense can we speak of war overcoming war. This by way of parenthesis.

There are two different ways—as in the case of strategy—of approaching the tactical and technical problems of aerial attack and defence of vital centres. The one is to try to discover and to fix the actual position to-day. This method leads to a chaos of technical details from which there is hardly any issue. The other is to try to construct the system partly on hypotheses. But the hypotheses must be based on possibilities. It must especially be remembered that the hypotheses are based on the existence of the flying-machine as an element in warfare. At the moment when a new instrument is discovered which will displace the air weapon from its dominating position, then the very foundations of current developments will be undermined. If, for example, we should take into account electric waves which would bring the aeroplane crashing down helplessly from the skies, then we should have reached a new stage of development. But so far as we are able to see at present this is outside our horizon. Hence a limit to the application of our hypotheses is drawn.

There is no room for doubt that *if* the vital parts of a Western country can be reached and effectively stricken by a mighty air force, if its great cities and industrial and economic centres

are destroyed, the result must be a social, psychological, and therefore also a military catastrophe. Practically all who have studied these questions are in accord on that point. Such a conclusion is not based on more or less varying views of the special efficacy of gas and bombs, but on a general estimate of the broad masses at the present day and of their psychology. The only question open to discussion is the extent to which air attacks can be made effective; in other words, the possibility of raising defences against them. Of course the effect of air attacks on different populations may vary. But no civilised people can resist repeated mass attacks from the air unless the vital centres can be so well protected that the effects are diminished. Otherwise the attacks would be effective. We may take this as our starting-point.

We would now remind the reader that we assume in this part of our argument that developments in warfare will continue, and that it is to the resulting position that we here refer. That which may seem quite fantastic from our present point of view will appear normal at a later stage of these developments. We would recall in this connection the words of Meresjkovski, quoted in the Introduction, in which he refers to mankind gone mad, and connects this madness with formulae for poisonous gases. Even if we assume that the defence of the large number of vulnerable vital objectives—the capital, large towns, industrial centres, economic arteries, etc.—is at present impracticable, yet in the face of such developments immense efforts will be made to perfect their defence. A drowning man will clutch at a straw. Fear will under such circumstances be the decisive force, possibly more than ever before. If it was possible under the conditions of old warfare to drive the peoples to armament, how much greater will be the effect of fear when each individual knows that within an hour he may expect a

blow from the skies! The military experts who speak only of the improvement of defence hasten this development. They are happy if they can always establish that a new weapon of attack has given rise to a new weapon of defence. That is the sum of their wisdom and their philosophy. This also in parenthesis. But now to the kernel of the matter.

* * *

The most important objective of air attack will undoubtedly, as a rule, be the capital of the enemy country, especially if at the same time—as is usual—it is a large centre of population: London, Paris, Rome, Copenhagen, Warsaw, Stockholm, Prague, etc. But other large towns are almost of equal importance. The destruction of a large number of medium-sized towns and industrial centres and areas may even have the same disintegrating effect as the destruction of the large centres. It is a mistake to urge that if only the capital is protected then the whole country is protected. There are experts who say so. In a vast agricultural country, such as Russia, air attacks on towns would, of course, not have the same effect as in the industrialised countries of Western Europe.

In the preceding chapter we indicated the effect which injury to or the destruction of industry, especially of a war industry, would have on the operations of the fighting forces. But industry in Western Europe is also the nerve of economic life. Since *strategy is now directed to the crippling of economic life* we must expect air attacks even on those industries which do not directly serve war. The industrial centres are inhabited, moreover, by that part of the population which is psychologically most sensitive—the working classes. The railways, as being important economic factors, must also be regarded as threatened, and not

only those lines which are primarily necessary for the proper functioning of the army.

Can all these objectives be protected, and by what means? What form will the defence take?

We have already expressed our opinion on the establishment of local defensive air forces, and have pointed out what would be the effect of such a division of forces and energy. It should be reasonably clear even now that the attainment of air supremacy is the only real means of protection. This supremacy will be secured by victorious battle in the air. There is no chance of victory for an air marshal who has divided his forces into several local groups if the enemy is organised for concentrated attack in the decisive direction. Rather it is true that the problem of the flying-machine as "bomber" and "fighter", constituting the "shock-troops" of future aerial war, has not yet been solved. Ritter—certainly the greatest authority on air questions—nevertheless anticipates an early solution. And even if both "battleships" and light "cruisers" of the air should remain, the latter swarming around and in front of the former, as do the destroyers around the capital ships at sea, sooner or later the country which has held back the greatest percentage of its forces for defensive purposes will be beaten. And logic tells us that the local air forces waiting for an attack on an objective will also be struck down by an enemy which is able to concentrate his blows on each of those objectives successively. We know the opinion of Brigadier-General Groves, that there is only one really effective air defence, viz. the possession of bombing squadrons ready to attack, in order to show the enemy that every blow delivered will be repaid with interest. For our part we are persuaded that General von Seeckt hits the nail on the head when he says that it may be doubted if the country which has first been struck will be in a position

to retaliate. We should like specially to emphasise this utterance of the eminent German. He and the Italian General Douhet seem to be of the same opinion on this decisive point. We are in full agreement with them.

This seems to be the only conclusion possible. The defence of the vital centres must *in principle* be based on anti-aircraft batteries, complemented by passive measures of protection. It should be remarked, however, that the passive protection afforded by gas-masks, subterranean chambers, and other auxiliaries at best only applies to human beings. We do not care to discuss to what extent. The truth probably lies somewhere between the extreme views. But the best possible passive defence is useless against material and economic destruction. Material destruction is inevitable from the moment the attacking forces reach their objective in sufficient numbers. Evacuation is only practicable in comparatively unimportant places. It is impossible to evacuate a city of a million inhabitants. If the attack is made during the evacuation, when the streets and railway stations are crowded with people and blocked by the traffic, the danger is at its greatest. Catastrophe would be inevitable where people, with or without gas-masks, filling roads, stations, and trains, were attacked from a height of 150 feet with machine-guns, light bombs, and poisonous gas. And we may be sure that the enemy will be informed when an evacuation is planned to begin. An evacuation cannot be kept secret. But even the material and economic destruction—to say nothing of the loss of life—would as a rule be sufficient to break down the resistance of an industrialised population if the damage inflicted were very great. Air attacks on vital centres produce their effect in two ways: by striking directly at masses of human beings and by destroying their material resources. The latter also has a strong psychological reaction.

At the same time it undermines the possibilities of continuing the war. A country in which the great centres lie in ruins, in which the factory chimneys of the industrial towns stand like blackened monuments or have crumpled up, in which communications are more or less destroyed and economic life is crippled, can no longer wage war. Its people may resolve to die in the ruins, but it is more probable they will surrender. It is wise to face this possibility frankly. Industrial Europe is not Montenegro, Morocco, or Afghanistan, where war can be prosecuted with primitive weapons.

The only means of defence which appears to offer any degree of protection for the great objectives against an enemy who has acquired supremacy in the air consists of anti-aircraft weapons. Whether effective or not, such weapons will be developed, and will be grouped in a local defence system around the objectives which it is hoped to protect.

This development brings us to what we have called the *air fortress*. The term implies that those places in a country which are regarded as vital will in future be protected by such extensive defences that the application to them of the term "air fortress" is justified. When armies and navies determined the character of warfare, those places which were regarded as specially important were encompassed by fortifications, whether for defence against troops or ships or both: modern developments will compel another kind of fortified place, and existing land and sea fortifications will shrink in importance.

Air fortresses—by which name we designate the whole complex of weapons of defence for the protection of a vital place against air attack—will certainly in future be of varying strength, ranging from a small number of anti-aircraft weapons to the widely extended and fully equipped ring-fortress which

will encircle those great centres of which the destruction would be more or less equivalent to defeat.

* * *

At present aerial attacks consist theoretically and practically of what might be called "passive flight" over the air fortresses. These flights may be at a very great height in order to avoid projectiles from anti-aircraft weapons, and in order to diminish the possibility of the searchlights catching the machines. That is one method. Another method is to fly very low, in order to pass below the trajectory of the anti-aircraft batteries. In low flying, *racé* flight, however, there is the risk, in a developed system of defence, of fouling the wires of the aprons. To foul them is to be brought down, though we know of one case during the war (at Verberie, April 1918) when the metal edges of an aeroplane severed two balloon wires.

The passive method implies that the anti-aircraft fire remains undisturbed as the attacking force enters its zone. In our opinion this method of attack will not be employed alone much longer. Such a statement doubtless requires substantiation.

As a foundation for our argument we shall first indicate the climax to which the means of attack and those of defence may be expected to develop in the near future:

1. A great increase in the number of machines, achieved by transformation of military budgets. In consequence of this quantitative increase, the air weapon will be able to sustain greater losses than are at present possible. This absolute increase will, however, not diminish the relative preponderance of the offensive.

2. Increased engine-power, combined with lighter construction, thus giving a wider range of action, more rapid climb, greater speed, and greater ability to manœuvre. The

greater lift will perhaps be utilised for protective armour, but above all for stronger armament for the bombers, including several machine-guns and a greater cargo of torpedoes and bombs.

3. The possibility of refuelling machines in the air.

4. The surmounting of the difficulties of flying by night and in fog.

5. Greater precision of aim for bombs.

6. Great increase in the number of anti-aircraft weapons.

7. Higher trajectory.

8. Greater precision of aim and greater rapidity of fire. More powerful searchlights.

9. Improved wireless altitude reckoning.

10. Further development in offensive and defensive chemical warfare.

This list could certainly be lengthened without entering the realms of Utopia.

When aircraft were first adopted for military purposes, they were used exclusively for reconnaissance. Some time elapsed before they were allotted fighting functions. They were not regarded as weapons. General Douhet relates an amusing story of how the military authorities were disinclined to give aircraft a place beside the older weapons. At the beginning of the war he had had to issue instructions for aircraft, but he was forbidden to use the word "weapon" in relation thereto. The expression was not considered suitable or correct by the representatives of the older weapons.

Gradually the fighting character of the aeroplane became manifest. Its combative functions varied. Sometimes it attacked troops on the ground, sometimes, and in an increasing degree, it was engaged in battles in the air. The bombers directed their fire against an objective on the ground: a town, a railway

station, or an aerodrome, etc. The defenders sought to prevent the bombers from reaching their objective. We have not reached the stage of battle between the attackers and the anti-aircraft weapons. In order to reach their objectives the bombing-machines or squadrons, both in the war and in manœuvres, only employed the method which we have characterised as "passive flying". Their attacking power, expressed in high-explosive bombs, gas bombs, torpedoes, gunfire, and machine-gun fire is not employed against the weapons on the ground. They try to achieve their purpose by their wings and not by their claws.

To base calculations for reaching an objective in aerial warfare on mere flight over the air fortress is nevertheless much the same as to assume that an army could reach the enemy capital simply by movement round the flanks of the enemy forces. A battle in the air, a conflict between air forces, may be likened to the conflict of opposing masses of cavalry in advance of the main armies. But when the cavalry of one side is beaten and driven from the field there still remains the decisive action between the masses of infantry and artillery, between the main armies. After the battle in the air there remains for the offensive air force an action against the air fortresses. Flight over them remains one *modus operandi*. It will certainly also be used in the future. But it will probably not remain much longer the only method.

The battle for the air fortresses, including the nerve centres of the enemy nation, will require the application of the whole strength of the attacking air force, which involves the use of its firing power to beat down the defender. If a breach can be made in the fortified girdle the objective will be exposed to the bombing squadrons after a few minutes' flight. The enemy capital may then, after operations during a couple of nights,

be bombed and destroyed. In the strategy of yesterday the same operations required—as in 1870—several months. In the world-war it did not succeed at all.

Of course, objections and reservations may be made. The attacker will sustain great losses in attacking the anti-aircraft batteries. Of course he will. But great losses are unavoidable in all decisive battles; and, thanks to the possibility of rapid concentration and of vertical encirclement, the attacker will secure tactical supremacy. If in a battle between armies a tactical break-through does not lead to strategical success it is because the defender is able to move new forces to the threatened front. The anti-aircraft formations are in the main obliged to remain stationary. They cannot surrender their positions to an opponent who may appear from any quarter, and who possesses such mobility as does an attacker in the air. Their power of co-operation from their appointed stations is limited, even if comparatively great. The bombing squadrons in their turn may be described as a combination of flying batteries and flying machine-gun companies. They have great firing power, though only for short moments. Against the mass of projectiles there is opposed a certain mass of bombs, explosives, and gas, which can be concentrated on a certain battery, etc. The decision is not entirely determined by a comparison of bombs on the one hand and projectiles on the other. Vulnerability, etc., of course, also plays a part. Tactical methods will without doubt be devised by which the various weapons available will be systematically utilised in different combinations by the attacker, and will be countered by similar defensive means. But by a concentration on battery after battery, which cannot be countered by a similar concentration on the part of the defender, we must expect that in such a development the attacker will be able to silence the batteries

seriatim, or so weaken or disturb the fire of the defensive weapons that they become practically useless. This must be done only on such a limited part of the front as a break-through requires.

In the European military Press a Frenchman, Major Vincins, is, so far as we know, the first who has approached this line of air tactics. He writes in the May–June number, 1929, of the *Revue de l'Aéronautique* as follows: "My reflections are based mainly on the experience that the air defences, fully developed, are becoming more and more dangerous to the attacking machines, which find it more and more difficult to escape the searchlights. We must therefore be prepared to employ new methods of attack. Just as the infantry, before it attacks, expects the enemy batteries and machine-guns to be silenced, so also the bombing-machines may demand that the searchlights, the eyes of the anti-aircraft guns, should be, if not destroyed, at least blinded. This method of working has not yet been systematically employed. It would therefore appear that in the future the commander of a night bombing expedition will have the important duty, in order to make the attack safe, of silencing or destroying the anti-aircraft guns, and especially of destroying the searchlights. Every bombing operation at night will therefore be preceded by fire preparations."

Much will assuredly be written about this theory. It would be very interesting to hear the views on this subject of British experts in air defence.

On the basis of the above arguments we for our part consider ourselves justified in the following statement of the new strategy and the new tactics:

The fight for the air fortresses and the subsequent attack on the vital centres will probably constitute the decisive factor in future war. Supremacy in the air, partially or totally crippling

operations on land and sea, will culminate in this fight. The ability of the attack to achieve supremacy—owing to the possibility of concentrating forces and vertical encirclement—would seem to show that the attack will achieve such a mastery over the defence that it will open the road to those objectives which it is desired to injure or to destroy.

CHAPTER VI

ON THE ROAD TO ANNIHILATION

WHO, at the dawn of modern science, could have foreseen the revolutions which it was to introduce? From the first electric spark to the electrical marvels of to-day. Who could have imagined that the technical revolution would create modern industry, transform communications, and change the nature of war? Perhaps there were some who did, though we naturally do not know their names. The situation is exactly the same to-day. The future is equally incredible and equally fantastic.

But a forecast of what will happen may now to some extent be based on safer grounds, so far as we are concerned with the question of the future consequences of the conquest of the air by man. The flying-machine and the rapid progress in the province of air technique are facts. The consequences of the art of flying are much more easily surveyed than those arising from the first discovery of electricity. The aeroplane and the art of flying must *inevitably* produce a revolution—if they have not already done so—in two spheres of life: communications and warfare. In a sense the effects of this discovery are visible in two diametrically opposed directions. Rapid communications between the nations, the encirclement of the globe by air routes which make our planet shrink, the possibility of closer contact which every new link, and consequently this one also, creates; these must be regarded as promoting friendly relations between the nations and as bringing them together. Somebody has said—indeed, was it not Ferrero?—that the ties which are created by new communications between previously isolated peoples have been a source of irritation. The nations so united learned to know

each other's differences, with the result that quarrels, hatred, and war ensued. Such certainly has been the case, and is possible now also. But that is only a transitory stage. In the long run communications lead away from war between States. This was also the opinion of the great German airman, von Hünefeldt, now deceased. The flying-machine as the promoter of peace and understanding, technical progress, has without doubt a good genius. But the other direction in which the effects of the art of flying are seen—the incorporation of the new invention in arsenals and the use of the aeroplane in war —without doubt far outweighs the advantages and gains of the former. There is always a struggle between the good and the evil genius of technical progress, in which the good genius is at present suppressed. And it seems as if the struggle will soon result in a victory for the devil.

Developments in war, in the flying-machine, and in chemical warfare must, however, lead to consequences to society which we must characterise as mad and fantastic. War has at all times set its stamp on society in times of peace. Conscription is the most conspicuous modern example. The XIXth century laid the foundation, by means of conscription, of what we have called the "war society" of modern times. Present developments are now perfecting this society.

The war society is no new phenomenon. Barbarous races and more or less savage tribes live in societies which are primarily organised for war. Palisades around the negro kraals. Weapons as the most important household implements. There is no difference in principle in this respect between the Germanic society of the period of the migrations and present-day Kaffir society. Neither between that of the Germanic and Asiatic tribes which overran Europe and founded the war societies in the territory where civilised races now live. Tam-

burlane, Gengis Khan, Attila, Abu-Bekr were rulers in such societies. Sparta showed similar features.

The fundamental principle of the former, and of modern war societies, is the same. But, owing to technical resources, the difference is tremendous.

At a congress in Frankfort-on-the-Main in 1929, assembled principally for the study of poisonous gas warfare, one of the speakers, a Swiss professor, demonstrated how society must be refashioned if there is to be any hope of protecting the civil population. This scientist, who, judging by his name, was of German origin, and who possessed the German capacity for steeping himself in everything he undertook, demonstrated how systematically the Swiss had faced the problem and how Swiss towns had begun to adapt themselves to the new conditions. The professor considered it necessary to prepare vast and deep protective underground chambers (ordinary cellars would not avail against bombs). These chambers must be furnished with electric fans and the necessary air-filters. Electric cables and gas- and water-pipes must be buried deeper in the ground. The inhabitants must also be provided individually with a simple gas-mask. A comprehensive system of auxiliary organisations must be created with special equipment for combating gas and fire and for purposes of first aid. Supplies of provisions, water, etc., must be preserved underground. All this is, as we know, certain. But it was news to hear the professor's statement that things had been carried so far in practice in Switzerland. He informed the congress—a curiosity indeed—that experiments had been made with a special kind of curtain so impregnated as to neutralise poisonous gas. We may have been relying on a misquotation, but the proposal affords a macabre picture of the newly married couple of the future war society examining, on the first day in their new

home, the capacity of the furniture—to protect them against a terrible death!

We refrain from emphasising elements of humour in the baffled dreams of human progress and prosperity to which such developments give rise. But it should be pointed out that the developments which we have noted in the case of Switzerland are still more pronounced in certain other countries. Every year the process is carried nearer completion. Different countries have reached different stages. Poland, Russia, Italy, England, and France have probably advanced farthest. Germany and the other defeated countries are at any rate "officially" outside the picture. Russia possesses comprehensive volunteer organisations with more or less complicated names. Russian architects have advanced proposals for the building of new towns adapted to the needs of modern war. Pavlov and Koschewinkow are European names in this respect. The former has specialised in domestic architecture, the latter in town-planning as a whole. Naturally towns assume very much the character of catacombs, as much below-ground as above. Modern catacombs equipped with every convenience. Nothing of that kind will be lacking in the new modern war society. All difficulties will be technically overcome. Koschewinkow proposes a revision of building regulations and the placing of them under military control. He proposes the training and appointment of professors and teachers in "war architecture". Similarly, a Russian engineer writes: "Just as in the Middle Ages every town had fortifications and many castle-like structures, and every architect was more or less a builder of fortifications, so also in modern times war requires that the civil architect shall adapt his technique to the requirements of war in order to solve the problem of the protection of human habitations." Without doubt he is right. Instead of town walls and draw-

bridges guarded by burghers armed with cross-bows, the modern war society will develop defensive measures ever so much more ingenious, and yet more barbaric, than those of the Middle Ages. They will be typified by the long fingers of the anti-aircraft guns pointing up to the heavens which were once thought to be inhabited by children's angels. A throw-back in an immense field of human developments to the stage of the Middle Ages—even if not beyond. We are transported back a thousand years in time. Science has never fully succeeded in discovering the mysterious cause of the collapse of earlier civilisations, such as those of the East, Egypt, etc. In the case which may now arise the external cause is clear. The documents relating to the annihilation of the world lie collected in the underground armoured cellars of the General Staffs or the Air Staffs. One day they will bear witness

Just as everywhere in the XIXth century the military principle of the people in arms, when its superiority had once been demonstrated by Prussia, was drilled into the peoples —at first against strong resistance from certain groups, *Die Vaterlandslosen*—so also the new developments in the field of preparation for war are advancing and breaking down resistance. The principle of organisation of the last century may be expressed in a simplified form thus: Every able-bodied man must carry a rifle and be trained to use it under any circumstances in time of war. In addition, much was necessary to convert the mass of riflemen into an army *en masse*. An immense organisation was built up on this simple foundation. The world-war carried it a stage farther. It absorbed the whole apparatus of production for war preparations, and placed a large part of industry in the direct service of war. In the process the non-combatants, the workers in factories, women and children, were also engaged: the man

in the steel-works, the girl who stamped the fuses, who rinsed the cartridge shells, who stood at the loom or in the preserve factory. All of these assumed the same relation, in principle, to the war as the soldier in the trenches. The French law extending obligation to service to the whole nation, irrespective of age or sex, codifies this development. But this is not all. The last stage is reached when the new warfare regards the whole population and its economic resources as the objective of war. If this development cannot be checked it will continue of its own momentum, and will give rise to the necessary reorganisation of society. The air arm is the architect in this new society; the constructor who, by virtue of his power of destruction, determines its type. This macabre architect will concern himself above all things with the general plan of cities. When the adaptation is complete the war society will be ready in external form also. All that will remain to be done, after practical experience has been gained, will be to make the necessary changes when the cities again rise from their ruins and mankind tries to live again. Even the most complete collapse will certainly not prevent this. The destruction of the world will never be so complete that invincible man will not make a fresh endeavour, though he will have ceased to be what we now call a civilised being.

In addition to the external transformation of society the economic and political consequences of these developments compel our attention. It seems inconceivable that the economic burdens resulting from them can be borne. The State alone certainly cannot bear them directly. This fact introduces a new phase of the transformation. Hitherto the State has borne the responsibility for the military system. Some sort of reduction or division must certainly take place in the future. Industry, for example, and the cities, must bear the economic

responsibility for their own protection. The protection of war industries concerns the State, but all other industries must shoulder the burdens which the new system imposes. We shall not attempt to explain how these burdens for unproductive purposes will affect world and national economy. Nevertheless the leaders of industry must remember that, despite ever so comprehensive defensive measures, industrial plant will, if not entirely destroyed, yet run the risk of serious damage when a modern war breaks out. The tendency of such a war systematically to cripple or destroy the economic auxiliaries can scarcely fail—when the position becomes clearer —to affect the attitude of those who regard war only from the point of view of self-interest. World economy has in parts recovered with astonishing ease since the last war, but that war did not involve the destruction of property in all countries which will, however much the defence is developed, characterise the next war. War, conceived as *the enormous destruction of economic resources*, implies an immensely important transformation of the whole outlook. Its consequences would render recovery much more hopeless than after the last war. It is difficult to arrive at any other conclusion, even though it is not possible at present to survey the economic consequences.

It is perhaps easier to prophesy the political results of the development of the war society. War, originating in such a society, will, once it has broken out, involve revolutionary changes. We are not alone in this view. But the political reactions which may be expected to occur during the developments preceding war are not so clear. It may even happen that the masses will themselves hasten these developments from fear, and that the majority of the people will accept them. Different countries differ in this respect. Unless resistance is so powerfully and so internationally organised as to check the new develop-

ments all along the line, the nations will be forced into a new strait-waistcoat. But this cannot be done without a dictatorship. This development therefore logically leads us to the dictatorial system. Dictatorship is, indeed, a product of the last war, but it is at the same time an indication of a development which cannot be carried through and maintained without the exercise of violence by the ruling powers. Possibly some countries can resist it. England and the Scandinavian countries, as well as Holland and Switzerland, are those which will fall only in the last resort. America will probably never succumb, unless we include under dictatorship the absolute supremacy of a plutocracy.

By the transformation of society, by economic burdens, by reaction with the dictatorship as a crown, the whole social development of the last half-century will clearly be checked and thrown back. It is the child of democracy, and must fall with democracy—if it falls.

But the question arises, must not a peaceful nation—the position being such as it is—take steps to protect itself? Must it not accept much that modern military developments require? It is possible that it cannot escape doing so. Those who think that a country can, in a turn of the hand, renounce the system of war will of course deny the necessity. But those who believe that this dangerous chain of events can only be broken by free peoples must accept this view. That is the great dilemma. One thing, however, is certain: if a nation embarks upon such military protection of land and people as the times require it must do so on the clear understanding that the whole of these modern developments must be abandoned as soon as possible. Even if it adapts itself outwardly, there must be no inward acceptance. The existence of the implements of war must serve as a constant challenge to forge the mighty weapons necessary

for a victory in the struggle for the future of the human race. Under no circumstances must democracy yield. Only in its hands must lie the decision what is to happen and what is not to happen, what is to be undertaken and what is not to be undertaken. With reaction in power every possibility of breaking the ominous chain of development is destroyed. That is why the existing system of dictatorships is so extremely dangerous.

But it is said that all this talk of the war society is a fantastic absurdity! Very well, let us look at the chain of causation itself, link by link, in the politico-military developments preceding the war (though even this was at one time impossible). Is not the air arm and its power to attack and destroy a fact? Are the stories of preparations for the use of poisonous gases also nursery-tales? And the extensive preparations made in various countries to counter them? Why should we regard Paris and London at the present moment as immense air fortresses? Do the doubters, who can see only what is before their noses, believe that there is no reason for all this? Is it just for fun? The investment of capital in chemical armaments is perhaps the most serious indication of what is in progress.

Can such a development lead to peace? It must lead to war. The military experts, as well as many politicians, know it. And they can discover no means of preventing it. Bound as they are by developments in the past, they can find no other means than to increase the armaments of their own country in the hope that they will be victorious in a future war. For the moment there is a pause, but only a relative pause. Europe is still hovering on the brink of a decision. Exhaustion after the war, combined with forces of various kinds which were set in motion in order to effect a change, have slowed down the tempo. But their influence is no greater than this: the

smaller countries hope that if there is a new war they will be able to avoid any participation in it. But everywhere there is a feeling that the ground is rocking as if by an earthquake.

The path of this development must inevitably lead to war. The word "inevitable" may perhaps be disputed; it is a categorical word. But in order successfully to deny its suitability, the opposition must prove the contrary. History only knows longer and shorter intervals between wars. So long as the forces directed against war have not shown themselves in history to be active forces of a strength greater than, or equal to, those leading to war, then war must come, as in the past. The strong current of opinion in favour of peace which courses through the nations has not succeeded in stopping military development. The generation which deludes itself, in an interval between wars, that war is over, should cease to do so. But it must similarly under no conditions believe those who, when speaking of the inevitability of war, or, as some prefer to call it, the everlasting nature of war, urge that it is useless to combat it, that it cannot be overcome. War is certainly not by nature everlasting. It is not, as the penitent ex-Kaiser at Doorn proclaimed to the world on his seventieth birthday, "an ethnographic law which only the divine powers can alter". The inevitability of war is relative to the forces thrown into the other scale. It is relative to the possibility of defeating, among other things, those who, whether from indifference or cynicism, always have the word "war" on their lips. It is even relative to the possibility of preventing preparations for war.

But if war must, in view of modern developments and the distribution of power, be regarded as inevitable, it is always possible to entrench oneself behind the hope that though there may be a war somewhere, "we" shall escape it. This is a

common ex-neutral argument. Those who participated in the world-war are strangers to this line of thought. Since they were irresistibly drawn in then, they expect, in the event of a European war, to be drawn into the vortex by the same irresistible forces. Even the ex-neutral, however, would do better to lock up his hopes. The Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, Beneš, writes in his book, published in 1928, *Der Aufstand der Nationen*, concerning the outbreak of the war: "And so it happened that a war, which according to the plans of Berlin and Vienna was to be waged only in South-Eastern Europe, became a European war and a world-war." It is a fact that those who have seriously speculated on the question of war and peace in Europe regard an eventual war as a more or less universal war. There seems to be a feeling that the external unity of the world which begins to reveal itself in the form of economic unity will also appear in war. This does not exclude the possibility of the localisation of armed conflict between two smaller States. But if a Great Power moves simultaneously, then . . .!

The diplomat or expert in foreign affairs might doubtless devise a jig-saw puzzle showing the various combinations which might conceivably lead to universal war. It is not difficult to adduce grounds of probability that if A and B are at war, C will join B, and D will attack C, E ally itself with A, etc., throughout the whole European alphabet. But it is obviously unprofitable to seek to read the cards in this manner. The European tangle is so complex that it requires more than usual dexterity to discover beforehand what will happen when a "local" war breaks out somewhere. We must content ourselves with the fact that everything indicates that a new war in Europe will rapidly become general, and that the age of the world-war having once begun it will not terminate in a

return to miniature wars. There are two factors—in addition to the situation created by the Peace of Versailles—which make this more than probable. One is Bolshevism, which, as long as it exists in its present form, will find it consistent with its plans for world revolution to make the conflagration as widespread as possible, preferably so widespread that the whole globe will be set on fire. It knows well that the world revolution will not come to a world at peace, but that it will come with absolute certainty after a new and universal war. This, indeed, is the principal reason why we should look sceptically on the integrity of the official Soviet professions of peace. The second factor is the air weapon, which here again exerts its influence. By means of the air weapon there has come into existence a new and more effective means of exerting pressure on a neutral State. In face of a threat of occupation, bombardment, or blockade, a Government could more easily keep a cool head. Time was always necessary to proceed from words to deeds. The matter becomes more serious when it is possible to state one's demand by an "air ultimatum"; to state that so and so will happen, that this and that town will be attacked from the air within a certain number of hours. The period may be so humanely calculated that evacuation may be possible and only material damage done. It is also possible to draw up a plan whereby different sections of a country would be bombarded in turn, in order thereby to produce the necessary pressure on the Government and the people.

It would then appear that as regards the possibility of maintaining neutrality the position has undergone a radical change for the worse.

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The above purely military deductions are not by any means superfluous, but the technical problems and the military terms in some of the chapters must not for a moment be allowed to conceal the essential significance of the developments which have been sketched, i.e. that the next war will assume more terrible forms than the last, and that strategy will aim at achieving the greatest destruction of life and property that the world has ever witnessed. These are the realities which confront us, despite all attempts to blink them and to shuffle the cards.

We should also remember that the preparations for such a war are going on practically everywhere, and are unaffected by the contrary currents visible among the civilised peoples. They are like work carried on in underground galleries, without any contact with events aboveground. All the time mines are being prepared which will in due course explode. The only explanation of this incongruity is that the traditional heritage of the centuries, and especially of the last century, holds developments in the old, well-worn, and bloody ruts.

Neither should we forget that the immense organisations which are a part of this inheritance still, by means of a thousand threads and resources, hold the hearts of the peoples and control policy. Just at the moment when everything depends on the skill of the pilot, these threads foul the rudder of State like the weeds of the Sargasso Sea. Little has changed in this respect since our last painful experience.

Let us also remember that mighty and influential forces are still inspired in thought and deed by the political and economic Machiavellism which was born in the century which Léon Daudet fittingly characterised as "le stupide XIX siècle". If the reader surveys these tendencies and synthesises the contents of the following "Six Danger Points", he will perhaps

understand that there is no exaggeration in the title of this chapter.

Those who consider that a new world-war will be the downfall of civilisation and a real Armageddon of the nations—and they are not few—share this vision and this opinion. They are not less right because people as a rule have not listened to them attentively. People as a rule have more important things to do than to listen to those who talk of the future of the human race. Nevertheless the warning words did not fall only on stony ground. The change visible in the reaction of people in this respect has not come from heaven. What is noteworthy is that the finest spirits and the best minds stand solidly by the formula, "Another war in Western Europe and European culture will collapse".

It is very seldom that developments pose a categoric imperative, an inevitable "either—or". Usually they prefer a compromise, a *via media*. In respect of war and peace, however, they appear to have confronted the civilised races with a choice which is of the nature of destiny. Either developments must in one way or another take a different turn from that which we have described or else the nations must be prepared, at a moment which it is not worth while to guess, to submit to that next war.

II

SIX DANGER POINTS

CHAPTER VII

THE DYNAMITE MAGAZINE

It has been said that Europe was Balkanised by the war.

The remark was perhaps fully justified a few years ago, when there were *coups* in Germany from the Right and the Left; when Hungary was one day red and another day white, or rather black; when the grim struggle raged in Ireland, etc. At the present moment the talk of the Balkanisation of Europe is an exaggeration. But it is true to the extent that owing to the war and the Peace of Versailles there now exist in Europe a larger number of such centres of unrest as the Balkans were. The position in Europe is still so dangerous, so bestrewn with the elements of conflict, that a monster notice ought to be erected: "Beware of dynamite, beware of fire."

There is a large number of people—they are to be found principally in the countries where stability and calm are seldom disturbed—who look at the world from their own point of view and who are certain that it is everywhere the same. It is principally for such people that this chapter is written. It may possibly tell them something. But it contains nothing new for those who are versed in European affairs.

The Great War broke out when some shots were fired into the heap of political explosives, soaked in all sorts of inflammable substances, which constituted the "real" Balkans, the object of anxiety of European politics, but especially the object of its ambitious calculations and intrigues. The danger of explosion had been increased by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria at a time when Russia, the protector of the Slavs, was unable to intervene. That was the last successful move in Hapsburg policy, and one which cost Austria

and the Hapsburgs their life. Even if a certain *détente* appears to have taken place, and even if occasionally there were signs of a possible Balkan Locarno, it was only a few years ago that the outbreak of war was threatened between the hereditary enemies, Bulgaria and Greece. Only the energetic intervention of the League of Nations, supported by the Powers, prevented it. The Balkans are still in the main the same arena of nationalistic cock-fighting as formerly; and there is a danger that the Balkan nations will again, despite the non-aggression agreement and the Kellogg Pact, in one constellation or another, fly at each other's throats when they have recovered their strength after the last great blood-letting, which was, nevertheless, very thorough.

The most dangerous ferment in this brew is perhaps the antagonism between Greater Serbia and Greater Italy, who look at each other furiously across the intervening Adriatic. In this antagonism the struggle for supremacy in Albania plays, as is well known, an important rôle. Mussolini sits with practically the whole of the share capital in his hands. The grounds of Serbo-Italian enmity are partly the question of the eventual hegemony in the Balkans, to which both countries aspire, and partly the challenging Italian megalomania which aims at making the Adriatic a "Roman" *mare clausum*.

Nor are Italian aspirations concealed. They bear a spiritual relation to a good deal of the pre-war Pan-German programme. Italian women bear many children, and have been ordered to bear even more (at a time when the earth has begun to be crowded and the question of the restriction of population is becoming acute). The surplus of births in Italy has, it is true, of recent years, despite orders, decreased, but it is still sufficient to motivate the demand for a larger "place in the sun". Even if it is pure megalomania which directs Italian policy

in the Balkans, it is the "children policy" which is the direct cause of its attempted expansion in Africa. When the mistake was made in the Peace of Versailles of not giving to Italy colonial possessions, and since Italy will not direct the stream of its emigrants to non-Italian lands, the consequence has been that Italian policy casts its eyes, not only on Tunis and Tangiers, but also on Syria. Corsica and Nice are claimed as purely Italian *irredenta*. Also in Africa Italy conflicts with France. As all the seats are engaged and nobody seems disposed to move up voluntarily, the Italian population problem and the Italian expansion policy, combined with a pathologically stimulated national vanity, constitute a dangerous explosive mixture of the first magnitude.

Up to the present Mussolini's foreign policy can only take credit for somewhat meagre successes. The bombardment and occupation of Corfu is now remote in time, and collaboration in Tangiers was not of such importance that it will permanently satisfy Fascist ambitions. In 1925, Italy succeeded, as is well known, in concluding with British imperialism a *pactum turpe* relating to Abyssinia, in which it was agreed that England should recognise "the special character of Italian interests in Western Abyssinia". Abyssinia, which is a member of the League of Nations, was not informed of this agreement! What the result of the concordat between the Papal Power and the Fascists will be remains to be seen. Pending a European crisis which will give Italy a free hand, Mussolini must keep his imperialistic plans in his pocket. But they will be taken out again and put into force at the first really favourable opportunity which occurs. We have reason to be thankful that the state of Italian and Balkan affairs is such that it bridles their policy and their bellicose spirit. Greece, Bulgaria, and Jugoslavia are burdened by enormous debts. But the latter

has as its banker France, who supports it—against Italy—just as it supports the whole of the Little Entente against Germany.

* * *

In its intelligible desire for security France, in the treaty of peace, exceeded the limits of right and reason, and created a situation—especially as regards Germany—which was untenable. With admirable patience, strength, and balance the German Republic has hitherto borne with it. But there is serious reason to fear that if French policy towards Germany does not lead to a real settlement, the forces now leading Germany will have to yield to a reaction which will throw back developments and will, in its turn, add strength to French intransigence. The Hugenbergians in both countries, the Bourbons of our day, those who have learned nothing and forgotten everything, would again ascend the thrones, though perhaps not in the literal sense of the word. The German social democratic victory at the elections in 1928 may be converted into a reactionary victory, and it is easy to understand what that would mean.

If, humanly speaking, we regard Germany's western frontier as fixed for the future, yet nobody can seriously believe that conditions in the East will remain as they now are. But everything which happens on the eastern frontier will in all probability set Russia in movement. Quite apart from any eventual plans of English Tory imperialism to settle accounts with Bolshevism by means of war, there is some truth in the suggestion that Poland and Rumania are jointly contemplating the "liberation" of the Ukraine. That would set the ball rolling. Whether or not the Litvinov non-aggression pact will really result in a *détente* in Eastern Europe it is too early to say.

Germany and her allies were deprived by the Treaty of

Versailles, as is well known, of the power to determine their future military strength. Germany was permitted to maintain a maximum army of 100,000 men and a small navy. Conscription was abolished, no military air force was permitted, and a number of modern weapons, the chemical weapon, heavy artillery, tanks, etc., were forbidden. This disarmament was justified in the Treaty of Peace on the ground that it would prepare the way for a general limitation of armaments. We all know that such a limitation has not taken place during the ten years that have elapsed. The Entente States have on the whole maintained their previous armaments, even though, for economic reasons, certain modifications have been made. In some places the military budgets continue to expand, and the annual armament expenditure of the world at this moment has reached the sum of 22 milliards of gold francs. Hitherto the disarmament question has been successfully side-tracked.

The French demand for "security" against a repetition of 1914 is quite intelligible. We must understand French feelings in this respect. To believe that France can overcome its fear of again being overrun is to show a lack of understanding of what France has recently suffered. It is also to forget the developments which have taken place. But on the other hand France cannot demand that that which she regards as security shall become insecurity for the whole of Europe—and that is what French policy has long been. It has been due primarily to French policy since 1918 that Europe may now be regarded as a dynamite magazine. France and all other countries have a right to demand security for peace, and they will not renounce that demand. But there is reason to assert that the French formula of security stretches beyond this; that it is not only a formula to preserve peace, but to *guarantee the untenable peace* which France created. So long as France

adheres to this formula it will not have peace—neither will Europe. The present French system of security is not one to preserve a decent peace, but one to secure victory in a new war. It is not security *against* war, but security *in* war. The difference is significant. It constitutes a boundary between the pre-war policy of *realpolitik* and something new, which seeks to found peace and security on something better than strategic calculations. There can never be confidence under the shadow of strategic calculations and the plans of general staffs. The very entrance is blocked. It is easier to understand the significance of the French system if we imagine the Foch-Tardieu programme of 1919 realised. The latter proposed the separation of the German Rhineland and the maintenance in the future of bridge-heads east of the river, thus facilitating a direct and overwhelming invasion of Germany. The system resulting from the peace was a compromise, but a compromise which was also based entirely on strategy. In spite of Locarno it was long maintained. The decision to evacuate the Rhine—which certainly would not have been taken but for the firm attitude of the British Labour Government—implies a relaxation rather than an abandonment. This sort of security may postpone a breach of the peace, but renders such a breach inevitable sooner or later. We must seek to distinguish just and unjust demands for security, and the French demand is unjust to Germany and to all Europe.

Very much the same is true of the claim for security set up by British imperialism and the late Tory Government as an excuse for its refusal to support the demand for a reduction of armaments. England justifies its demand for supremacy at sea on the ground that England must be able to prevent a blockade of the British Isles and to meet a threat to its communications with the Empire in case of war. This may appear

a fair demand, unless one asks oneself which Powers could successfully blockade England at the same time in the Channel, the North Sea, and the Atlantic. No European Power or combination of Powers could do so. Only one Power need be considered—the U.S.A. Owing to the change of government in England there is reason to suppose that such a demand will no longer be maintained. Whether the recent Anglo-American *rapprochement* will lead to such a limitation of armaments as may affect the whole disarmament question remains to be seen. There is perhaps ground for hope.

If the disarmament policy of to-morrow is the same as that of to-day, then Germany will be morally justified in arming herself. And if we may wish that Germany should not do so, yet sooner or later she will, on these assumptions. This policy, which pretends to aim at security, may therefore create the great thundercloud—German armament. Not now, perhaps, not immediately, but when this policy has driven the present leaders of Germany from power and has brought back the old régime. There are many in Europe who would like to see their old ideals restored in this manner.

It may perhaps be argued that Germany cannot arm. This is not the place to discuss how modern armaments, with air forces and gas, can be created in secret. But in one way or another a country with resources such as Germany possesses will be able to shake off its fetters. It may, for example, on the ground that the provisions of the Treaty of Peace have been violated, openly demand a standard of armament corresponding to that of other countries, and may declare itself released from all obligations in this respect. In that case France would have to suppress this attempt by the occupation of large parts of Germany. Would France dare to proceed so far? It would mean the occupation of a revolutionary Germany for

a long period, an impossibility. Another alternative is to allow Germany to arm, in which case it would be the prey of reaction, which would without hesitation revert to its pre-war policy and sooner or later precipitate the catastrophe.

Whether Germany will maintain its present armaments and lead the way, or whether it will be forced into the path of increased armaments—that, together with the Anglo-American parity question, is the essence of the whole of the disarmament problem in its present form. Equally certain is it that only a reconciliation, followed by the elimination of mutual fear, between the two nations on the Rhine can lead to the solution of other European problems of second- or third-rate importance.

* * *

The world-war liberated nations. It created new States on the ruins of old ones. The Habsburg conglomerate gave rise and contributed to six. Russia furnished the material for eight. Only one sovereign European State vanished from the circle—Montenegro. Though it chose the "right" side. But in spite of reconstruction and liberation the treaties of peace were far from preventing the inclusion of a number of minorities in practically all the new States. It would be more correct to say that the peace created a number of new Alsaces in various parts of Europe than to say that Europe was Balkanised.

In certain cases parts of nations were deliberately incorporated in other States in order to weaken them. Thus, for example, with the Germans and the Hungarians. There is a repetition of the pre-war Hungarian and German oppression of Rumanians and Poles. The minority question is as burning now as ever it has been. Europe is full of minorities and, what is worse, of oppressed minorities. Unhappily it is not possible

to create a "national map" such as Wells imagines. The blending of races and nationalities due to migrations renders it impossible. It would be a worse patchwork quilt than the present one. But so long as the oppression of minorities continues in the good old style—German, Austrian, and Hungarian—we may expect Central Europe to be the breeding-ground of unrest and of the spirit of war. The new masters, it would seem, are not a whit better than the old ones. Those who were oppressed have become expert oppressors.

The following examples may serve to give a faint idea of the confusion, the political oppression, and the economic disasters which the war and the peace treaties created in the area which constitutes the geographical centre of Europe.

The new Czechoslovakia contains only 40 per cent. Czechs. The remainder consists of 25 per cent. Germans, 10 per cent. Hungarians, 15 per cent. Slovaks, and 5 per cent. Ruthenians, a number of Poles and Moravians. The Swiss Dami says of Czechoslovakia: "The young nation has hastened to adopt its predecessor's faults. It rules by bureaucratic terrorism, it centralises in the extreme, and it sanctions a policy of oppression of the former oppressors. The new frontiers have also brutally destroyed geographical and economic unity. Rivers are cut up, farm-houses separated from their fields, towns from their suburbs, and mines from factories." The Ruthenian Deputy, Kurtjak, writes: "In 1919 the Ruthenian districts were voluntarily incorporated in Czechoslovakia, on condition that they received full autonomy. Years have passed, but the Czech State has forgotten its promises. During these years an incredible burden of taxation has been laid on the Ruthenians, and they have no hope of compensation for their sacrifices. In the great division of the land the Ruthenians obtained nothing. Only the Czech legionaries were remem-

bered. That was the meaning of the so-called 'land reform'. In their own country the Ruthenians cannot obtain a Government appointment because the offices are all full of Czechs, four times as many as are required." Another writer relates: "The Government has deprived hundreds of Hungarian-speaking doctors and other officials of their posts and has forbidden them to practise their professions. The Slovenian districts were cut up into a number of cantons from north to south, partly in order to overwhelm the Hungarians with Slavs and partly in order later to flood the Slavs with Czechs. By this scientific geography they succeeded in procuring an election which yielded a great majority of Czech deputies. Prague held in its hands all the threads of a centralised administration, entrusted principally to the former Czech legionaries. Czech became in practice the only official language, and the only one employed in the schools." And all this despite Masaryk and Beneš!

Economic conditions in these districts have even changed for the worse. Present-day Austria is an economic anomaly, and its political condition a constant source of anxiety.

The Danube, that great artery of Central Europe, which united and brought together the peoples who lived and worked on its banks, and which bore their commerce, has been transformed. It is cut up by a number of new customs boundaries. A considerable part of the 11,000 km. of new customs frontiers created by the peace are drawn here. General Thomson once gave a picture of the situation in *The Observer*: "Before the war the Danube was not only an international trade artery of great importance. Life on it resembled that on a great main road. Millions of human beings earned their living on its shores. It was an ingredient of life there. Now all is changed. The road is desolate. During a journey of three days we only

met three vessels. The others were laid up. On the railways which ran along its banks there stood a dozen locomotives, rusty and useless, like sorrowing witnesses of the downfall."

In Hungary much the same has occurred. The mills around Budapest ground on the average before the war 150,000 tons of grain. Now tariff walls and political frontiers have wrought such changes that the three largest steam-mills only work one day a week. Mills without grain. The grain heaped up in masses elsewhere. Dear bread. The tariff walls interpose insurmountable obstacles to the national utilisation of available resources.

In Jugoslavia the political crises—rooted in the dispute between the uncultured Serb majority and the culturally more advanced minority, and in the abuse of power and bad government of the former—became acute in 1929, with the result that Jugoslavia has joined the group of dictatorships.

As we advance farther to the south-east the brutality of the political system increases. The oppression of minorities assumes the most terrible forms. Misery culminates in Macedonia and former Montenegro, the latter now under the rule of Jugoslavia. Macedonia, whose people have practically always, in modern times, been ill-treated, has been cut up by the peace treaty into three parts, of which one has gone to Greece, one to Jugoslavia, and one to Rumania. This population and that of Montenegro suffer terribly. The Montenegrins, who are a proud race, resisted the incorporation of their country in Jugoslavia. Montenegro was laid waste. Fifty per cent. of all farms were burned by order of the authorities. Almost a third of the population was wasting away in foul prisons. Another third was living in continuous warfare in the mountains. The remaining third has submitted. The peasants in Macedonia said that under the Turks the country was a pool of

blood, but under the Serbs it was an ocean of blood. Death, imprisonment, or exile was the fate of those who resisted. There are still half a million Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria. And Thrace! In 1920 Venezelos, the Greek statesman who returned to power some years ago, signed an order which runs: "Act quickly and without consideration, so that there may be no traces to remind us that this province was once Bulgarian or Turkish!" (Ott, *L'infernal désarroi.*) Such is Europe!

The same author describes conditions in Bessarabia under Rumanian rule: "Terror is absolute, no political association is permitted to exist." When he passed through Varna, where he had been stationed during the war as commander of a French battery and had seen the guns of his own battery handed over to the Rumanian authorities, this ex-officer made the bitter reflection that this transfer was not made in order to bombard Bessarabian farms and that he did not volunteer for the war to promote such action.

And Poland with Pilsudski! In the Lithuanian area Lithuanian schools are suppressed. The Lithuanian Press is forbidden. Lithuanian intellectuals are expelled. As early as 1921 the Poles had settled in the White Russian districts 30,000 Polish families in order to Polonise the people. This method has given rise to everlasting hatred between the immigrants and the native population. In the Ukrainian portion Poland has forbidden the word "Ukraine" to be uttered. And yet Poland and Rumania are conspiring to "free" the whole of the Ukraine from Russian oppression! Such is Europe!

Italy under the Fascist régime adopts Balkan methods in its newly acquired territory. In the Tyrol there are 230,000 Germans living under Italian rule. Italian despotism, as is well known, suppresses German culture with all its strength. It has

removed a large number of German-speaking judges and magistrates, dissolved municipal councils, dismissed or transferred to other parts of Italy the German-speaking officials, teachers, railway officials, etc. Complaints are met by expulsion. Acts of violence perpetrated by Fascists or bandits on the German population go unpunished. Such is Europe!

The Manchester Guardian, in an article on the new European Balkans, states that the impression derived from a journey in those parts is one of economic stagnation and a tempest of rivalry and national hatreds. After having remarked that the principal cause is to be found in the unnatural Peace of Versailles and in subsequent French policy, the paper continues that it is all artificial; that in every State of the Little Entente the majority of the population is against this artificial structure and this animosity. These peoples, it continues, should not offer their arms in support of French policy, or in defence of the peace treaties, with greater enthusiasm than do the Germans or the Hungarians. Such is French "security"!

The right of minorities is a vital question for Europe. There is clearly only one way out of the morass: to endeavour to make frontiers less rigid, to lower tariff walls or to raze them, and endeavour to stimulate more active interchange of intellectual and economic impulses. If we cannot do so we must be prepared for an explosion. Mr. Wickham Steed emphasises that the only sound policy in this district is to cultivate understanding and good will between the nations. Every attempt made to save the situation by pressure is doomed to failure. It will only be possible to prevent Balkanisation when such a degree of harmony and social stability has been achieved that the mistakes of the peace treaties can be rectified by a more general agreement. The question of the minorities must be solved, writes the *Ère Nouvelle* in reference to the con-

flict between the Polish Foreign Minister, Zaliski, and Stresemann during the 1928 sessions of the League of Nations. But if it is solved by violence a great war is inevitable. Coudenhove-Kalergi can discover only one means: a real edict of toleration, a Magna Charta of liberty for all nations. He may be right, but before this is achieved much must happen. To eradicate the stain made by the oppression of minorities in XXth century Europe it is necessary for a new Europe to be organised, a Europe which wishes to escape from its ruins and really desires a future.

Europe constitutes, despite the existence of other centres of unrest on the earth, the focus of the question of war and peace. It is the centre of a more or less universal war. "In order to safeguard peace, Europe must organise for peace", says Aristide Briand. To admit this is not to underestimate America's growing influence or to depreciate the rôle which an awakening Asia may play. The historical European influence still continues. America has been visibly affected by its contact with Europe during the war, as is seen in a regrettable infection with militarism and chauvinism, of which its naval armaments are an expression. If the new American militarism, cradled by an awakening imperialism, overcomes American common sense, it will in turn react seriously on Europe. But Europe is still the dynamite magazine of the world, and if we are asked to pursue our diagnosis we would say that Franco-German relations are at the centre of it. It is on the Rhine that European peace must finally be guaranteed. There still remains the most dangerous "point" of all.

CHAPTER VIII

RED AND BLACK FASCISM

THERE are especially two things which we must study if we are to obtain an approximately correct view of the position—Bolshevism and Fascism, with their accompanying phenomena the "red" and "black" dictatorships. The association of these two phenomena may appear completely unjustified in a popular presentation. Are they not opposite poles? Did not Fascism arise as a reaction against Bolshevism? This is partly true. But at the same time there are spiritual features in these two movements which are so similar that we may well ask whether that which unites them is not greater than that which divides.

It is a common error to describe Bolshevism and Fascism as exclusively products of the world crisis. Nowadays we are all too ready to forget that the Russian Revolution and Bolshevism sprang from the régime of violence of the Tsars, from the Middle Ages to the present day, from the injustice, crying to the heavens, of the old régime; that it rose up like a ghost from Siberia and the prisons of Spalernaja, Krestzy, and Kronstadt.

The causes of Fascism do not lie so deep. But behind Fascism we also glimpse an historical development, though it is much more a direct product of the war than is Bolshevism. Both movements are without doubt strongly infected by the peculiar nature of the war. The Fascist leaders, high and low, and a number of the guiding spirits of Bolshevism—though not its founders—were alike children of the trenches, and retained the psychology of war, with its preference for force and its scorn for human life. In the Italian Fascist hierarchy the soldiers of the years 1915–18 occupy the most

important posts. What unites the two movements in principle is the political dogma of force. In their rejection of democracy and scorn of parliamentary systems of government Lenin and Mussolini are one. But there exist also other points of contact between them. Both were on their first appearance supported by the masses. Lenin and Mussolini are unthinkable on any other platform. When those masses had played their part, and when, by their help, the pre-existing system had been destroyed, the movements changed in form and partly also in direction. The curious thing is that whereas in present-day Russia the masses scarcely stand behind the Bolshevik dictatorship, yet they do stand behind the Italian dictatorship.

It is not without significance that Mussolini at first played entirely on the communistic, revolutionary strings; that he thereby enlisted popular support, and that he did everything in his power to foster the movement which he subsequently resisted and defeated. At the very moment when, in Milan in March 1919, he created his *Fasci di combattimento*, he also gave his blessing to the simultaneous occupation of the factories by the communist workers and to the proclamation of a general strike in Bologna, because, as he expresses himself, "it vindicated Italian power in its proudest and most manifest form"! "During 1919–20", says an Italian writer who prefers to remain anonymous, "there was no violent labour movement which did not gain his sympathy and approval: food riots, strikes of officials, railwaymen, and teachers, even sabotage of factories, mines, and communications, all of which would facilitate the taking over by the workers of the means of production." There was a competition for the soul of the masses in which Mussolini incited to deeds of violence and the social democrats were the restraining force. It was only when it became clear that this was not the road to success that the

volte face occurred. (There is good reason to believe that if Mussolini had succeeded as Lenin did the subsequent differences between the two movements would not have been considerable.) But the change of purpose did not affect the choice of means. Mussolini's violent methods now struck the proletariat, which was in full retreat from its advanced positions. Several witnesses bear testimony to the fact that he only intervened against Communism, which he had previously encouraged, when it had ceased to be dangerous. "Fascism only became what it is after the socialist collapse. It was developed after the socialist disillusionment, and it advanced to the attack as soon as the enemy was stationary. The attack was then launched along the whole front. Workers' councils, 'red' organisations, newspapers and institutes, communications and human beings were attacked in a fierce onslaught. Man against man, without mercy, with every weapon: ambush, fire, rifle, knife, and hand-grenade." In the atmosphere of terror and blood which ensued in this Fascist attack there occurred the terrible red excesses in Bologna and Ferrara, which in turn stimulated the reaction of bourgeois opinion, wrecked Socialism and conducted Fascism and Mussolini to power. It was after events had taken this course, and after he had destroyed the Facta Ministry, that the new dictator wrote: "If a group or a party is in possession of power, it is its duty to defend itself against all by the utmost use of force, and by using that force, when necessary, without mercy. By physical force we mean armed force. For it might happen that the opponents do not submit, and in every case where submission is refused, force must be used to compel it." An impartial observer must agree that even Lenin and his associates have not expressed themselves more clearly on this point.

But there is, it would appear, a difference in principle

between the attitude of Bolshevism and Fascism towards force. The original Bolshevism aimed at world revolution and scarcely at war. There is no doubt that Lenin contemplated the suppression of war, though we do not know to what extent he wished to make use of it to achieve world revolution. The Russian Revolution was essentially a revolution against war. Hence the Bolshevist attitude to the conception of the State was entirely negative. The national State, with its national armaments and with war as an instrument, did not enter into a conception which envisaged a proletarian world empire. Fascism, on the other hand, was from the start fully equipped with the whole of the nationalistic apparatus. From the beginning it had embraced the philosophy of power and of the State as its highest expression, and this doctrine was now applied to the "sacred" Italian fatherland. In this doctrinal structure force became, as in the German dogma of power, not primarily an inner force, but rather an acceptance and an accentuation of war, not only as an *ultima ratio* but as the natural means of settling disputes with other States and other nations.

We have referred already to the reason why Bolshevism became militarised and why war is now without doubt a part of its creed. When Denikin, Judenitch, Kolchak, and Wrangel failed to restore the old order, and when this failure became clear to its instigators—i.e. West European imperialism, the armament interests, and the emigrants—strangulation methods were tried. Russia was encircled by Clemenceau's *cordon sanitaire*, which was designed to serve two purposes: to prevent the infection from spreading to other nations, and to kill the sick patient. Nitti, the former Italian Prime Minister, writes: "No more injurious policy could have been pursued, because in this manner a nationalist character was given to Bolshevism.

It was given the rôle of defender of the Slav ideal, and at the same time it aroused in the working classes of the world a justifiable bitterness against anti-Russian policy. Owing to the fact that it was combated by the capitalistic European Powers, Bolshevism was invested, in the eyes of the world proletariate, with a halo which it did not possess in the beginning." But a third successful result was also achieved. Bolshevism was driven out into the Asiatic hunting-grounds, where revolutionary propaganda technique found full scope. Europe and the Great Powers, especially England, received Bolshevism through the back-door, and we may wonder if they do not regret the exchange now that they have witnessed the reflex action which it has stimulated in Asia. It is true that Bolshevism has not achieved its objects in Asia either. But nevertheless developments have been extremely unfavourable to imperialistic statecraft. It is doubtful also whether the system of isolation really prevented the spread of infection to Europe by underground channels. Probably the reverse is true—that a psychological atmosphere was created which would not otherwise have existed. We may well ask whether segregation, still partially maintained, serves any reasonable purpose. In any case the barbed wire which still blocks the way into Russia from Ladoga to the Black Sea is not effective.

There is assuredly no effective remedy for the Lenin disease, unless it be that Western society should understand that a visitation is approaching and that far-reaching economic and social reforms must be effected if a new outbreak at a convenient moment is to be avoided. Past events have shown that fiscal measures are no use. In any case we should realise that preparations for war directly prepare the way for the triumph of the Russian world revolution. In order to put an end to the Russian menace—which is a continuation of the Tsarist

menace, now forgotten—Europe must accommodate itself to the new position. The only escape, however difficult and impossible it may appear, is to endeavour in every possible way to draw Russia into the cultural and economic orbit of Europe, and not to shut it out. This is not to say that Europe should offer to sacrifice itself either to Bolshevik propaganda or to the eventual military advances of the Soviet. It must demand guarantees against both. The civilised countries cannot remain defenceless against such a power as past or present Russia.

Nobody up to the present has succeeded in correctly appraising developments within the Soviet. From the very beginning, and for various reasons, the end has been prophesied. The wish is father to the thought, and it is certain that it has been in the interests of the emigrants to depict the situation as untenable. Everybody agrees that a perpetual crisis has existed since Bolshevism came into power. That is not strange. A sequence of events of such importance in the history of the world usually unfolds itself in the form of successive crises, which resolve each other and which can scarcely be despatched in a decade.

Even though the economic development of Russia must be considered of the greatest importance to the rest of the world, interest nevertheless attaches primarily to the question: What will most probably happen if the present political régime should in fact collapse? One thing is quite out of the question: the restoration of the Romanoffs. Such an historical throwback is scarcely conceivable. If, against all expectations, it should occur, it would be an indescribable misfortune, much greater, indeed, than the survival of the present Government. Why? Because it would be necessary to go through the same process over again. The peasants would never, without violent resistance, relinquish the soil which, be it ever so little, has come

into their possession, and they are too ignorant to acquiesce in any parliamentary procedure. They would have little confidence in any promise that they might retain their land, but they would certainly fear the terror which the Russian landowners and princes would assuredly initiate. There is, indeed, little reason to suppose that the latter have learned anything from their ten-year sojourn in the West. There is too much of the Tartar in them for that. Another alternative would be the collapse of the present form of government without anything to replace it; a relapse into complete internal anarchy, into a war of all against all. This is, nevertheless, an alternative to be considered.

Even if nobody can foresee what will happen to Bolshevism, and to Russia under Bolshevism, yet on the other hand one may venture to express the opinion that of all possibilities the maintenance of the present régime is perhaps the least dangerous and the least unfavourable from the point of view of general development, in spite of the fact that we do not in any way underestimate its dangers. But there is reason to believe—or at any rate to hope—that the course of developments will be such that with widening experience the Bolshevist leaders will prove adaptable, and that from their adaptability—especially in the economic sphere—a more reasonable system will be evolved which will approach Europe and which a far-sighted European statesmanship will be able to approach with some degree of confidence.

One of the differences between Bolshevism and Fascism —to resume our comparison between the two movements—is of course their attitude to the capitalistic system. The very considerable concessions which the Bolshevik leaders have made have not shaken the anti-capitalistic principles of Bolshevism. Fascism, on the other hand, became, as soon as it

had passed the proletarian stage, sympathetic to capital. It even found in capital a zealous supporter, because capital naturally found in Fascism a saviour from economic chaos and communistic expropriation. Mussolini, in his turn, immediately after his conversion sought the aid of capital. By a series of measures he sought to strengthen the capitalistic system of production. Thus, for example, he exempted foreign capital invested in Italian undertakings from taxation; he abolished the existing parliamentary investigations into supplies to the army—which threatened certain powerful interests; he granted to industry a remission of three hundred million lira in taxes and he abolished death duties. All this implied, as seen against the background of continued inflation and a rising cost of living, a transfer of wealth from the middle and lower classes to the plutocrats.

It is not without interest for our purpose to examine further the relations of Italian Fascism to capital. (Fascist circles in Germany and France combine their anti-democratic tendencies with the reproach that democracy is in the leading strings of high finance: an accusation which is not altogether unjustified.) That Italian Fascism chose the same path is in any case evident. The Italian plutocracy executed a double manœuvre in order to achieve its ends. In the first place it succeeded in shifting the main burden of taxation to the middle and working classes on the pretext that the formation of new capital should not be discouraged. At the same time, the depreciation of the currency gave them fresh gains. When finally, in 1925, Mussolini tried to check the growing power of the financial groups (by an unsuccessful decree relating to exchange transactions), industry, the banks, limited companies, and chambers of commerce were alarmed and tried with all their power to prevent the deflation which the Government sought to bring

about. As soon as the conflict began, obscure and powerful forces were set in motion and gained the victory. When, occasionally, Fascist workers, compelled by circumstances, threatened to strike, the State intervened and secured an apparent improvement for the Fascist syndicate, but at the cost of great benefits to the undertakings concerned, in the form of remission of taxation or raised tariffs. This price had, of course, in due time to be paid by the consumers. We need not be surprised, therefore, at the support which the Fascist movement secures from capital. Industry, as the goose that lays the golden eggs, its Press, and its election apparatus, has repeatedly expressed its gratitude and devotion. Internally capitalism is protected by restrictions on the free movement of labour. Externally it enjoys the advantages of high protection, which owing to the nationalistic dogma is regarded as of value in itself. But this protection has deprived industry in the long run of the spur to those industrial improvements which, under the pressure of free labour and foreign competition, would be apparent, whilst at the same time these conditions lessen the possibilities of expansion in the home market owing to the impoverishment of the working classes and the middle classes. The September crisis of 1929 in Italian Fascism seems to indicate that Italian finance is now tired of the rough Fascist régime. Bankers and industrialists are beginning to regret their isolation from Western developments, and to fear for their own economic future and that of Italy. The change of British policy, and the growing friendship between the two mightiest Powers ruling the "economic waves", has been a shock to them. In all probability even the Duce shares these feelings in his heart. In spite of his proclamations and his provocative speeches he must surely be nervous about the outcome. But both he and the financiers appear to have failed on this occasion to

bring about a normalisation of conditions. The lieutenants and *les caporaux* of Fascism have been victorious. They do not doubt the blessings of the system. Assuredly not.

Italian Fascists, and their imitators in other countries, never cease to proclaim that Fascism is the new light in Europe. It represents a higher form of government, a hitherto unapproached ideal of statecraft. "Fascism offers new ideals, opens up new domains of historical thought, signifies a new theory of State, is the crown of historical experiment, and offers the Western races a fund of ideas which will suffice for the present century and will give it a name and a character." If we examine this new dogma more closely we shall find there is not much new in it, and that little not so very new at that. In the Fascist cult of the State we recognise the German philosophy of power. It is a direct descendant of the latter. Its economic programme is not without elements of corruption. Its vain self-advertisement and bombast is perhaps human, but might well be modified. The story, in Kipling's *Jungle Book*, of the Bandalogs who always call out to the other people of the jungle, "Come and look at us, we are the most remarkable beasts of the jungle, we are the mighty Bandalogs!" involuntarily comes to mind. As regards the famous orderliness which so much astonishes tourists—among other things because trains really arrive and depart as they do in the rest of Europe—it scarcely equals its German prototype. The suppression of liberty of the Press, of the right of public meeting, is certainly something new in the age of democracy; but a reactionary Power has always found similar expression when it dared, and when the people had no strength to resist it. No phrases can alter this fact. Fascism is, from a broad point of view, a post-war reaction in the most acute and pregnant form, carried to extremes by a crude and fanatical nationalism. Not even

"sacred egotism" is new as a principle of State. It has for centuries been associated with the Florentine and Italian name Machiavelli. But it has been granted to the new Italy of the XXth century publicly to proclaim it as an ethical principle. On the other hand, we must recognise and, with Keyserling, emphasise the element of heroism, of *Spannung*, which Fascism possesses.

We have already called attention to the Italian need for expansion. That it is intimately combined with a revival of militarism is in the nature of things. In May 1927 Mussolini said: "The spirit of Locarno has vanished. All the nations are armed. Italy must arm. It must be in a position to mobilise five million men and arm them, and our air forces must be so numerous that they will darken the sun." Doubtless! Europe already lives in the shadow of Italian militarism, as of the French, and as formerly of the German. The Fascist traditions are a direct continuation of German developments before the world-war. The analogies are evident. Italy has now assumed Germany's rôle, though partially caricatured. Nowhere is the type of the War Society so evident as here. Reaction, militarism, force as a principle, political tyranny, suppression of democratic institutions, and, as a climax, the Dictatorship. Mussolini's Italy is directly referred to in the condemnatory words of Briand spoken at Geneva in the autumn of 1929, when he characterised as criminal the education of youth for war—though we may well ask if they do not equally apply to France. The German professor, Bonn, writes of the resemblance to Bismarckian Prussia: "It is doubtful if Mussolini, who began his career as a Socialist, is at bottom more revolutionary than the German Junker, von Bismarck. In both cases we have a strong man usurping power under the shadow of a king. Both refuse to share their power with a Parliament, or to

waste their strength in convincing their opponents. Both rule by violence and persecution. Both pursue a nationalistic foreign policy, and both understand how at the right moment to foment national prejudices to the extreme. The resemblance could be carried still farther to show how Mussolini has Prussianised Italy by means of the administrative system, and we may ask the interesting question how much Prussianisation it will stand." It is amusing to observe how German Fascism reacts against this plunder of German mental property. One of its representatives says: "It sounds contrary to reason to talk of a Fascist idea. It would be more correct to describe the new forces by a name which would clearly show that they are an organically developed German idea, Prussianism transferred to Italian soil, modified and modernised; that Prussianism which in the persons of Frederick the Great and Bismarck embodies an unparalleled ethical, constructive, and vitalising idea and method. It is intelligible that the Italians to-day are not willing to name the parents of their movement. But history will one day designate Fascism as the Prussification of Italy." Germany avenged herself in a terrible manner on her treacherous ally—who attacked her in the rear during the world-war and introduced the new "ethical" age with this treachery—when she made Italy accept the inheritance under the weight of which she had herself collapsed.

Bolshevism and Fascism have not been considered here from the point of view of general culture. We have discussed them only so far as their cultural—or rather anti-cultural—elements influence European politics—especially in regard to the question of peace and war. Nobody knows exactly how or in what direction these forces will influence future developments. That they are danger "points" can scarcely be doubted, nor that they are powers to war. The danger is all the

greater as there are forces in all countries which as soon as the peace is broken will range themselves on the Fascist or Bolshevik side, black or white, of dictatorship. That neither democracy nor the liberty of the people may expect any mercy if they are subdued is clearly shown by a study of the psychology of the two movements as described above. Democracy should be on its guard against any illusions in this respect.

Two years ago Mussolini in one of his speeches reminded his faithful followers of their entry into the world-war, and asked them whether they were ready at any time to make the same decision again. He immediately received the desired affirmative reply. "So long", says an English newspaper in reference to this intermezzo, "as such a question and such an answer are possible in a European Great Power, we are as far removed from peace as in 1914." Assuredly we are.

CHAPTER IX

ASIA AND THE EUROPEANS

No educated Westerner can be ignorant of the fact that something remarkable is happening in that vast territory, of which Europe is merely a projecting lobe of land, among the Asiatic masses from which long ago migrating streams issued and populated our continent. But we are perhaps not always so clear in our minds that what is happening is of the most serious import to Europe. In order to understand it we must first understand that the earth is becoming unified, that the antipodes are becoming linked.

The linking up of the different parts of the world is not the work of a day. It began with the European Renaissance, with Marco Polo's travels and Columbus's voyages of discovery. Not till four hundred years later was the new geographical map complete and the supremacy of the white races on the globe in the main established. Only a few areas escaped the process. Japan, owing to its insular position, but more especially because it early—before European policy became annexionist—adopted the technical civilisation which made Europe outwardly so strong but inwardly so weak, and knew where to obtain the strength necessary to avoid the fate of the other races—subjection to the white man. China, to which mechanical progress was more alien than anything else, was too big to be swallowed even in a dismembered form, though Europe tried its best. The African continent, on the other hand, was dismembered and swallowed entirely. Only Abyssinia and Liberia remained free.

Such was the position at the outbreak of the war. The extra-European world, with the exception of the areas just men-

tioned and America, was divided among certain Great Powers, with England in possession of the greatest and the best part.

The war was in this respect, as in so many others, the herald of something new. The change in the relations of Asia to Europe, which was introduced by the Russo-Japanese War, in which for the first time the Mongols defeated the "Christians" on a large scale, is now complete. Asia is now in full revolt. There can be no doubt that this is the significance of present events. Taken separately it may be that impressions from China, Turkey, India, Afghanistan, and Palestine are not seen in proper perspective. But taken together they can have no other meaning than that Asia is in revolt against Europe. It is a movement at once away from and against Europe. A study of the literature of Asiatic problems and conditions—and it is copious enough—leaves us no doubt, however composed the picture sometimes is and however kaleidoscopically the position shifts, that whilst Europe is licking its numerous and deep sores the Asiatic colossus is rising from its long sleep. Upton Close, who founds his opinions on a study on the spot, says of the situation: "The synthesis has begun. It will continue until the white man has been forced to render up his special privileges in Asia and to recognise in word and deed the equality of the Asiatic peoples racially, socially, morally, and culturally." These are perhaps disputable questions from the European point of view, but not from the Asiatic; and it is the latter who make the demand and rise up to enforce it practically everywhere, even though in places the fire is not yet lit but only lies and smoulders. Unconditional European supremacy is, since the war, a thing of the past. This is one of the most evident, though not sufficiently appreciated, results of the war. *The world-wide results of European "Realpolitik" are now growing.* It was undoubtedly the

world-war which inspired the Asiatic agitation. But European policy towards the Asiatic peoples prepared it long ago. European force, tyranny, and profiteering have struck deep into the Asiatic soul. How deep nobody can at present say with certainty.

Interest centres principally in China and events there. Japan is certainly of importance, as are also Turkish developments and conditions among the three hundred millions of India; but all who know are agreed that it is China which will determine the broad lines of development of the new Asia. During the latter part of 1928 the great Chinese puzzle began to assume a form from which it was possible to guess what the final result would be. For a long time it seemed impossible, even for the initiated, to prophesy whether it would be the nationalistic Southern China which would triumph over the ancient Northern China, or vice versa. After the defeat of Chang-so-lin and the comparative stabilisation which appears to have been effected under the rule of the Southern Government, one is certainly justified in asserting that China will never again be dominated by European imperialism, and that in many respects a new China will arise out of the chaos. Those who hold the ideas of which Dr. Sun-yat-sen was the protagonist are now transforming the Celestial Empire, which in point of fact collapsed at the moment when its millions clearly perceived that the "Son of Heaven" was unable to resist the "heathen devils". Something snapped. Out of this collapse was born the Chinese Republic. It is a mistake to suppose that only the Southern Chinese leaders desired a united China and deliverance from the foreign yoke. The defeated and banished ancient Chinese Government of the North was also saturated with the same thought, despite its opposition to the South. In the middle of the great riots of

1927 the American Minister in China said: "The world may be assured that the whole China will not rest until its independence and national integrity are realised. It sees no reason why it should not just as well now as later recover its rights, and it is ready to make every sacrifice to secure the satisfaction of these demands." The question which the Chinese independence movement has made acute for the Occident is formulated in an expression of one of the leaders of Southern China, Soong, a graduate of Harvard and the financial leader of the Southern Government: "The question now is, since China has shown that it can be master in its own house, how much it will generously permit foreigners to retain of the privileges which they have illegally obtained."

A special indication of the rôle which the new China will play in the Pan-Asiatic movement is afforded by the caution with which Japan nowadays treats its big neighbour, which for a long time it treated with as little consideration as did the Great Powers. The Japanese shark formerly, like the European beast of prey, endeavoured to bite out pieces wherever it could from the body of the colossus. When now, during the decisive struggles between North and South China, dangerous situations and even direct conflict between the Chinese and Japanese troops arose, Japan did not, it is true, cede its positions, but it displayed conspicuous moderation, which nevertheless did not prevent the Chinese from resorting to the dangerous boycott of Japanese goods. There is probably no prospect of a situation in which the two great Asiatic Powers will be opposed to each other whilst the European Powers will again snatch the bone away from between them. The slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" holds the field. It is an open question, moreover, whether Japan does not already understand that China will play first violin in the Asiatic orchestra, and that by virtue

of its vast though ill-developed resources it will be called to political and economic leadership. This modesty of Japan would then correspond with the repeated failures to which Japanese policy has led and with the economic weakness which still afflicts the island empire. Even the war with Russia, which ended in a victory for Japan, may be regarded as a misfortune. It did not give the expected result, and it exhausted the country more than one is usually disposed to believe.

The role of the young Chinese Republic is also reflected in the attention and expectation with which other Asiatic peoples follow the course of events in the Far East, and in the fact that the Chinese agitation leaves its traces everywhere among these peoples. From Tokyo to Cairo the influence is felt.

The whole picture reveals European imperialism in Asia in full retreat, even though for the present and for some time to come it may retain its position in certain areas. There is no possibility of this retreat being converted into a new offensive. Should this, against all expectations, occur, all Asia would probably be aflame. Fortunately Europe is too weak for the purpose. So much gain the war has brought.

It is England which is primarily affected by the Asiatic crisis. It has its most valuable possession in Asia. India lies half-way between Turkey and China, the two new leaders. Even if Egypt belongs geographically to another continent, it has spiritual affinities with the East. England is fully conscious that its power there is tottering.

Developments on the globe cannot fail to be influenced by the manner in which England resolves the crisis with which the Asiatic agitation confronts the Empire. But the British race has proved its capacity for adaptability. Its peculiar intuition has guided it in previous great crises, both those relating to its own government and those which relate to its colonies.

Incredibly difficult as it is to extricate itself with honour and without too great loss from this position, the world has a feeling that England and the English people are working forward to a new position which will accord with the changed conditions in Asia. The Frenchman, Eugène Jung, who is clearly dissatisfied with French policy in the Far East, says: "England is the country which has begun to understand. France must not allow itself to be outdistanced in the return to sound sense just because of the great profits of certain ambitious groups of financiers."

The really great question is, however, whether England can free itself from the hereditary dogma that its prosperity, its trade and economic power, the well-being of its people, is bound and fettered to its sea power and its military "occupation of the world". The creation of the Dominions was one step in this direction. It showed the ability of English statesmen to hear when the bell has sounded.

This adaptability will be put to the supreme test, however, in relation to India and to Egypt. Neither can anybody at the present time affirm that England would render a service to civilisation—even if it could disregard its own interests—by relinquishing India and abandoning it to its own resources to become the cockpit of racial strife and internal disorder, which its people are not yet able to suppress. But on the other hand it may retain India, in which case the question is, how long? Only an expert will venture to express an opinion. As regards Egypt, England appears to have good reason not entirely to relinquish it. The bold step of the new Cabinet in introducing, in combination with the recall of the High Commissioner, self-government will surely prove to be one of those wise measures characteristic of British policy at its best.

The demand for the complete and unconditional indepen-

dence of the colonial peoples, without consideration of the consequences, can scarcely be regarded as reasonable. But England is in a dilemma. Almost superhuman statesmanship will be required to escape from it. Close formulates England's dilemma as follows: "How much will England retain if it surrenders its political preponderance and places its industry and commerce on a basis of equality without any special advantages? That is the serious problem. On the answer depends the future of the British people."

But this question has still wider implications. It affects in a way the whole white race. The revolt of Asia changes the whole perspective. Is not the Asiatic revolt the last link in a mighty chain? From the French Revolution and the Napoleonic age, with their reactions on the whole of European policy, to the collapse of German imperialism and of the Russian Tsardom? And now comes the final retreat from the positions in Asia held by the military force and imperialism of the European Great Powers. What, finally, apart from occasional gains and successes, has been the harvest of European policy? Great, decisive, strategic defeat. "There is a point", Ferrero writes, "at which power destroys itself. The West has thoughtlessly passed that point."

What is most important, however, is how the Chinese question will develop. What form will the Chinese movement take? Will China follow the example of Japan and become an imperialistic Power?

The Japanese example should not prove especially alluring to China. Nor are conditions quite the same. Japanese development was very largely determined by the disproportion between the growth of population and the space available. It forced Japan first to the occupation of Korea, after defeating helpless China. It led also to the conflict with Russia in 1904, as a

result of which Japan acquired the southern part of Manchuria whilst Russia retained the northern half. But these successes have not brought any rational solution. Japan is battling with great difficulties. Its trade and industry have difficulty in maintaining themselves, and its military armaments have cost sums which its finances can ill afford. On the other hand China has doubtless learned that there is no hope of free development if it does not, like Japan, imitate Europe's technical, commercial, and, partly, military organisation. The national movement has now attained its first objective. China has achieved self-determination, and nobody will in future seek to dispute it. There was a time during the conflict in China when it was not at all sure that relations with Europe, and especially England, would develop so smoothly. English financial interests sought with all their power to induce the British Government to intervene in order that its economic supremacy should not be lost. The English Press in Shanghai published inflammatory articles demanding the despatch of more troops, and sought to induce the Government not to restrict itself to the defence of the concessions. The Government, which realised the impossibility of an aggressive policy in China, declined. The firm language of the Radical Press assuredly also allayed the danger. Similarly the U.S.A. showed a reasonable attitude to the new China. It withdrew its contingents of troops and hastened, first of all, to recognise the Nationalist Government. The Chinese Revolution has thus been treated in a different manner than formerly the French and more recently the Russian. There is thus reason to hope that the course of events will in this case be different, and that the new national combination in the Far East will not be directed by external force into the loathsome nationalism which, combined with militarism, would develop into aggres-

sion. The marks which European supremacy have left on the Chinese soul still remain, but time perhaps will remove them.

The great hope, however, in the development of China is that the Chinese people will not follow the same paths of development as the Japanese. The Chinese are not of the bellicose type. Their history has been peaceful throughout known time. They are an industrious race, refined, artistic, and with a high culture which is in many respects immensely superior to that of the West.

At the present moment the new National Government has been obliged to adopt the methods of the dictatorship in order to restore order in the country. A strong government is at present a matter of life and death to China. The Government must put an end to civil war and battles between generals. It must suppress the troops of bandits and robbers who terrorise the peaceful population. China is now living under exceptional conditions. The organisation of the military system has even become a necessity. The reduction in war strength is to be regarded as a consolidation of power in the hands of the Government, and a reduction of that of the generals. In spite of their departures from democratic policy, one has the impression that the new men in China nevertheless still follow the lines laid down by the great Sun-yat-sen.

An expression of the spirit which appears to inspire the new Asia, and especially China, is found in the resolution which was adopted at the Pan-Asiatic Conference in Nagasaki in 1926, at which representatives of China, Japan, India, Siam, the Philippines, and Korea participated. The resolution embraced the following points:

Race equality.

Liberation of the nations now ruled by foreigners.

Class and religious equality.

Creation of a Pan-Asiatic university.

Creation of a central propaganda organisation in Asia.

Creation of a Pan-Asiatic bank.

Universal peace on the basis of equality and justice.

It may be remarked that this programme includes the chief ideas of the French Revolution. There is no expression of the old, deep-rooted European chauvinism. One may ascribe more or less importance to this resolution and to the Nagasaki Congress—as also to those held in Cairo and Mecca. All three, however, appear to give expression to the temper and demands of an awakening Asia. The Nagasaki Conference raises the hope that the spirit which there found expression will be the guiding spirit of Asia.

But the hope of a happy development of Asiatic conditions may be dashed. In the last resort the result will depend on European developments. If Europe remains as it has been, ruled by militarism and imperialism, or if the dangerous developments of which we have sketched the results continue, or are further accentuated, they must inevitably influence developments in Asia. Such a Europe will be unable to keep its hands off Asia. In that case it is to be expected that the favourable turn which the Chinese crisis has now taken will be reversed. An Asiatic imperialism will take its place. It is possible that the leadership may then fall to Japan. One who knows conditions in the East unusually well remarks on this point: "If China, the most reasonable nation in Asia, achieves its ambitions without having to fight the white man, the impression will spread over the whole of Asia that it is possible to come to an understanding with him in a sympathetic and peaceful manner. Militarism will be forced back. Otherwise a conflict, whoever gives cause for it, will be inter-

preted as a proof that the only argument which the white man understands is the thunder of cannon, and militarism will rise like a flood tide over the whole of Asia." If the Russian advance in Manchuria of the summer of 1929 really leads to a Russo-Chinese war, the prophecies of this observer will probably be realised. The whole possibility of a favourable development would be at stake. Curiously enough, Europe takes the matter calmly.

It is to be observed that Asia has learned another thing: organised propaganda. The Nagasaki programme refers to a central propaganda organisation for Asia. The U.S.S.R., which failed throughout Asia and encountered adamantine resistance to its ideas, made a present to the Asiatics, and especially to China, of its terrible propaganda weapon.

Nobody knows what will occur if Asia is driven to militarism. But it is more than probable that in such case what has happened hitherto may be regarded as merely a foretaste of what is to come. If China became militarised, English and French rule in India would not last long. Pressed by East-Asiatic military forces, and with India in revolt, England and France would no longer be able to control the situation. But things will certainly not stop there. A bridge over to Egypt exists, and thence to the oppressed black races. The Asiatic revolt against European imperialism, against everything that European policy stands for, may be the impulse which will set the coloured races in motion.

The choice which confronts the West involves consequences far beyond its own boundaries. It is not only developments in Europe which are at stake. The revolt in Asia against the Europeans, and the effects which this revolt may produce on the coloured races, is perhaps the most potent feature of the present situation.

CHAPTER X

THE IMPERIALISTIC WAR

IMPERIALISM, in the sense of dominion over other nations, has existed at all times as a product of the will to rule and expand. To some extent it has probably always been mingled with economic motives and the desire for wealth.

But that is not what we understand by imperialism to-day. It is not modern imperialism. The latter was first born when the motive of economic power became dominant, when the economic factor preponderated and entered into an apparently indissoluble union with two other factors of development, militarism and nationalism, and when the "great three" interacted on each other. In order to define the conception of the imperialistic war we must therefore refer to the economic system—the capitalistic system—which controls the imperialistic West.

Nobody, to our knowledge, has clearly elucidated what the capitalistic system is. Its synthesis has not been discovered. Those are probably right who say, with Wells, that whatever else a capitalistic system is, it is not a system. It is a phenomenon of which the various conditions cannot easily be classified. But certain it is that one of the conditions is technical. Technical revolution created modern industrialism. Industrialism in its turn is the main foundation of capitalism. Not of capital as a whole—for there are other gold-producing veins—but of the capitalistic "system". In antiquity and during the feudal ages wealth might accumulate just as it still does in non-capitalistic countries. The riches of the East are not of a capitalistic nature.

In industrial capitalism, on the other hand, there must be

an incessant accumulation of capital, even though at certain intervals some of this accumulation is wasted away during crises. This capacity of modern capitalism to accumulate new capital leads, as experience shows, to a further increase of the means of production, and these in turn to increased production, even though there may be set-backs. But in the main, developments show, ever since the advent of mechanical industry, a constantly rising curve of capital accumulation and a consistently growing output. It is a rolling wheel with the mysterious power of growing whilst it rolls. It is an aggregate so vast and so many-sided that it does not appear possible to survey the whole. In certain branches of production—especially those intended for home consumption—one can see that production is dependent on demand; in other branches, where export industries are concerned, this does not seem to be the case. Production creates ever-new masses of goods. If they cannot be sold there automatically arise crises, unaccountable in their effects, which cause production to stop or to be restricted for the moment.

In pre-capitalistic times such phenomena, caused by immoderate and incalculable production, were unknown. The difficulties in those days were usually caused and characterised by a shortage of goods due to causes which had nothing to do with methods of production, such as bad harvests, war, pestilence, etc., which produced a deficit instead of a surplus.

In its earlier stages, as in England and Germany, capitalistic industrialism was able, by displacing handicraft and by creating an excess of industrial population, to obtain a home market for a greater volume of production. The real industrial countries, among which France and, above all, America were soon numbered, were also able, by penetration of the non-capitalistic

countries—especially Russia and South America—to create the necessary outlet for their increased production.

Developments entered into a new phase when the Atlantic States were more or less completely industrialised with the help of ever-new machinery; the volume of production increased to such an extent that it could only be disposed of with difficulty.

This stage was entered upon by England later than, for example, by Germany, because before the capitalistic age it had, for the benefit of its trade, acquired extensive colonial possessions. As a result of the tension which has everywhere arisen, economic developments have begun to run parallel with a political development which aims at relieving the difficulty by the acquisition of new markets. The increasing stricture of the extra-European markets intensified competition and at the same time automatically increased the political strain between the competitors. This was especially true of Germany and England, but also of France. When developments assumed the form of State intervention, either diplomatical or military, in the interests of capital and production, in order to gain concessions or to make annexations in the non-capitalistic countries, the purely imperialistic stage of development was reached. We then reached the threshold of modern imperialism.

The deepest cause of the Great War is probably to be found in the conflict of German industrialism and capitalism with the fully developed and world-wide British imperialism. In this statement there is nothing which denies the importance of those political causes which have previously been mentioned as leading to the same result. They are two parallel courses of events, each inducing the other. The Franco-German tension was not of the same accentuated economic kind. In this case the

political and psychological motives predominated. But there also the economic tension and the industrial progress of Germany constituted a threat. In the relations between England and Germany it was the motive of economic power which was decisive. We have already pointed out how, when German imperialism, partly urged on by the capital invested in industry, began to compete directly with England in armaments at sea, this was the cause of a re-orientation of British policy against Germany. The German armaments aimed at two objectives: to guarantee its newly acquired political power, and to increase the latter and to support economic expansion. From this latter endeavour spring the post-Bismarck German plans, especially in the East, with its unexhausted markets. The diffuse lust of power, which saturated the leading groups, became more and more subservient to the capitalist interests and the behests of industry, thereby increasing the demands of the latter. Everywhere there was a tendency to greater accumulations of power, capital, and production, which in turn required further room for expansion. As a result of these later developments in Germany, English capitalism was thrown on the defensive. England had all that it required, but could not successfully meet the more rational competition.

Fritz Sternberg says in *Der Imperialismus*: "We can no longer speak of an imperialism independent of capitalism. Both in antiquity and in later times there have existed colonial foundations and the like. But there is a distinct difference between these and modern imperialistic advances. With the present industrial system producing a constant surplus and an accumulation of capital, advance supported by the power of the State has become a necessity."

The force with which the necessity for such advances manifests itself varies. The degree of necessity depends upon the

fact that so long as a State has a capacity for internal expansion the necessity is correspondingly less. This applies, for example, to the U.S.A., and also to France and Italy. That Russia and Italy show a tendency to expansion (which was in any case true of Russia under the Tsars) is due to the fact that in those power-complexes there existed other strong factors than the economic factor, i.e. the pure desire to rule and to possess power of any kind. In Italy there is in addition, as has been emphasised already, over-population—"the production of children"—which also requires its market. Italy desires by an expansion of power to support this production, which in its turn will give the country additional strength.

If we are of opinion, with Sternberg, that imperialism is the phase of the capitalistic industrial development in which it advances farther and farther into the non-capitalistic countries which it seeks to bring under its sovereignty, then we may also ask, with him: "Is it not imperialism if highly developed capitalistic States attack by war areas already capitalistically compact?" Sternberg replies: "If the Pan-Germans wish to acquire French raw material markets, or if the French annex the German Ruhr, both desires are without doubt expressions of imperialism, for imperialism has a decisive influence on the relations between sovereign States. The annexation of the Ruhr district by France would vastly strengthen the position of French capitalism in the constantly increasing international competition. On the one hand it would imply an access of power of a purely political nature, which would be of importance in the relations between the active Great Powers and the imperialist States. On the other hand, in the advances in extra-European countries the base from which the advance is made is very important. The greater the tension between the imperialistic States, the more im-

portant it is for them to strengthen the base from which it is made. In consequence there always enter considerations *in which the struggle for the base itself* takes a primary place. At such a moment the *political* elements are decisive. The economic elements are camouflaged and thrust into the background. This fact should be specially noted. In the increasing interplay of the struggle for political power and the desire for economic expansion, first one and then the other is forced to the front. In armaments, coalitions, and diplomacy it is practically impossible to distinguish these interactions. Their influence in the parallelogram of forces can never be mathematically determined. It is only in isolated cases that it is possible to make such a differentiation."

So long as there existed unoccupied territory in the world—areas of consumption which were not exploited—the economic tension might be resolved otherwise than by war. But when this territory became more and more limited as a market for constantly increasing output, the tension became unbearable. It found its first real outlet in the world-war. But the world-war itself has introduced an epoch in which the strain may be still further increased. The industrialisation of Asia has begun, not only in Japan, but also in Turkey and China. South America also is in train to escape European producers as its States become more and more dependent on the U.S.A. Finally the great Russian market has, for well-known reasons, for the present disappeared.

Owing to its immense home market America before the war had not reached the stage of development at which it required additional territory for the disposal of its output. Germany was undoubtedly worst off in relation to the extent and capacity of its industry. Its colonial relations were extremely unsatisfactory. The disproportion is shown by the fact that

whereas England before the war had invested in its colonies 35 milliard marks, or 50 per cent. of its total foreign investments, Germany had only opportunity to invest 1 per cent. England's turnover with its colonies amounted to 35 to 40 per cent. of its total trade; Germany's to only 1 per cent. By the loss of its colonies this disproportion has been still further accentuated.

If the main features of this sketch are correct there is some justice in the statement that if the Western industrial system cannot be regulated in a rational manner, or if the existing politico-military-capitalistic combination cannot be dissolved, then the system must by its own dynamic force lead to a renewed mighty conflict.

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In his book *The Great Illusion*, published in 1909, which in its day was regarded as a portent and as particularly well adapted to influence particular interests, Norman Angell sought to prove that war was, economically, very bad business, and that nowadays it could not bring any economic gain to the victor. But Norman Angell in reality saw only the commercial side of the question. He did not enter into the problem of the system of production and its influence on war and peace. To some extent, therefore, his treatment is superficial. The world-war, which broke out five years after the publication of his book, showed that he was in the main right in his thesis that nowadays a nation cannot gain anything by war, even if we regard the case of the U.S.A. as doubtful. This exception is only partially explained by the fact that the U.S.A. was a great supplier of war material to the belligerents, whilst it was only for a very short time an active participator in the

war. The real reason why the economic reactions did not affect America is probably the fact that America constituted a practically closed area of production and consumption, of which the export trade was not based on countries more or less ruined by the war. Had the export trade of the U.S.A. been based to any considerable extent on exports to Europe it would not have escaped the most serious consequences of the world crisis.

The time when a war might bring a profit either to the State or to an industrial area is definitely past. Still less will a war be profitable when it is directed towards the destruction of the means of production, and when such destruction on a large scale must be regarded as practically certain. On the other hand we cannot entirely escape the fear that developments may be such that war will be waged in order to destroy or seriously to damage the apparatus of production of a rival. This must lead to a further and more violent development of the typical imperialist war, i.e. war for the purpose of destroying the machinery of production of a competitor in the world market. It may be conceived as a consequence of acute insanity in mankind. On the other hand reason must, as has been said, establish the thesis of growing economic unity, as a result of which large-scale destruction, wherever it may occur, will affect everybody and thus react on the destroyers. Similarly the possibility of obtaining reparations when the means of production in a country have been destroyed will be excluded. No longer can the consumed milliards be recovered in that manner. The world-war and the present forms of warfare should have dispelled any illusions of war as a profitable business for the State or for manufacturing interests. The importance of this fact can scarcely be overestimated.

But even though States and manufacturing interests cannot

gain anything by war, yet it is without doubt true that individuals and particular financial circles may still profit by war and by preparations for war. The loathsome race of war profiteers was extremely numerous during and after the war, and certain large financial combines certainly earned immense sums by a war which slew millions and caused a destruction of wealth amounting to hundreds of milliards. Even though these war profits, cynically garnered, shrank or vanished entirely in the economic post-war changes, yet they did exist, even if they do so no longer. The possibility of vampires amassing wealth out of a war fought by others has probably not vanished.

All these things are not without their significance. The urge of Western economics towards war is due to the capitalist system as now constituted, and *to its alliance with the military power*. So long as this system must be regarded as the mechanical product of technical progress it will remain practically dead to outside influences. When an unrestrained greed for gold, the result of materialistic thought, was combined with this development it could not fail to exert its influence over the whole of the field which it dominated. The first and most natural deduction is that if such be the deepest cause of war every attempt to prevent it must be useless. War must ensue with the force of a natural law so long as this system exists and sets its stamp on the West. Perhaps it may be so. In that case, as we have indicated in our Introduction, it is technical revolution, leading to three results: the materialisation and mechanisation of the West; the new technical war of destruction; and a system of production which automatically tends towards war, which is the *profoundest cause of the threat of annihilation*.

It is scarcely possible to check technical progress. The consequence is, therefore, that only a victory over the capitalistic

system of production can render possible the abolition of war. Sternberg, whom we quoted above, says that without the destruction of the capitalist system it is just as impossible to prevent war as to square the circle. This line of thought leads, however, straight to social revolution. There is no third way. The error in this reasoning is obvious. Its advocates have not—even if it were possible entirely to eliminate capitalism without a destruction of economic life more complete than in Russia—offered any evidence at all that war would not flourish equally in a communistic world. It would even seem that there is reason to fear that if manufacturing interests were nationalised the undoubted dangers of the present system would be replaced by an even greater danger. We cannot be sure that the desire to abolish war, which is present in the advocates of the social revolution, will be sufficient in the future to cope with the difficulties which the demand for markets will create. Doubtless if evidence could be adduced that the destruction of the capitalistic system would, without at the same time ruining the possibilities of maintaining the population, lead to the abolition of war, there would also be good reason for supporting those who wish to make the social revolution world-wide. But such evidence is totally lacking. On the contrary, one may assert very definitely that the two most important lessons of the Russian Revolution are that the doctrine of the ability of the Marxist revolution to guarantee the subsistence of the people has been destroyed and that everything tends to show that the abolition of war would not follow upon an extension of the revolution.

But have we with these arguments exhausted the possibilities of escape?

Up to the present no serious effort has been made to escape by means of *regulating* the present system of production. It

may be that the latter is a soulless product of the technical revolution, but this in its turn is the product of human thought and science. It should be possible to regulate the system in a manner which would not destroy it; to put a brake on its dangerous developments. Probably the result will be the same as that which will emerge sooner or later from the present conflict between labour and capital if developments are not interrupted by war. We may hope that economic science, in conjunction with practical men, will not be impotent in its endeavours to throw light on the numerous dark places. Serious efforts in this direction must be made. On the possibility of discovering an acceptable solution of this profound economic problem depends largely—some say entirely—the possibility of securing an age of peace in the West. What we have to establish is, in the first place, that Norman Angell's thesis is correct, and in the second place that economic power has proved *not* to be dependent on military power. Germany has been compelled to furnish a copybook example of this fact. Disarmed Germany has a chance of becoming an economic Great Power—if it is not one already—in spite of the fact that it must drag along the immense burden which its armaments have indirectly brought upon it. Even before the war there existed other illuminating examples of the same kind. Holland occupied a strong economic position even before the war. Belgian 3 per cent. bonds were quoted before the war at 96, whilst the 3 per cent. bonds of a Germany armed to the teeth stood at 82, and $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. bonds of Russia, with its army of millions, at 81. The militarily weak Norway was quoted at 102. This tendency has become even more clear since the war, and it emphasises the fact that military power and economic prosperity are not identical conceptions, and that armaments must not be regarded as in any way a

condition of economic progress. The militarily weak smaller States are beginning successfully to compete with the Great Powers in the world market, and have secured a part of it. Sweden is a brilliant example. There is nothing to indicate that this is accidental. On the contrary it is probable that we have here an important proof that economic success is not linked to the military power of the State. If this be admitted, *then one historical dogma falls to the ground.*

Economic and political leaders will perhaps understand that imperialistic aggression, characterised by annexations, concessions, and subsequent conflicts of the controlling bodies, is artificial and *can* be replaced by free competition. In that case only economically backward States would be inclined to adopt imperialism in the modern sense, because they would be beaten in competition. Does the decision in this respect lie primarily with England? America, with its potential resources may well be willing to join those who denounce force, even though at present she follows the old lines of development. The change has not yet come.

That it will come we can only hope. There is a chance. Such a development will assuredly not take place unless there occur at the same time essential changes in the political field. So far as changes leading to free competition between the nations and to the exclusion of military force occur, the situation would be changed. They would at any rate render possible the breaking of the alliance between militarism and imperialism, so that the latter would no longer have a military emphasis. That would not necessarily mean the end of imperialism in the form of economic expansion, but its most dangerous manifestations would be removed. Imperialism would no longer be imperialism in its present form.

Even if attempts to change the present system of production

by regulatory measures were to break down or yield only very slow results, all hope would not be excluded of so modifying the system that it would no longer tend towards war. If only the capitalistic system and the forces behind it could be divorced from militarism and the latter be rejected, a great and decisive step would have been taken in the abolition of war between economically competing nations. Developments afford a certain hope that this is possible. In order that it should be so, sufficient time must be available for the process. The necessary work can never be done unless by some means we can protect the world against the outbreak of war in the immediate future. The devotees of the social revolution will certainly deny that such methods are possible. If they are right, so much the worse for the world. The imperialistic war, in the form it will assume, will assuredly finally convince even the economic interests of the implications of war both for them and for world economy.

CHAPTER XI

STAGE MANAGERS AND ACTORS

THERE are people so zealous for peace that they consider we should not even speak of war, because by doing so we run the risk of suggesting war and thereby unconsciously prepare our minds for it. It is a strange doctrine. It is as if a society for the saving of life should refuse to speak of drowning. The method would, if it were taken seriously, imply that those who try to strengthen the front against war should remain as innocent and ignorant as sheep while the forces behind war would be left undisturbed to carry out their designs.

It is almost impossible to point out these forces. One can perhaps broadly indicate the chief causes of war, but it is in most cases impossible in the pulsation of modern life to discover those who pull the strings, to detect the stage managers and to distinguish them from the comparatively innocent actors. There is, moreover, an endlessly shifting variety both of stage managers and of actors—from the immediate instigator of war to the pacific indolent person who, on the ground of his general opinions and his natural fear, is unconsciously driven to apathetic co-operation with the former. There is a play of forces which it may appear hopeless to disentangle. Any attempt must necessarily be a rough generalisation, though it is justified by the necessity of making clear at least a part of the great aggregate. It is, of course, impossible to make the extremely irrational intelligible. Now and then, however, the observer catches a glimpse behind the scenes, hears the voice of the prompter, and sees his gestures. Those who have a talent for deduction can sometimes from these glimpses produce evidence on which a jury might convict. It is just such

glimpses that are presented here—little bits of evidence collected without any definite classification or evaluation.

The attitude of the Christian Churches towards war has always been ambiguous. Not only in the form of crusades against the heathen, but also in our day. Nowhere did the attitude of the "Men of God" towards war assume in modern times such grotesque forms as in pre-war Germany. It is not splitting hairs to say that, especially, the German clergy in the pre-war period and during the war really constituted one of the forces tending towards war.

Before we give any typical quotations from the Church proclamations during the war we will present a few lines from the Catholic *Curia* which show, for example, that the Papal power of that day was not innocent of the charge of having directly contributed to the outbreak of the war. On July 26, 1914, about a week before it, the Bavarian Legate at the Papal Court, von Ritter, reported to the Austrian Government as follows: "The Pope approves energetic action by Austria against Serbia. The Cardinal-Secretary of State hopes that on this occasion Austria will stand firm. He asks when war should be declared if not in a case such as this, when a foreign agitation has led to the murder of the Archduke and threatens Austria's future." If this statement is authentic we have in it a flagrant example of the "religious" power—probably by its fear of Pan-Slavism and its connection with the Orthodox Church—directly urging war. And it offers as a pretext the murder of the Archduke, which murder was the direct consequence of the Austrian expansion policy and of the oppression of an incorporated people. *Das lässt tief blicken.*

We now give some other clerical quotations.

An English bishop writes: "Virtue grows when watered by

the bloody rain of war. A cannonade is to me like an oratorio, almost a divine service."

"God be praised that we have not yet peace. The wounds would soon heal and the people become more threatening than ever. War is a great operating knife, with which the great surgeon of the people cuts out the terrible poisonous tumours." (German pastor.)

"War is an absolute necessity, for it is a means of education by which youth is fostered in ability and national consciousness. I have myself two sons, and I do not know how I should bring them up if I could not implant in their hearts a longing for the camps of war and devotion to their ruler. When the Kaiser calls, we are there." (Priestly sermon to Leipsic youth.)

"You are not sent out to pity the enemy. He has honourably deserved his fate. But you must, as men, seize with merciless resolution the means to procure us an early and lasting peace. That means is cold steel. To wage war is to let blood, and the more freely it flows the sooner the enemy will seek peace." (Brochure entitled *In God's Name*, by a German priest, 1916.)

"See how the German sword leaps out from its scabbard! See how it flashes in the morning sunshine! The good German sword. Tried in victory and victorious. God has placed it in thy hand. We press it to our breast like a bride. It is the *ultima ratio*. Strike in God's name!" (German pastor.)

"A people in arms, led by a royal hero! That is a spectacle of indescribable grandeur. But there is a greater. The struggle of this king and his army, sanctified by the power of the throne which is stronger than death, by faith in the living God, by the determination to conquer and die in the faith of our fathers. Our Kaiser shows the way. Let us follow him" (German pastor),[1] etc.

[1] Quotations from Friedrich Friedrich's book, *War on War*.

We should be wrong in this chapter not to point to these things. To quote is not to generalise. These quotations do not touch the Christian religion. They do not touch Jesus. They are probably principally a proof that a particular form of religion affords no protection against war-psychosis. Certainly the clerics and the Churches have to atone for much that they have done or left undone, not least in their attitude towards war. This does not in any way minimise the fact that religious forces, among others the Quakers and the great Free Churches in America, are strong defenders of the cause of peace and that, especially, they have become important forces in determining the attitude of a large part of the American people.

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Even before the war, politics showed certain evidence of the rôle played by finance. The opium war in China was stimulated by financial interests of the most unclean kind. It can scarcely be said that the Boer War was waged by England purely on financial grounds, but one may assert that Cecil Rhodes's policy, out of which the war developed, was dictated by financial interests. Great financial interests also lay behind the American declaration of war on Spain. Even if Spain's misgovernment of the West Indian possessions might be regarded as a reason for depriving her of them, we must not forget that the U.S.A. had large dollar investments in Cuba, and that its trade with the island amounted to one milliard dollars annually. The blowing-up of the American battleship *Maine* in Havana Harbour—the cause has never been discovered—was taken as a pretext by the American Jingo Press, supported by financial interests, to demand war with Spain (which was quite prepared to cede Cuba for suitable compensation).

It is in the nature of things that it must be exceedingly

difficult to place our finger on the financial forces which at any particular moment initiate one manœuvre or another which at a later date may be considered to have been one of the causes of a subsequent outbreak of war. In what follows we only refer to those interests which we may with reasonable certainty describe as "war capital".

As war capital we must consider in the first place the capital invested in the war-material industries. Nowadays these consist not only, as formerly, of gun, arms, and munition factories in the real and narrower sense. With them are now associated a number of different kinds of works manufacturing chemical and anti-chemical weapons. It is doubtful to what extent we should also include in war capital the great combines controlling the dyestuffs industry. The same applies to makers of aero material and aero-motors, who will in the future certainly represent large capital sums. In the majority of cases it is not a question of manufacture for peaceful purposes only, but of a combination of manufacture for civil air traffic and for the military air force.

The position of the great gun-makers is, however, quite clear.

There is no need to use strong language in this connection. The strongest possible language would scarcely suffice to give expression to one's feelings. Until there has been a thorough investigation into war-material interests we can do no more than adduce certain examples which may point the way.

We can, moreover, readily agree with Professor de Madariaga of Oxford when, in his book *Disarmament*, he emphasises that it is no use coming with particular proven "cases". It is not necessary, as he says, to relate the story of this or that Press campaign, or the underground connections between War Offices, armament firms, and newspapers. We do not

know, and we do not need to know, them. What is the position? Armaments presuppose armament firms. (Here we would interpose the reservation that it makes a great difference whether armaments are manufactured by the State or by private firms.) There is no armament firm in the world which is guided by disinterested patriotic motives. They are all industrial undertakings which have, in common with all other enterprises, the function of providing dividends. They only differ from others in that the products by which they procure such dividends are guns and battleships instead of motor-cars and cheese. An industrial undertaking is primarily interested in its market. It is not peculiar in that respect. Let us write it down in large letters, even though it is a banality to say it: it is to the interest of armament firms to create a state of affairs which will increase the need for armaments. This statement cannot be denied, says Madariaga. Of course it cannot. But on the other hand there are numerous people who require the concrete examples. And the more examples one gives, the better.

The most recent case is the worst. The Shearer scandal in America arrived as a final confirmation for those who worked for an agreement between England and the U.S.A. on the subject of limitation of naval armaments. The details should be so fresh in mind that they need not be repeated here. Seldom or never has the lifting of the veil shown so clearly what was going on behind. The great American yards, whose interest it is that there should be no limitation of naval building, paid their agent, who was exposed, to prevent—with the assistance of the Admiralty—the Disarmament Conference coming to a result, and when he was dismissed he was maintained by a powerful newspaper king in order to intrigue against the adhesion of America to the International Court at

The Hague. This is until this moment the youngest shoot of the tree.

It is well known that Liebkneckt once read a letter in the German Reichstag in which the Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken instructed its agent in Paris to endeavour in a specified newspaper to secure the publication of an article to the effect that the number of machine-guns in the French Army should be doubled, which article would be used by the German firm to press for rearmament in Germany. The German Reichstag, in fact, made a grant in the years 1908–10 (the letter was written in 1907) for the purchase of machine-guns. The famous letter was signed by Geheimrat von Gothard, who became one of the most powerful men in the German armament industry.

Ch. Lange, a member of the Secretariate of the League of Nations, reminds us of the storm which arose when it became known that Krupp capital was invested in the Russian Putilov works. *L'Humanité* at the time offered proof of the Tsarist system of bribery of French politicians where there was a question of loans to Russia for military purposes. A German writer, Leonid, gives us some information concerning the policy and power of manœuvre of armament capital, which we here present in an abridged form in a note, with the definite reservation that we have not been able to check it.[1] Possibly

[1] The armament industry (Leonid writes) is divided into three main branches: the metal industry (arms, battleships, flying-machines, tanks, etc.), the explosives industry (powder, dynamite, and explosives for artillery projectiles, bombs, etc.), and the chemical industry (gases and protective appliances, etc.). The organisation of all three overflows the national frontiers into European or international alliances. The leadership of the first branch was until some years ago in the hands of Sir Basil Zaharoff. The explosives industry is controlled by the Nobel group, which later comprised the chemical concerns. The metal industry laid its international foundations long

some of the details given are false or unimportant. Broadly speaking, his account is probably an accurate picture of the "bloody international".

At the conclusion of this account the author pretends that

before the world-war. It was gradually concentrated in a single concern, which included all the armour plate and gun manufacturers. At its head were three groups: the English (Vickers, Armstrong), the German (Krupp, Stumm), and the French (Schneider, Creuzot). The Russian (Putilov) and the Italian (Terni) were gradually bought up. Vickers absorbed the Italian firm; Krupp associated itself with the Austrian Skoda works. Vickers and Armstrong made the Balkans and the Near East their domain. During the war they equipped the two belligerent sides. Armstrongs sold battleships to Turkey, whilst in compensation Greece bought submarines and destroyers from Vickers. In 1913, Vickers and Armstrong founded La Société Impériale Ottomane de Docks et Arsenaux, which organised and built up the Turkish fleet at the same time as Vickers and Schneider Creuzot, with the help of French and Russian banks, reorganised Nicholajeff's yard on the Black Sea in order to procure for Russia a good base against Turkey. Every political combination which was organised created a counter-organisation by the same or allied firms. Two years before the world-war Krupp, Schneider and Blohm and Voss (the leading German shipyard) organised a syndicate to capture the Russian Putilov works, which succeeded in its purpose after an agreement with Vickers and Armstrong had been effected. Parallel with this fraternisation between German, French, and Russian war-material capital the latter put a finishing touch to their work in order to bring about the Great War. At the moment when Poincaré was in St. Petersburg to feel the political pulse of his ally, Krupp and Creuzot entered into an agreement by which they bound themselves in view of the tremendously increased demand for war material not to compete with each other. Further, Creuzot agreed to support Krupp against the German firm of Ehrhardt, which did not belong to the group.

As early as 1912 a French torpedo concern had been formed (Whitehead) with the share majority in the hands of Vickers and Armstrong. Among the shareholders was a British ambassador of the name of Whitehead and the French admiral, Hubert. Still more remarkable, highly esteemed German ladies, like Countess Plessen-Cronsten, Prince Herbert Bismarck's wife, etc. (says our author), financed the manufacture of torpedoes for the Entente (*Documents politiques*, Paris, January 1926).

With reference to the interplay of war-material capital and State

the German and French chemical trusts had combined. It may be of special interest to elucidate further the significance of this statement, for which purpose we avail ourselves of certain information supplied by G. Reimann in his book *Giftgas in Deutschland.*

Already in 1919 the predecessors of the existing German chemical trust, the Interessengemeinschaft der Chemie Kon-

organs the author points to naval administrations, General Staffs of the Great Powers, diplomacy, and gives the following examples:

England.—The Chief Technical Adviser to the Admiralty for shipbuilding, Sir Tennyson d'Eyncourt, a director of Armstrongs. Lord Southborough, a director of the same firm, was from 1913 to 1917 Civil Lord of the Admiralty. General Lyttleton, whose brother is a director of Armstrongs, was once Chief of the General Staff. Lord Sydenham and Admiral Ottley—both directors of Armstrongs—were Secretaries on the Committee of Imperial Defence, which decides the military policy of the kingdom. On the National Service League, the great military association, eight presidents and directors were the representatives of English armament firms. On the council of the English Navy League sat four persons who were shareholders in Russian and Italian war-material firms. *The Economist* admits in 1913–14 that the Foreign Office procured diplomatically foreign orders for war material for Vickers and Armstrong.

France.—Schneider and Creuzot appointed certain Ministers of Marine, who sat on the Military Commission of the Chamber, and employed in its private service Admirals Besson, Nabona, and Lacaze, as well as a brother of Clemenceau.

In *Russia* the whole of the Tsarist military hierarchy from top to bottom was full of armament agents.

Germany.—The armour-plate king, Stumm, ruled in the Foreign Office, in which a clique of his relations—Counsellor of Legation von Stumm, Counsellor von Schubert, and others—held important posts. In the Stumm concern sat a French Secretary of Legation, Count Waldner.

Thus a close net, impenetrable to outsiders, was spun over the whole of Europe, the threads of which joined up in Sheffield and Downing Street, at Creuzot's and the Quai d'Orsay, in Essen and the Wilhelmstrasse. As the general political tension between Germany and the Western Powers reached its height at the same time, the intended limitation of Vickers was never realised. The policy of armament capital had achieved its object on August 4th, the "extraordinary accumulation" began. It brought to Creuzot a monthly

cern, had entered into an agreement with the French Société de l'étude de l'Azote. The French were of opinion that the successful working of the German patent could only be achieved by intimate co-operation with the patentees. The Germans were ready to supply all necessary information, and even to

profit of 300 million francs (J. Poiry); it multiplied Vickers' capital by three and Armstrongs' by two (*Labour and Capital in the Engineering Trade*). It brought a profit to the German armament concern of between three and four milliard marks (*Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*). During the Battle of the Somme, when there was a terrible lack of ammunition in Germany, there were sent (according to the German military attaché in Berne) every month as much as 250,000 tons of steel from Germany to other countries to be worked up as war material for use against Germany. The armament concerns had succeeded in preventing an export prohibition of steel (Behrendt, Director of Artillery). The officials who protested were sent to the front! Just as Krupp ruled in Germany, so Zaharoff, Vickers' Agent-General, ruled in the Entente countries, whose requirements in war material were satisfied through Vickers, Creuzot, and Armstrong. The directors of Armstrongs were appointed to the military command. Giroward, also of Armstrongs, became the Director of Munitions. The Marquis Graham, of Vickers, became adjutant to the King of England, and Basil Zaharoff, formerly an errand-boy in Constantinople, was made an English baronet and was awarded the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour for his services.

The victory of the Entente led to a complete regrouping of international armament capital. Vickers and Schneider destroyed their former partner Krupp. The manufacture of war material by Krupp was forbidden, and the Stumm works passed over to a French consortium. At the same time the Anglo-French armament firms launched out on a new world programme. The most important step in this direction was the coalition with oil capital. Zaharoff, the leader of Vickers, became also the leader of the Anglo-Russian Oil Company. This trust organised, together with the Shell group, the English interests, and became the cause of the Anglo-American conflict—that is to say, of the new naval armaments. On oil is built up the new military apparatus. The new system functions like the old, except that now America is the chief objective. At the same time the old objective still serves. New objectives also arose in Europe after the peace. In Poland, Schneider and Vickers founded La Société Polonaise de Matériel de Guerre. In Czechoslovakia, Schneider takes over the former Skoda works. Vickers are firmly planted in Rumania. The

disregard the possibility of a rival manufacture in France. Especially interesting is the expression used in the agreement that the German chemical trust will "give the French Ministry of War all necessary information". The author here quoted refers to one of the return services which the French are reported to have rendered in exchange for this accommodation of the German chemical industry. He says that when the poison-gas disaster occurred in Hamburg on May 20, 1928, the reassuring explanation was given that there was no question of manufacture, but only of an old stock. The author denies this. It was war gas, the manufacture of which originated in a

Greek Army was equipped for the attack on Turkey and Kemal by Zaharoff, who is said to have expended on the organisation of this war £4,000,000. In 1928 it was reported that Vickers planned the manufacture of war material in Lithuania and Latvia. Every such step on the part of armament capitalists was accompanied by agreements by the General Staffs and diplomats, and in French interests were accompanied by loans from that country. In Germany, Krupps were of course compelled to begin to make agricultural machinery, etc. But they still employ their capital in the old way. The building of the new German cruiser is to be ascribed in no slight degree to the influence of the gun and armour-plate manufacturers. It is not for nothing that the ex-German Chancellor, Dr. Luther, has a seat on Krupps' *Aufsichtsrat*. In 1926, however, Vickers were nearly bankrupt. Since then the whole armament industry has got wind in its sails. This applies specially to the manufacture of chemicals for war, which is also now centred in a gigantic trust, the Nobel Dynamite Trust, Ltd. The various subsidiary companies, it is true, bear different names, but the profits all flow into the same till. Just as the war of position involved an immense increase in the consumption of ammunition, so also the future war in the air elevates chemical capital to the highest place among the armament interests. Whilst the Press incessantly cries out against the dangers of a German gas war, and whilst German nationalist circles dream of it, both the French and German chemical trusts have combined, and the German trust has bound itself to supply all necessary information concerning manufacturing processes in return for concessions in the dye industry, which of course uses the same methods. It is the German chemical industry which supplies the needs of the Little Entente for this sort of war material, whilst it is politically supported by France in the rear of Germany.

secret Russo-German agreement. The question was asked: "What will the Entente, which forbade Germany to manufacture poisonous gases, say?" To the general surprise we read in the papers that the French expert members of the former Inter-Allied Commission had declared that the Hamburg phosgene did not come under the provisions of the Versailles Treaty!

The director of the great armament firm of Undershaft & Lazarus, Mr. Undershaft, in *Major Barbara*, is not merely a creature of Shaw's imagination. There are two passages in the play which for their drastic nature may be regarded as characteristic of the thought and morals of the maker of armaments. To the question, "What is the religion of a maker of armaments?" Mr. Undershaft pathetically replies in the following words: "To give arms to all men who offer an honest price for them, without respect of persons or principles: to autocrat and republican, to Nihilist and Tsar, to Capitalist and Socialist, to Protestant and Catholic, to burglar and policeman, to black man and white man and yellow man, to all sorts and conditions, all nationalities, all faiths, all follies, all causes, and all crimes."

Doubtless most impressive religious toleration. The second *passus* is more significant. Particularly, it throws light on the forces behind war. The young Undershaft had quite other views than the old one. During a heated discussion with the latter the son declares that he as an honest Englishman does not agree, and on his father's query as to what exactly honour in politics may be worth, the son breaks out and says that he will not permit his Government to be insulted in this manner. Undershaft replies: "The Government of your country! I am the Government of your country—I and Lazarus. Do you suppose that you and half a dozen amateurs like

you, sitting in a row in that foolish gabble-shop, can govern Undershaft and Lazarus? No, my friend. You will do what pays us. You will make war when it suits us, and keep peace when it is decent. You will find out that trade requires certain measures when we have decided on those measures. When I want anything to keep my dividends up you will discover that my want is a national need. When other people want something to keep my dividends down you will call out the police and military. And in return you shall have the support and applause of my newspapers and the delight of imagining that you are a great statesman."

There is one product, one commodity—oil—which has become almost equal in importance to arms. Naturally the importance of oil in warfare in this age of motors has not been the sole determining cause of the struggle for oilfields which has been going on in recent years. But there can be no doubt that its importance as a raw material of war at sea has stimulated this struggle. The importance of oil in warfare is described by Lord Curzon in the words: "That the Entente floated to victory on a wave of oil."

The struggle for oil began before the war, especially between the financial interests of Germany, England, and America. English policy in this respect revealed itself early. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was influenced as early as 1905 by naval interests. The Admiralty was represented, *ex officio*, by Vice-Admiral Sir Edmund Slade and by Lord Inchcape (Hoffmann, *Ölpolitik*). Competition between England and France ceased, however, when they became allies in the war. The Inter-Allied Oil Council was appointed, whereby the seriously threatened supplies were secured. When the Oil Alliance dissolved after the war the great oil struggle between England and America was renewed. The English oil interests suc-

ceeded in consolidating their position everywhere, and in excluding the Americans from a number of districts. When the Americans wakened up, the English had already won the race. This in its turn led to the great oil campaign in America, and now the oilfields are—says Davenport, an American author—the chief concern of diplomatic notes. The Standard Oil Company, he writes, which as a milliard-dollar trust was not beloved of public opinion in America, succeeded in winning the sympathy of the public through its Press, by issuing shares to a wide public and by similar methods which are always available. It forced matters so far that the American Foreign Office—since the Press and public opinion was now crying out against England—initiated a foreign oil policy precisely the same as that demanded by the Standard Oil. So soon as the Standard Oil found a door closed, it affixed a door-knocker bearing the notice "Open door policy, Republican Government", and thus induced the Republican Government to knock hard. The correspondence on this subject between the American Foreign Department and the English Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon, affords, says the author, priceless documents for those who desire to see the constellation Foreign Policy–diplomacy–financial interests fully illumined. Lord Curzon's talent in the composition of diplomatic letters in combination with the exposure of the system of bribery of the American oil company (the Fall scandal) again brought victory to England, which, if the MacDonald Labour Government had been more interested in oil manœuvres and titles, would have brought to Lord Curzon the much-coveted ducal crown.

The chief point in all this oil story—and it is thither we have tended—is to what extent English financial interests, in co-operation with the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, may be

regarded as having contributed by reason of their oil policy to the *breakdown of the naval disarmament plans*. It is certain that this financial-military foreign policy brought so much wind into the sails of the American "Big Navy" Party that it succeeded in forcing the American building programme. The Naval Conference at Geneva failed, it is said, because the admirals wished it to fail. It was a conference of admirals, and must fail. All very fine and large. If we wish a disarmament conference to fail under any circumstances all that is necessary is to call in as many admirals and generals as possible. But the question is whether, with the best will in the world (and we do not doubt the good will), the admirals could have brought about a breakdown, as things were, if the Government and public opinion had not been influenced by a campaign which converted the whole question into one of prestige—if the U.S.A. had not still felt sore after the diplomatic defeat which it had just suffered. This defeat irritated the whole nation, and the irritation was exploited by certain interests to demand naval parity with England. If this is approximately true, then British diplomacy, which in the interests of the Admiralty and of certain financial groups inflicted a diplomatic defeat on the U.S.A., must have unfavourably affected developments at a very sensitive psychological moment. We can perceive in this interplay one of the causes of the impairing of international relations, which—despite Locarno—has contributed to the apparent shipwreck of the discussions on general disarmament. Some time after the breakdown of the conference at Geneva, the American Admiral Plunkett made the famous speech in which he declared that a war between England and America was sooner or later inevitable. His words were reverently quoted by the whole of the reactionary Press in Europe, of course in conjunction with

scornful references to the desperate straits of the "angel of peace".

It is the same Press and the same interests as have prepared the way for and brought about these international defeats which point to the "fiasco of peace policy". The conclusion everywhere drawn is that we must keep "our" powder dry. A very real double book-keeping! Concerning the part played by oil in these accounts, Devonport says: "Djambi, Mosul, Persia, and Baku have become expensive places for the European nations." We do not yet know how expensive!

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An intelligent and very well-informed foreign editor of a great Liberal newspaper not long ago expressed the opinion that the connections between diplomacy and war preparations were purely legendary, more romantic than real.

The art of diplomacy which developed on the outbreak of the war is probably now so enlightened—though there are still many dark places—that it need not occupy any space in our fragmentary account. It is probably true that diplomacy when it was once aware of the danger, as a rule made serious efforts to slow down the ship. But there were, nevertheless, some members of the diplomatic service who at that terrible moment seized the oars and urged it out into the current. We know that, if no more, from Emil Ludwig's last book, *July 1914*. There is reason to believe that they did not know the extent of the danger. We may hope that even the diplomats received a salutary shock from what occurred, but we should be too sanguine if we were to assume that any re-orientation or any new attitude of mind has arisen among them.

In their attitude to war there exists a dualism in the souls

of diplomats. On the one hand they know that as war approaches the decision slips out of their hands and passes more or less completely to the military command. At best they must share their influence and their power. The tension which existed between the German Headquarters—especially as represented by Ludendorff—and German diplomacy and the Foreign Office is no historical exception. The conflicts between Bismarck and Moltke are further examples. At important junctures it was the Iron Chancellor who drew the shortest straw whenever the royal power ranged itself on the side of the military command. We have to thank the Alsace-Lorraine question after 1871 for that. The same tension as arose between the German military command and German diplomacy during the world-war appeared—especially at critical moments—in the Entente. Memoirs from this side consist to a large extent of mutual accusations.

But these historically authenticated disputes between diplomacy and the military command have never prevented diplomacy from supporting the military authorities in times of peace. This can only be explained by the psychological fact that war is the *ultima ratio* of diplomacy, i.e. the final expression of diplomacy's will to power. Military victory is the crown of the diplomatic masterpiece. During the progress of a war diplomacy must suffer restraint from its ally the military power, and it does so because it knows that it is its own war and that the expected victory, which it has prepared in co-operation with militarism, will increase its power and give it wider opportunities of exercising its skill and its "statecraft". (In so far as the diplomat ought to see in war the collapse of his life-work—the maintenance of peace—certain diplomats should in 1914 have put their revolvers to their temples, as did certain soldiers who saw in the great defeat

the end of their life-dreams. But so far as we know no shots were heard in the diplomatic boudoirs.)

It is therefore of little value or importance to show that a perplexed and discomfited diplomacy, confronted by the sudden threat of a Titanic war like the last one, when everything rocks and war-psychosis destroys all calculation, will also be seized by fear and will at the last moment, when nothing can be changed, make attempts to deflect or prevent the catastrophe. The old diplomacy as such cannot, on the ground of such showings, or because many diplomats are doubtless exceptions to the rule, escape from its rôle as a constant abettor of war preparations, or from its very real responsibility for what may happen. Doubtless there are diplomats and diplomats, just as there is capital and capital. But the diplomatic system remains the same as before. No fundamental change has been made. "It is the diplomats", says the French ex-officer, André Ott, "who force their impressions and their views on Governments. Their art of cookery frequently consists only of the choice of sauce with which war is to be served up." And these views and opinions are inseparable from the whole thought and *milieu* in which they live.

It is simply unthinkable that a corps of officials so hereditary, so historically burdened, so rooted in an old system as is the diplomatic corps in general, can itself strike out on a new path or be capable of regeneration. Neither is it only historical precedent that they must cast aside. By its roots, its interests, its careers, its connections, in a word by the whole mass of personal imponderabilia, it is unalterably attached to a certain exclusive class of society. Not the very weakest of its roots connects it with the people. Bismarck, as we know, relates how he sometimes told the truth. His diplomatic opponents never dreamed for a moment of the possibility

of his speaking the truth. So impregnated with lies and half-lies is the diplomatic art, which has adopted as its lodestar Talleyrand's saying that speech is given to us to conceal our thoughts. With what admiration must its aspirants look up to the French statesman—who was one of the unfortunates who do not understand that the truth is the strongest power in heaven or on earth. It is simply marvellous how little we have progressed, when such an institution should not only exist but also claim to have the final word when the fate of nations is to be decided.

The nations will never be able to join in an effort to escape from the impasse into which they have been driven so long as vital questions are decided at the green table of the diplomats, with military experts standing behind their chairs—at any rate if they remain diplomats of the old European type. The democratic esteem for the diplomatic superstition is perhaps intelligible. The necessity for doing away with it becomes more urgent when we clearly understand that it is a question of escaping from an inheritance from a bygone feudal age. With all its state, its orders, its embroidery from head to foot, its multi-coloured cock-feathers, its coaches and sponsors. The same must happen to them as formerly to the Jesuits and clerical conspirators among enlightened people. That savages keep their medicine-men, who practise with drugs and incantations, or that certain religions still hold men in the grip of superstition, is no reason why in the XXth century civilised nations should leave their policy and their fate in the hands of similar wizards.

Mr. Houghton, the former U.S.A. Ambassador in London, in a speech to Harvard students two years ago, expressed his views on diplomacy, and stated that unless the nations were able to influence foreign policy in quite a different way, and

to take it into their own hands, and especially to refer to Parliament questions of war and peace, they have no prospect of preventing war coming upon them again like a thief in the night. Of course, Houghton is right, as certainly as the fact will be denied in all quarters in which the right of the Government to declare war is regarded as the cornerstone of the Constitution. We must not suppose the ambassador to mean that the problem of the abolition of war would be solved in such a manner. That is only one step forward. The manning of the Foreign Offices by democracy in as decent a form as possible, and the casting out of the money-changers, is one of the measures which are necessary in order to control the prompters of war. But this step cannot be taken by itself; it can only be taken under other conditions than those which now exist.

After the war there was a widespread demand for the abolition of secret diplomacy. Was not this demand one of Wilson's Points? But such talk is no longer fashionable. This does not mean that such a demand was wrong. Even if we are convinced that all negotiations between nations cannot advantageously be conducted in public from beginning to end, and even if it can be shown that some of the most important results in international negotiations since the war have been achieved by private discussion, yet there is a vast difference between that and a system which practically always follows underground channels, and the strength of which lies in its secrecy.

* * *

The head of the firm of Undershaft & Lazarus mentioned, in his conversation with his son, the Press.

Who owns the Press? There is a free Press in all countries.

At any rate in all countries without a dictator. Perhaps it is only more or less free. But there is also a tied Press, a proprietary Press, a bought Press. The Press is partially an article of commerce, like other articles. But the purchase of such a commodity implies the acquisition, in an easy and rational manner, of considerable power—power to make men think in the way one wishes. Who owns this proprietary bought Press, where it exists? Naturally in the first place those who are rich, very rich. In the second place those who desire to be rich. In the third place those who are rich and would be richer, and also influence public opinion in a certain direction. There are only large and very large financiers who do business in the Press. Moreover, an actual purchase is not always necessary. Many people who cannot be bribed with money are sensitive to other offers of a less obviously scabrous kind. Let him who is incorruptible throw the first stone. There are so few who can do so in this world. But we commit a very dangerous mistake, or else we delude ourselves, if we consider all these imponderabilia as of no importance in a great chain of events; if we dismiss them with the words, "We can't be bothered with such rubbish". However this may be, and even if nothing can be done in the matter—since all these things, social influence, success, family connections, orders and decorations, Court favour, are a part of human weakness—yet the underestimation of their importance is due to lack of observation, to deficient knowledge of that which lies behind appearances and to ignorance of how the world is ruled. The words of the great Swedish statesman, Oxenstierna, "With how little wisdom the world is governed", might equally well have been, "With what small means the world is governed". Diamond-encrusted snuff-boxes formerly played the same part as do the ribbons of grand crosses nowadays. All this,

however, by way of parenthesis, and not as a sermon to the Press.

Gibbs, *à propos* of the rôle of the Press in the grand style, gives a little genre picture of the chief editor of the *Daily Chronicle* in the service of the fictitious newspaper king, Brockham. As the editor of the *Daily Chronicle* he ought not to have possessed a soul. There was nothing about it in the contract. He was not paid to have a soul or a conscience. Sitting in his room he was a receiving apparatus, connected with the whole world by living wires. Day after day he saw the winding of the threads of destiny which would lead to the collapse of Europe, twig laid upon twig for a new war even more dangerous than the last one. And it was his duty by the choice of news, by underlining certain facts, by striking headlines, by false emphasis, by distortions and evasions, by lies printed in large type, to conceal this reality. All the forces of the machinery which he controlled were employed to incite the passions of the people, flattering their vanity, nourishing their prejudices and their ignorance—in short, the people were to be deliberately led to the abyss in the interests of others. There is much in these words, even though it is necessary to remember that Gibbs attacks a particular section of the Press, the section which is equally hostile to peaceful development and to the honest Press. But nevertheless the Press is the great orchestra. In the hands of clever and unscrupulous persons it is, especially in regard to war and before the outbreak of war, an extremely dangerous power. The immense force of modern war-psychosis stands in a certain analogical relation to the growing influence of the Press, to its ability to create a sensation, and to rank sensationalism before everything else, even at the greatest of risks. One might almost formulate the problem as follows: without

the assistance of the Press a modern war could not be carried on. It is as necessary as oil. In every case, without the Press the prompters would be powerless.

* * *

This "sundries" account might have been made even more comprehensive. There are other prompters and actors than those included in the above categories. The central official organs of the military system have not been specifically mentioned. But they may be glimpsed throughout the story. It is evident that the naval and military staffs—which are the citadels of the inherited armed system in which the whole of these developments are concentrated—can only be reckoned among the forces making for war. The attitude of individual soldiers may be opposed to war, and such individuals may fear it as much as any civilian. Yet collectively they stand for the system and its consequences, which are war. It is scarcely possible to demonstrate the connection better than Madariaga has done. "The General Staffs and the Admiralty Staffs", he says, "are composed of soldiers and sailors; they have a high sense of honour. Now what can a General Staff do for 360 days a year with a working day of six hours except prepare for war? Every important nation maintains a General Staff, which is expected to be fully occupied. Very good. But strategy is not merely a theoretical science. It must be practised on the basis of a definite hypothesis. The first thing a General Staff has to do is to envisage an hypothetical enemy. In most cases there exists a series of circumstances—historical, geographical, and traditional—which clearly point to a certain nation as the potential enemy. The same circumstances, pointing in the opposite direction, compel that nation to single out the former as its opponent. Then the customary rivalry begins. Arma-

ments, the merciless analysis of policy, the microscopic examination of the speeches of statesmen by anxious leaders; the gradual guiding of the public from indifference to interest, from interest to suspicion, from suspicion to fear, from fear to hate, from hate to frenzy. And one day a spark flies through the air and death rides on wild horses." The only alteration we would make is that death no longer rides on horseback, but sits cowering in flying-machines, busily engaged with bombing apparatus. Whenever in this book we use the word "militarism" we refer to the whole system in its various branches, degrees, and manifestations. The individual soldier, who is a part of it and its traditions, a product of the system itself, often combines with his professional duty a real idealism in those things which he esteems most and which he has learned to place first. We can scarcely even reproach the individual for his unwillingness and inability to reflect, for his dislike of independent thought or his frequent reckless ignorance of everything which does not fall within the military purview. This, too, is a product of the system, an inheritance from the age of mercenaries, an historical burden, a consequence of the discipline the system has instilled since olden times. We may quote in this connection the sarcastic words of Frederick II: "If my soldiers began to think, not one of them would remain in the ranks." It is evident that a military system which is to survive in the democratic developments of the XXth century must not possess such features. Ultimately, however, the whole militaristic system, the cursed inheritance of the XIXth century, must be attacked, abolished, and destroyed as the great inciter and war prompter which, collectively, it is.

CHAPTER XII

"PATRIOTIC" HANDS

A GREAT American newspaper has for two generations borne the originally English slogan "Right or wrong, my country" printed on the top of its front page. In Germany the song of the Pan-Germans was "Deutschland über Alles". To the French, France is the only country. Italy is the "Sacred" patria, and Italians are the chosen people. And so on. Is this patriotism? No, it is nationalism! The reverse of patriotism, the obverse of the medal. Real patriotism is inconsistent with all this. It is great, and necessary. It has been and still is an important feature in the development of civilised man. In its nationalistic form it is one of the most dangerous forces of the time.

Patriotism and the sense of nationality are scarcely a hundred years old. They sprang from the wars of liberation. These feelings, and the conflicts arising from them, set their stamp on much of the XIXth century. That period is not yet at an end. There are still peoples and fragments of peoples who do not possess the right to cherish their national sentiments. This *suppression of patriotism by nationalism* is one of the dangers of the present situation. It will persist until patriotism and free national life are recognised as rights. And these rights will not exist until nationalism, in combination with militarism, is thrust back or defeated. Nationalism always struts about in the garb of patriotism, although it is its worst enemy. This blending of two different conceptions has caused much confusion. Nationalism knows how to play on the strings of patriotism, and the latter does not notice how false is the note which is struck.

If we now offer some examples of nationalistic card tricks from the U.S.A. it is only because material exists there which throws a certain light on these forgeries, whereas such material is not easily obtainable in Europe.

After the war, powerful movements developed in the U.S.A. They moved in two different directions. On the one hand there was a reaction against war; on the other hand nationalism in the European sense sprang up. The latter found expression in a violent agitation against the former, among other things against the existing labour movement. Nationalism, in association with capitalism, found the situation favourable for a blow, in the name of patriotism and "100 per cent." Americanism, at the labour movement and at every form of radicalism, which in such circles was considered to be, and was labelled, "Bolshevism".

During the years after the war there grew up a number of organisations calling themselves "patriotic" which declared their willingness to defend the Constitution, which, they said, was threatened. The names of some of these societies are: Allied Patriotic Societies, American Constitutional Association, American Citizenship Foundation, American Defence Society, National Civic Federation, National Patriotic Council, United States Flag Association, U.S.A. Patriotic Society, The Woman Builders of America, etc.

"The majority of these organisations", says Norman Hapgood, "are dependent on promoters who play on the fears of the propertied classes in general or on the alarm of some individual powerful old gentleman who is kept awake at nights by the fear of revolution; or they depend on officers who are convinced that the world they were brought up to believe in is threatened by these radical movements."

What is of special interest here, however, is the actual

light thrown on the connection between the "patriotic" organisations and other forces which either make use of them for their own purposes or which created them. Hapgood says in this connection: "Whoever doubts the connection between business and patriotism in these associations has only to glance at evident facts, which show that this furious propaganda—which makes patriotism the servant of the dollar—is supported principally by those who make money out of the manufacture of war material. The mixture of patriotism, anti-radicalism, and privileged business is found in all the organisations. The National Civic Federation programme serves the conservative plutocracy in its opposition to laws relating to the protection of labour, the restriction of child labour, old-age pensions, and general social amelioration."

An investigation, ordered by Congress in 1919, into the National Security League, in consequence of the League's systematic persecution of members of Congress who, in the League's opinion, were unpatriotic, revealed that among the supporters—paying up to 30,000 dollars—were Mr. Rogers of the Standard Oil, Mr. Vanderbilt, Mr. Colman du Pont (du Pont's powder-works), Mr. Frick of the Carnegie Steel Corporation, Messrs. Guggenheim, Morgan, and Rockefeller. The committee of Congress reports: "If the curtain were rung up we should see the hands of Rockefeller, Vanderbilt, Morgan, Remington, du Pont, and Guggenheim developing associations of steel, oil, rifles, powder, and rails." The organisation of which we speak had in 1918 a budget of about 235,000 dollars. The contribution of Carnegie and Comps was annually 50,000 dollars. Another organisation, the American Defence Society, founded in 1924, has as its president Mr. Hooker of the Hooker Chemical Society, manufacturer of chemical war gases. Its finance committee was presided

over by Mr. Remington, one of the directors of the Great Western Chemical Corporation. Mr. Hooker's name is also found in the National Civic Federation, the strongest of all these associations. The prospectus stating the objects of the association contains one illuminating point: "To increase production in the chemical industries." The Women's Department of this Federation published a brochure entitled *An Appeal to the Women of America*, in which women are urged to support the chemical industry, as it is of importance in protecting home, health, and country. In this case it is probable that these really were the cause of the appeal to women, i.e. fear of gas attack. Now it so happens that America is the very last country imaginable to be exposed to air attacks unless it provokes war with England and its fleet is sunk in the ocean. Nevertheless, the U.S.A. budget for war chemicals was, in 1925, 8·7 million dollars. At the chemical arsenal in Edgewood, the staff at the same time consisted of 84 officers, 13 engineers, 7 scientists, and 8,000 civilian and military functionaries. Who is at the back of this demand for American chemical armament? We have here convincing proof how preparations for a future chemical war are supported by certain strong business interests which, in order to force the State authorities and public opinion to support them, take into their service patriotic associations which endeavour to cultivate in the masses the belief in an attack on the U.S.A. This combination is also visible in an association of chemists and manufacturers called the National Union for Chemical Defence. What strange labyrinths these organisations reveal, and what beasts crawl about in their darkness, we can best imagine when we hear that a Mr. Brasol, formerly one of Russia's "Black Hundred", came as a refugee after the revolution to the U.S.A., where he obtained an appointment in

the National Civic Federation and there worked to place the Grand Duke Cyril on the throne, at the same time following Ford in his anti-Semite campaign. In this connection he published two anti-Semite books, which in his own words "would do the Jews more harm than ten pogroms".

Senator Inman says of another of these associations: "Under a false title, which suggests that the organisation aims at a better America, we find it openly assisting powerful special interests which seek to avoid taxation as by law ordained."

The American military are no strangers to these organisations. In investigations the names of generals and colonels are constantly cropping up. That the name of the famous Admiral Plunkett appears will not occasion any surprise. The military organs *Army and Navy Journal*, *Quartermaster Review*, *The Reserve Officer*, and *The Army and Navy Register* often quote the opinions and appeals of these patriotic organisations.

The above phenomena can scarcely be fully understood without considering how America came into the war. We express no opinion of the fact itself. That is a matter which we leave aside. It is, as Kipling says, another story.

In 1915 an Anglo-French Commission came to New York and procured a loan of 500 million dollars in order to purchase necessary material from the U.S.A. Shortly after, with the increasing loans by American financial houses, the firm of Morgan became the agent of the Entente. Developments reached such a pitch that the Entente was soon purchasing war material to the amount of 10 million dollars per day. In September 1917, Morgans had already negotiated loans amounting to three milliard dollars for the purchase of ammunition, etc. When Lord Kitchener became Secretary

for War one of his first actions was to telegraph to Mr. Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel Company, to ask him to come to London. The agreement which was then entered into provided that the whole of the output of the Company should be sold to the British State, and in less than two years there was shipped to England war material of the value of about 300 millions from this firm alone (Moody, *Masters of Capital*).

American industry in this way became one with the Entente. The greatest banks and industrial concerns had become dependent on an English victory. *Under these circumstances the patriotic associations were moved* to induce America to enter the war and thereby guarantee a victory. The Navy League, the American Defence Society, and the National Security League were financially supported by suppliers of ammunition. They became propaganda bureaux to prepare the way for entry into the new war. Among those who founded the Navy League were several representatives of the great armament and steel concerns: the Midvale, Bethlehem, and Carnegie.

When the U.S.A. entered the war in April 1917 a State Propaganda Bureau was established under the name Committee on Public Information, which worked in intimate co-operation with the already existing patriotic associations. The Committee issued 75,099,023 copies of brochures and books. It employed 75,000 speakers, the well-known "four minutes men" (Creel, *How We Advertised America*).

Everything can be transformed in this world. Religion becomes persecution and intolerance. National liberty becomes the suppression of the rights of others. And patriotism, springing from and closely connected with the national sense of liberty, sees its grotesque features in the mirror of nationalism. Wherever there is a struggle between peace and war, false or

misguided patriotism has played a prominent part. Everywhere the "patriotic" hands are ready. It is seldom that we catch them red-handed. But to expose them and nail them down wherever possible is a step forward in the war against war. Frequently these hands belong to the same stage managers as we have already encountered. Sometimes they belong to others. That is why we have treated them separately.

* * *

The forces behind war are still at work. They are a characteristic feature of the situation even to-day. War does not come of itself. History can be influenced. If the situation is to be changed these forces must be repressed or cast out. If they are not, war will come. And in that case they will again call Heaven to witness that inevitable natural laws produced it. He who denies that light should be thrown on these "danger points" is either more than usually simple or else he knows more of what is going on behind the scenes than he ought to know.

III

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE NEXT WAR

CHAPTER XIII

THE ILLUSION OF THE PACIFISTS

It is correct to describe the collective forces directed against war as pacifist in the broadest sense of the term. But by pacifism in the narrower sense is meant rather a movement based principally on spiritual and ethical motives.

Hitherto pacifism has placed its faith mainly in a spiritual and moral transformation of mankind. Or else it regards human nature and its moral foundation as a reliable basis on which to build social life. That is a generalisation. Many differentiations are to be found.

The pacifist movement appears in its judgment of the situation to proceed from the level of the most peaceful and advanced nations, which they regard as normal. It does not seem to take sufficiently into account the vast differences in culture, even in Europe. Neither does pacifism see clearly the explosive factor in the political situation and the risks which it involves. It is one thing to assume that the situation can be improved and that everything possible must be done to improve it; but we close our eyes to very important considerations if we do not come to grips with it. Neither does pacifism take fully into account war-psychosis and the invincible strength which it possesses. On the other hand it does clearly see the connection between the origin of war-psychosis and the fear begotten of armaments.

The problem which practically dominates the movement is disarmament. Other associated questions are only touched upon in passing. The disarmament problem appears to have been regarded as something by itself, something which can be excised from general historical developments as easily as one tears a page out of a book.

In this chapter, which is devoted to an examination of pacifism, we shall elucidate its attitude to this essential problem. We shall polemise, not against pacifism and its objects, which are quite the same as ours, but against its manner of thought. The starting-point of our discussion—already stated in the Introduction—is that the struggle against war at the present day and under existing circumstances must be conducted on a political and economic plane.

In this respect we must disregard those pacifist factions—for they exist—which believe that in the course of development a people should not hesitate, if necessary, to make the "sacrifice" of permitting itself to be absorbed by other nations which are still at a more primitive stage of development, in order that it may suffuse the latter with its spirit and in this way set it, and humanity, an example. Such a belief cannot play any rôle within measurable time. No people would accept such a solution. The whole point of view lies outside the political perspective, however widely we draw it.

We must, however, endeavour to separate the purely idealistic pacifism, which is based mainly on religious ethical grounds, from that which seeks to combine ideals with political values.

It is thus impossible to polemise against such a line of "political" thought as is represented, for example, by the German woman pacifist, Dr. H. Stöcker, who says: "Since we regard the duty of the State to protect human life as the highest good, we look upon war differently from the politicians of other days. Even the occupation of territory by attack may at some future time be rectified. But a single human life destroyed can never be restored. Belgium's fate and that of its inhabitants would without doubt have been much easier if it had renounced military force. The example of its neighbour, Luxemburg,

showed this. Pacifism, as we understand it, implies a complete transformation of the world outlook, an ethical revolution. Is it not clear in what a horrible, grotesque contradiction Wilson, the champion of peace, stranded? If mankind does not see the goal and does not labour with all its strength to attain it, it will become bankrupt, it will commit race suicide. It will have no object in life. We are still in a *pre*-human stage, and we have not yet learned the value of human life. We must force this most natural, most elementary, and most simple truth into the consciousness of the masses, where at present it is only darkly and vaguely alive. The only possible security is to be found in striving to this end."

The preservation of life is here set up as the final and vital objective of this philosophy. Such thinking forgets such details as the right of a people to maintain its political liberty or to protect its own civilisation and all that these things imply in the progress of humanity. Neither does it consider the problem of the influence of force in general on human development. Pacifism of this kind turns its back on all the political problems with which the world is now wrestling. It is detached from all historical, biological, and other realities except the preservation of human life. Dr. Stöcker's words are scarcely an extreme presentation of this point of view.

We must also take into account the more widespread pacifist view that there would be no danger to liberty, civilisation, or progress if the difficult problem of disarmament were solved simply by the peace-loving countries disarming. This view is based on the belief that in such case nothing would happen. A pacifist gives expression to this belief in the words: "No modern human being who can boast any knowledge of the times we live in can seriously suppose that a civilised State would be guilty of a shameless attack on another civilised State

which had definitely renounced war, which proposed to substitute law for force, which had constitutionally forbidden war and preparations for war, and which had, in fact, disarmed. It must be clear to everybody that a statesman who openly advocated such procedure would be condemned not only by his own nation, but by the whole world. It would, moreover, be a technical impossibility in the present structure of society. Who would attend to exports and imports? Who would pay bills of exchange? The thing is clearly ridiculous. If, nevertheless, there is anybody who believes in it, he must be entirely ignorant both of the nature and logic of war and also of folk psychology and politics. If since the world-war an attack on an armed country is impossible with present international instruments, then a plundering expedition must be regarded as purely Utopian. Under such conditions an attack would have to be very carefully disguised to bring about a war, but it is beyond the bounds of reason to suppose that it would be possible under such conditions for a State to unite all parties and in the face of its own people and of world opinion attack a pacifist State. So far we have advanced. So much should be noted. History has gained. The independence of States is an historical fact. England cannot attack a disarmed Denmark. Such an attack would raise a storm throughout the world, and not least in England itself."

All this is difficult to answer because it is based on faith. It is not faith in an ideal, but rather a political faith, an optimistic judgment of the situation. Even if the writer quoted is right with regard to the case of England and Denmark—so long as it is not a question of Danish territory in a war in which Danish navigable waters would be of decisive importance in operations at sea, in which case Denmark's security might be very doubtful—yet the whole situation is generalised

from this particular case. Is his faith equally firm if we substitute for England and Denmark, Italy and Jugoslavia, or Russia and Rumania, or Russia and Finland, or Poland and Lithuania, or Poland and Germany, or Hungary and Czechoslovakia, or almost any two countries in Europe? Let us imagine that certain democratic States, with England and Germany at their head, forthwith abolished all their military armaments and embodied in their constitutions the proposed prohibition of war and preparations for war. On what should we found our faith that nothing would happen? We should have to assume that Italy, Russia, Poland, and France must follow their example. This would require in the first place a complete and direct transformation of the whole mode of thinking of Fascist and Bolshevik leaders, and of the Italian people. Have we, with our knowledge of that mode of thought, the least ground for expecting such a sudden metamorphosis? Italian-Fascist pacifism! But if events do not justify this faith, and Bolshevism, for example, were to seize the moment to accomplish its plans of world revolution whilst Italy sought to realize its obvious plans for a new Greater Italy, what expression would world opinion take, and with what means would it be enforced? When a pacifist believes that it would be impossible nowadays to induce a nation to sanction the occupation of a disarmed country, he assumes that people think in the same way during war, or on the outbreak of war, as they do in times of peace. This is a striking illustration of how people overlook war-psychosis and the transformation it effects in men and nations when once it is let loose.

But there would be no war for a disarmed nation. Occupation of a country is not war: "For war at least two opponents are necessary." Quite right. To a pacifist who regards the

occupation of his own territory so lightly—as if it were a Cooks' tour—this is clearly decisive. But if Italy or Russia hurls itself over its frontiers there will be a conflict somewhere, despite all. We may perhaps assume it to be somewhere on the line Constantinople–Vienna–Berlin. What will be the position of the populations along this front and behind it when the struggle breaks out and develops? And will the populations—quite apart from the effects of aerial war—be able, under the iron heel of the war dictators, to enjoy peace and fulfil their pacifist mission in the world? Where would Western European liberty be then?

There is nothing to indicate that the nations will base their existence on such a loosely founded faith. Peace must have a different and a more substantial foundation. If we are convinced of this, we must also regard a movement directed against war, expressed in such terms and conducted on the above-mentioned lines, as impracticable.

If we now leave these types of pacifism and pass over to those manifestations of the movement which are less remote from reality, we shall find that they are divided—especially in regard to the vital question of the *maintenance of international law by force*. As a rule they realise that a certain amount of force will be required to enforce an international law which aims at suppressing war. But they do not realise that this law, with organised international force behind it, is a pre-condition to the abolition of war.

If in the following intermezzo—long as it is—we allow two representatives of different pacifist schools to discuss this question, it is not only to throw light on their differences of opinion, but also, and principally, because these representatives touch upon some of the problems on which we shall subsequently state our own views. They throw light on conditions

which are of supreme importance in the elucidation of the argument which this book presents.

* * *

Two Germans, Dr. H. Wehberg and Dr. C. Hiller, the latter the leader of the German revolutionary pacifism, will now speak for themselves. In the first place we quote an extract from Dr. Wehberg's brochure, *Sicherung durch militärische Gewalt*, in which he says: "During the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations in 1924 Lord Parmoor attacked the use of military forces in international society. Herriot had already said that the small States must be put on the same legal footing as the great States in all international questions. If this is to be achieved, said Lord Parmoor, we must finally abandon military force. So long as it plays any part in the life of the nations, inequality will remain. Equality is only possible if the supremacy of international law is recognised. He emphasised the fact that military force was superfluous under any circumstances, since all arbitration awards had hitherto been accepted and voluntarily executed. If, however, it should happen that a State refused to execute a judgment, then the economic and financial sanctions would be sufficient. The Greek politician, Politis, opposed Lord Parmoor, and denied that all arbitration awards, without exception, had been respected, though he admitted that the exceptions were rare. He gave a warning at the same time against drawing too general conclusions from previous experience. Hitherto only those disputes had been submitted to arbitration which States had voluntarily so referred. In each particular case, consequently, the nature of the question had been clear. It would be quite different, however, in the future, if binding arbitration were extended to every sort of dispute. States would not

know, when they signed a binding agreement, what difficult kinds of disputed interests they would have to submit to arbitration. Should we then also be able to count upon a faithful execution of the award? In this connection the fate of the Central American Court of Arbitration affords matter for reflection. It collapsed because its findings were not respected. If, therefore, we are to introduce arbitration without any reservations, we must also assume the existence of an international executive authority.

"The question of an international executive was," continues Dr. Wehberg, "freely debated before the war." Among others, the Leyden professor, van Wollenhoven, energetically advocated an international fleet which would enforce respect for arbitration awards. Wehberg himself at that time had opposed the idea of such an executive, whilst Schücking in 1912 expressed the same opinion as Wollenhoven, advancing his reasons in the following words: "The existence of an international force would be a fact of immense psychological importance and influence, since, unhappily to the majority of mankind, the conception of law is joined to that of force, and the good citizens, of whom there is no lack, would be disposed to look differently on the justice of The Hague if there stood behind it an international organ which could enforce obedience. By such an organ the whole complex of international law, so far as it is codified at The Hague, would at one stroke acquire the necessary guarantee. It would be a step forward of immeasurable value and extent."

"During the war the idea of an institution with executive power made great progress. The central organisation for permanent peace at The Hague, the American League to Enforce Peace, and other associations, advocated the sanction of international law by armed force. In a message to the Senate

in 1917 Wilson made himself the spokesman of this idea, and said: 'Agreements alone cannot guarantee peace. It is absolutely necessary that a power should be created capable of guaranteeing the observance of agreements, a power greater than that which either of the interested parties or groups possesses, or indeed exists elsewhere; so great that no nation or conceivable combination of nations can resist its pressure. If the peace now to be concluded is to be lasting, it must be a peace which is secured by the joint organised forces of humanity.'"

Dr. Wehberg asks what is the attitude of the League of Nations in this matter. "If we read Article 16 of the Covenant rightly [he continues] it would appear that the members of the League are in duty bound to provide not only economic and financial sanctions, but also, under certain circumstances, military sanctions. It is true that the view is often expressed that the latter are only facultative. It is sought to prove this by a reference to the second part of the article, in which it is provided that it is the duty of the Council to propose to the Governments the share of each member in the land, sea, and air forces necessary to enforce obedience. The Council has therefore the right to make proposals as to armed forces. Since there is envisaged here only an eventual expression of opinion by the Council, attempts have been made to interpret the paragraph in the sense that there is no obligation to military action in the event of a war of aggression. This is incorrect. It is true that each member must himself determine the manner of his military dispositions, but in the event of a war of aggression he must intervene with military force. It is also to be observed in this connection that Article 8 refers to such a reduction of national armaments as is consistent with national security *and the fulfilment of international obligations*. Those

who regard these principles as anchored to the Covenant of the League of Nations do not forget the terrible experiences of the civilised world by which the conviction was created that we could not save the situation without an international armed force; they do not forget that between the pre-war period and the birth of the League there occurred the violation of Belgian neutrality, and that the German advance through Belgium made it clear to the whole world how much international law was worth when at a critical moment there existed no power to enforce respect for it. In Belgium and France, which had to bear the whole weight of the blow—and also in other countries—there is a conviction that security cannot be based on agreements unless provision is made for enforcing the law by armed power in the event of the breach of an agreement. This conviction is so deeply rooted that it cannot be eradicated. To reject it can only lead to the strengthening of the national forces and to the conclusion of military conventions and alliances. Those who *wish to abolish fear in the French and other nations should not seek at the present day to found international law on moral and economic sanctions alone, but must proceed to develop a military instrument to execute that law. Only in this way can States be prevailed upon not to found them securely on armaments.*

"The problem of self-determination is not solved. The great economic problems are far from a solution even though it must be admitted that Geneva has debated, among other things, the questions of raw materials and of population. Even if at the Fifth Assembly of the League, on the initiative of Sweden, a codification of international law was resolved, yet there will be many disputes before the law of international society has been determined. As long as this is the case, the danger will always exist that a nation which cannot obtain its

rights in a peaceful manner, and which has failed in arbitration, will resort to arms. We pacifists unconditionally renounce such use of force. It is true we do not base this renunciation on the belief that peace is greater than right, but we believe that it is better to postpone the settlement of such conflicts until some future time when it can be achieved by legal process. When Count Bernstorff says that we democrats place right above peace, we pacifists mean that right is as great as peace. If, however, every more serious international dispute cannot yet be satisfactorily settled by legal process, the danger of a State overriding an arbitration award is in reality greater than formerly. Without military support the whole structure of the League of Nations might in such case one day collapse.

"It is admitted that a military executive also has its dangers. It is conceivable that some day the League may collapse in exercising its military force against a great Power. It is also possible that sanctions could be more easily applied to a small State than to a large one, since the Great Powers in fact constitute the executive. It is simply a question of deciding whether the dangers or the advantages are greatest. We are of opinion"—it is still Dr. Wehberg who is speaking—"that the development of the League will be more easy if it creates an executive than if it stands powerless and loses the confidence of those States on whose co-operation it depends. Above all things, we must not forget how greatly military alliances will expand if the League is not in a position to bestow security by its own power. In saying this we do not deny the danger of such an instrument. This danger must as far as possible be diminished. The League might in the event of the rejection of an arbitration award—not followed by war—content itself with economic measures. The winning side might also be accorded the right to resort to military measures. From this it appears that the military

sanctions would not descend from the skies on a nation which refused an award but did not resort to war, but only when they were required to resist an aggressor or to prevent the triumph of force. It will still be necessary in the future, before military action is taken, to make every effort to find a peaceful solution. In the future, therefore, it will be necessary to interpose a period of grace before military action is taken, during which moral and economic pressure will be exercised. At present this is, for psychological reasons, useless, since neither of the parties dare wait for the other. To us military pressure is only a second-best means of tiding over the worst times, when everything cannot be left to faith and promises. We see before us the ideal of the complete abolition of defensive wars and wars of sanction. But for the present we still see no possibility of supporting the League of Nations system if we do not admit the executive war. We believe that only the complete development of a League executive will render possible the prohibition of wars of defence.

"If, in principle, we resolve upon a military executive, it is ultimately a technical problem rather than one of principle whether we prefer an *international force* or combine various *State contingents*. We realise that there still remain certain serious objections to an international League of Nations force, especially the possibility of the development of a Pretorian guard, which would lead instead of being led, and which might precipitate military action where other courses would suffice. But, on the other hand, the combination of contingents might lead to great difficulties if Powers in close political association with a law-breaking nation should consider themselves bound, or should find it in their own interest, to obstruct execution. In any case, the League must hold to the principle: one for all and all for one, until the ideal is

reached when the nations will be filled with such a spirit that the prohibition of a war of aggression will be observed."

To this Dr. Hiller replies as follows:

"Dr. Wehberg's representations lead us straight to the heart of the problem of pacifism. It is the object of pacifism to substitute legal process for force in the settlement of international disputes. What is to happen if there is no force whatever to support and enforce the award of a court? If no such force exists, then the award is wasted breath, mere smoke and words. The whole legal procedure may be left to its fate. Every State will help itself if the community of States is unable to help it. However favourable an award, it is useless if it is merely recorded on paper and the State whose duty it is to follow up the award refuses to do so. We may say, the League of Nations stands or falls by its ability to command respect for its awards. Up to this point I agree with Wehberg. Henceforth our ways part. To him force is synonymous with arms and military compulsion. We must clearly understand what this means.

"It does not mean that an international detachment will occupy the Government offices of a defaulting State, drive out the Government, and replace it by a new one which will execute the award. A State which would permit such a thing to happen would have submitted to the award. If it does not submit it is because that State is determined to resist—that it is bent on war. A small State would not make such a resolve. A great State more probably would, just on that account. A small State would only do so with the help of allies. It is evident, therefore, that as soon as military execution proves necessary, war will ensue. What is war? War implies that legions of innocent human beings are doomed to sufferings which cannot be described. It means that legions of innocent

human beings will be forced to kill and be killed, though all life is meaningless without life, though all the labour in the service of mankind by philosophers, teachers, jurists, hygienists, and politicians is grotesque theatricality if the maintenance of life is not secured. Military execution against a law-breaking State will employ all the new technical means of destruction, the more certainly so as that State will doubtless seek to employ them also. Such a cruel martyrdom and murder of the members of the Government and the politicians responsible for the situation and the breach of the law one might possibly admit. But it is impossible to conceive the crippling of a child or the loss of its sight by poisonous gas, or death, for the sins of a Cabinet Minister. Right stands as high for us as peace, says Wehberg, and Count Bernstorff ranks law above peace. I ask: Is it right that an innocent child, that untold innocent human beings, should be murdered or crippled because these rulers have violated international law? Are we pacifists only to allow the peoples to atone for the sins of their leaders? Are we pacifists in order to give a new idealism and new substance to mass murder, or are we pacifists in order to put an end to the age of mass murder?

"What is the nature of conflicts between States? In ninety-nine cases in a hundred they are of an economic nature. War is waged for territory, for spoil, for trade advantages. Thus, for example, Costa Rica considered that it suffered economic damage by the Chamorro Agreement. Nicaragua refused to submit to the award of the Court. I regret it. As a Nicaraguan I should have strenuously resisted the rulers. But the advocates of the military executive think it right to destroy Nicaraguan women and children by gas bombs in order that Costa Rican traders and farmers may increase their wealth, in order that the ideal of law may thereby triumph. *Fiat justitia, pereat*

mundus. One may say so, but one is not a pacifist if one does. To the pacifist right is neither superior nor equal to peace; to him peace, the maintenance of the right of each and all to live, is the highest principle and the lodestar of political action. To him the maintenance of the right of all to live is the first demand made upon law. It may be unjust that territory in which the majority of the population is German shall be placed under the sovereignty of other nations; but it is still more unjust on that account to slay Germans, Danes, Poles, and Frenchmen who desire to live. The flooding of Australia with Japanese who are forced out of their own over-populated country is certainly a danger from the economic and ethnographic point of view; but what is it compared with the damage which may be done by the killing of a single British or American citizen? The circumstances which give rise to war between two nations may have a certain weight, but they are light as feathers in comparison with the life and death of man. These conflicts require legal adjustment, but even an unjust judgment is better than the destruction of human life and human bodies. This is so elementary, and yet very few believe it true. There are even pacifists who do not. They kill the warm-blooded life of peace with such a formal conception as that of right. Without a military executive, says Wehberg, the whole League of Nations may one day collapse. I do not believe it; I believe, as Lord Parmoor does, and as Wehberg believed until 1914, in the real force of ethical belief, in its indestructible power and in the compelling force of economic sanctions. But if Wehberg be right, then it seems to me that a League of Nations which cannot exist without military support deserves to collapse.

"Since, as I have already explained, a small isolated State will never allow matters to reach the stage of military execution, since it will always be the Great Powers or groups of

Powers against which the executive measures of the League of Nations will be directed, the maintenance of the League by such means implies nothing but crusades, apocalyptic crusades, with all the technical refinements possible. History will follow these lines of development. If we pacifists demand military execution, if we demand the apocalyptic crusades, then we grotesquely misunderstand our mission, which is the prevention of human slaughter. What we demand is the disarmament of the nations (except for a small police force). Disarmament does not solve the question of security, but security will follow upon it. A disarmed people is not in a position to attack its neighbours. Consequently these neighbours do not require the protection of the world. A federation of disarmed nations will create an arbitration court which would have supreme authority, from which no nation would withdraw itself. If, exceptionally, one should withdraw, a blockade would not kill immediately. It would only soften. To discountenance it would be to exaggerate too much the supremacy of non-power. But we will not demean ourselves to preach mass murder in the name of right. We leave the gas bombs to others. We pacifists are not in the world for that purpose."

This confrontation of two well-known pacifists is not without its interest. It helps the important question how far international law requires or must resort to force in order to prevent the outbreak of war. As regards the importance of this question, it is desirable that the reader who follows our argument in the succeeding chapters should remember Wehberg's reasoning. It will save certain repetitions. This strong and indisputable evidence of the necessity for an international military executive must be specially borne in mind in reading the chapter which bears the title "Creation of The World Executive".

The polemic between the two doctors raises the question of the responsibility of the peoples for the policy of their Governments. Doubtless there is no other foundation in principle for international law than the assumed solidarity of a people and its Government. The German people was held responsible for the sins of its theocratic rulers, and has had to pay for them. Even when, after defeat and on the eve of collapse, the German people cast out its rulers, it nevertheless had to bear the consequences of their acts. That these consequences were made too rigorous, and that they were psychologically imprudent, is another story. The people which, under the protection of a system of international law, supports or submits to a Government which is in conflict with that system or breaks its laws, and does not resist the Government, must share the responsibility, even if innocent and guilty must suffer alike in consequence.

Economic pressure alone, including a blockade, cannot, as Dr. Hiller states, prevent a modern war breaking out before the pressure is felt or before it is even resolved upon. This important fact has generally been overlooked. It alters the situation considerably. Curiously enough, it has not yet been discussed. Even if States were disarmed it would still apply owing to the possibility of converting rapidly the civil air force into a military air force, especially if preparations had been made for chemical war.

It is an illusion, and a dangerous illusion at the present day, to base a campaign against war and for the future salvation of mankind on a pacifism of the kind which Dr. Hiller has described, and which represents the point of view of many pacifists. We must assume, in the present state of affairs, and so far as we can survey the future, that peace must be based on an international power which, under certain circum-

stances, will be required to exercise force. For the ideal state of peace there must be a new epoch. It is the illusion of the pacifists that they believe the contrary. This error concerning one of the most vital points also partly explains why pacifism has not become that power to peace which it ought to have become.

CHAPTER XIV

THE GREAT DILEMMA

THE strategic situation on the peace front may be considered from two different points of view. It may be said that what has already been achieved is not without importance; that certain steps forward have been taken; that there are signs of change of thought, etc. It is true that all that has been done constitutes no guarantee of peace. But if peace is not secured war is certain! From this we may conclude that considerably greater efforts, perhaps of a different kind, must be made by the peoples. That is one point of view. The other point of view is that which declares that everything hitherto achieved has been useless; that endeavours to secure peace have led to nothing at all. From this reasoning it might be concluded that in the future they will also prove purposeless, that war will come under *any* circumstances with the force of a natural law. This is the everlasting chorus when it is desired to show that one's own armaments must be maintained or increased.

The latter point of view is common in reactionary and conservative circles in all countries. The reactionary groups never draw the conclusion that the weakness of peace must be fortified by the development of peace machinery and of the international organisation.

When it was a question of guaranteeing peace by armaments there was no hesitation about going the whole length. The system was developed to the utmost. But when it is a question of developing another system—based principally on international measures and connections—the demand is made that it must prove capable of achieving immediately what the other failed to achieve. Otherwise away with it! "We are tired

of all these pacts", wrote a reactionary newspaper in reference to the signing of the Kellogg Pact.

The number of honest and neutral people—the great majority—who read of dangers here and crises there, of the tension between this country and that, of secret military treaties, aeroplanes, and gases, hear nothing but suggested or open declarations that the only way to guarantee peace is still to arm. They are not able to see for themselves that if in every corner and behind every frontier people talk in the same way and pursue the same policy, it is just because of the strength and influence of their voices that it remains impossible to face conditions squarely.

But if they thereby defeat any attempt to solve these questions, yet on the other hand it is certain that those people who abandon themselves to illusions and foster the belief that peace will infallibly come are doing an ill service. Some people seem to think you can bribe a tiger with a bouquet of flowers. They do not as a rule seem to understand what tremendously strong machinery will be necessary if we are to have the slightest chance of bridling war.

The results of international co-operation hitherto suggest only a starting-point. They show that a change is taking place. But hitherto this change has revealed itself almost exclusively in the field of peace and ethics. Though we do not underestimate its value, we must bear in mind that morals are quite different in times of peace and on the eve of the outbreak of war. In the latter case morals in general play a very subordinate rôle. Reason and morals are then cast aside. Brains no longer function normally. We have repeatedly emphasised this point because it is in an attack of war-psychosis that the strength of agreements is tested, and it is only at that moment that they have any value—if they hold!

It is, of course, a gross exaggeration to say that the latest agreement, the Kellogg or Paris Pact, is of no importance. But on the other hand it is difficult to see how it can have the weight which the American "outlawry of war" movement ascribes to it. Like other treaties, the Kellogg Pact suffers from the fundamental weakness that it cannot be expected to function at the very moment it is designed to function—on the eve of the outbreak of war and under the pressure of war-psychosis. (Professor Madariaga, in the above quoted book *Disarmament*, ridicules, in the chapter on the U.S.A., Dr. Clayton Morrison, the chief advocate of the idea of outlawry, and shows his inconsistency.) Very little, or nothing at all, has been gained if the whole globe is encircled by a network of treaties and if they do not hold at the moment when the real strain comes. It is only necessary for one of the more important treaties to be broken at a given moment for all of them to become futile. If we are to rely on international measures and regulations they must be so constituted that they render difficult, or prevent altogether, the rise and development of war-psychosis, or if it arises, check it. An international organisation which leaves armaments undisturbed also leaves the chief cause of war-psychosis untouched. And if the international organisation possess no force at its disposal, it cannot suppress war-psychosis, especially in a great and powerful nation. The Paris Pact does not create any organ of force—just as little as did the League of Nations—and it does not mention armaments. Neither can the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations be expected to apply. We should have no illusions on this point. They were buried with the Geneva Protocol. If we close the doors behind the Paris Pact, and if the peoples in their faith in the Pact slacken their efforts to obtain really rational measures, then the Pact will

prove a positive danger. It, like the movement to outlaw war, only has a meaning if it constitutes *a link in a continuous chain* of international action.

Peaceful States and democracies must rid themselves of the illusion, if such it be, that all is now well with the cause of peace. They must not stop half-way; for indeed nothing will have been gained if only a loophole is left for war to break out. Then the whole foundation of good intentions, agreements, and international law will collapse.

But the democracy of peace must also resist the loose idea, which some pacifists would force upon it, that just the peaceful and most highly civilised countries can throw their weapons into the sea. Were they to do so the pacifist democratic States, and democracy itself, would come to a sudden end, and with them all hopes of victory in the struggle against that next war.

It is here that we approach the great dilemma.

* * *

We have affirmed that armaments, which developed beyond all reason after 1870, were one of the principal causes of the Great War, and that they are also one of the chief obstacles to a permanent peace. We have endeavoured also to emphasise that the "war society" now in being must be destroyed. From these premises pacifists draw the conclusion that individual countries have no other course than to disarm completely, irrespective of what other nations do and regardless of the general situation.

But we are here concerned with the checking of an historical development. History shows that it is impossible suddenly, or even in a decade, to check such a development and to remove its effects. On the other hand, a new turn in develop-

ments may become so strong that it gradually produces *a new political system* which will replace the old.

We may believe that the necessary pre-condition—a sufficiently strong impulse—to this change of direction exists in the form of the world-war. This impulse is strengthened by our knowledge of the monstrous nature of preparations for the next war. Nevertheless, certain States have not been influenced at all, or at least very little, by this impulse, as may be seen in the military dictatorships, in the Fascist idea, and in the reaction of certain nations. (Reaction is always in the end a reaction towards war. That is its profoundest meaning.) The existence of these elements in Europe is a fact which civilised democratic States must take into serious consideration. We cannot escape these facts.

The Commission appointed in 1926 by the Workers' International to investigate the armaments problem sent out to the Labour Parties in various countries a questionnaire in which the first question was formulated as follows: "In what manner can the disarmament of the different countries be promoted?"

We read in the introduction to the collation of the answers received made by the Commission: "Whereas in a number of these countries—which participated in the war; which are still in the unsettled sphere of politics of the Great Powers; and which are extremely sensitive to every tension which may lead to the outbreak of a new war—disarmament is only conceivable as the result of international agreement, certain people in particular countries consider that there is a possibility of independent, national disarmament. Since 1918 the movement in favour of national disarmament has become especially strong in the small countries which did not participate in the war." This remark is very noteworthy. It is based

upon an examination of the thought and attitude of the socialist parties and groups. The result of the investigation is that in the larger countries the view is held in socialistic quarters that disarmament is not feasible unless it be of international character. On the other hand, it represents that in smaller countries the idea of isolated disarmament may find a practical expression. The Commission reports further concerning these smaller countries: "If the socialist parties in the particular countries strive for disarmament, it by no means signifies that they are indifferent to international arbitration by international agreement. They desire international disarmament just as much as do the socialists in other countries. Yet they are of opinion that their own country need not wait for such an international agreement. They are, further, of the opinion that by agitating for national disarmament in their respective countries they promote international disarmament by offering an example which may greatly stimulate other countries."

It so happens that opinions on this point differ greatly in the various smaller countries. The smaller States of Central Europe are quite strangers to it. But in some quarters, notably in the Scandinavian countries and Holland, more or less numerous groups have adopted the pacifist views on this subject.

It is certain, as the Commission points out, that the great nations will not entertain the thought of even a limited isolated reduction. Against the findings of the Commission it may be objected that it has not realised that it is not only the nations which participated in the world-war which are now affected by the tension arising from the general unrest in Europe. That this is less noticeable in certain nations not accustomed to observe the political situation abroad does not exclude the existence of strong reasons for unrest among them.

There is no real justification nowadays for putting certain nations in a category by themselves. If we do so we fail to take into proper account the universality of the danger, the solidarity for good or evil which more and more characterises modern developments, the unity of peace and war which on the whole exists. Moreover, if present developments are to be successfully checked, and if the forces making for war are to be defeated, then the peaceful nations must act in unison, and all division of forces must be avoided.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the peace of the small peaceful States of Europe is threatened. Some of them may persuade themselves that at any price they will keep clear. Very good. But by doing so they betray the solidarity which the present and the future require, and on which everything depends. The nations which accept it are doomed to vegetate. Neither is it the message of the ideal, heroic pacifism.

There is, too, another risk, namely, that a movement which fails to take into consideration national liberty and its inestimable blessings will create a reaction which will restore the old system and will justify its strength. There exists in man an elementary will to liberty and to defend that liberty. It is not possible to trample on that will with impunity, certainly not on that of the white races. If, for example, a British Labour Government were to attempt isolated disarmament or a great reduction of the British fighting forces otherwise than by international agreement, it would not be long before the imperialists and the reactionaries would again be in power, stronger than ever, and probably with the opportunity of dominating political developments for a long time to come. The same applies to practically every country. Neither is it impossible that such developments would produce a crop of dictatorships where we should otherwise not expect to find them.

Now we may ask ourselves how a country is to create the necessary resistance to the war society and to militarism. Is not what we have just said a contradiction of what we have said before? Yes and no. It only emphasises the dilemma of the peaceful States. Nor have we finished, for there remain some chapters in which we shall develop our argument. Only then can we come to a conclusion. We have so far desired merely to indicate the difficulties of the problem. We deny the possibility of simplifying it by supposing that a nation can cast aside its military defences just as it would cast aside an old coat or close an umbrella. It is the inherent difficulty and immensity of the problem which precludes such a simple solution. It is not a Gordian knot which can be cut in two. The knot must be untied by solving the problem which constitutes it. If in this book we could show on the one hand how to deal with armaments, and on the other hand how to avoid the risk of attack on particular countries, then we should have solved the most difficult of all present-day political problems. Unfortunately there exists no simple formula for such a solution.

It is not possible to generalise on the attitude which democracy in different countries will take up towards military defences. It can only be determined in each case individually after a consideration of all the circumstances. It is one of the tests which will be imposed on every clear-sighted democracy.

We deny, however, that the problem of the reduction of armaments can be solved or even brought nearer to a real solution *otherwise than by the organised international solidarity of the peaceful States*. This is not to support those who say that there is no use in seeking to establish a world of peace. That is the language of the armament fanatics. Our point of view leads logically to the demand for the exercise of all

possible force to secure an international attack on the problem. Not to a slackening of the demand, but to an intensification of it. In the end it is the struggle between reaction and democracy which will determine the future of war. The organisation of the solidarity of the peoples—following upon a democratic victory in this battle—is the only escape from the dilemma in which we are placed. It is the only historically authenticated possibility of preventing universal war. This path *must* be followed. Wilson expressed much the same thought when he said: "If peace is to be lasting, it must be a peace established by the force of the organised co-operation of humanity."

CHAPTER XV

FOR OR AGAINST DEMOCRACY

"The only teaching of history is that we have learned nothing from History."

DESPITE Schopenhauer, it is of importance at this point in our argument to investigate to what extent the breakdowns and shipwrecks of earlier attempts to establish a basis of peace afford useful instruction. Especially we should analyse the last attempt at co-operation, which bore the name "Holy Alliance", for its failure is often made the reason for denying the possibility of unifying the peoples at all.

The idea of association is old in history. As early as about 1300 B.C., in the attempt of the Pharaoh Amenophis IV to unite Egypt and parts of the East in a great Power under his sceptre, we perceive an expression of this thought. In pre-Hellenic times the sense of a more widespread solidarity appeared sporadically. Alexander aimed at a kind of State synthesis. The Persian Empire had some of the features of a World Power. The Roman Empire became, in its fullest development, an organisation embracing the whole of the known civilised world, with the exception of the East. It was the origin of the *Pax Romana*. On the ruins of that power grew up the Papal power, which became for the Western Roman peoples the counterpart to Islam under Mohammed, Abu-Bekr, and their successors to the Caliphate.

Even where in the course of developments these combinations were disintegrated, the idea of union for the preservation of peace did not disappear. The XVIIth and XVIIIth century balance of power, with its alliances and counter-alliances, was in the beginning a reflection of the same idea. The system

was, however, soon overwhelmed by a growing royal egoism, and became the instrument of dynastic and hegemonic ambitions. The system of the balance of power was not suitable ground for the development of the peace idea which mankind had so long fostered. Rather it was a grotesque distortion of it. The system finally degenerated completely, and gave rise to the cutting-up and partition of certain second-rate States, still on the pretext that peace must be maintained by the balance of power. The partition of Poland is the most conspicuous example of the fruits of this peace policy of princes and cabinets. The smaller States and nations, which had no influence, became mere objects of exchange, passing from hand to hand. The young male population became an article of commerce, sold in the form of recruits or soldiers to one prince or another. This was especially true of the smaller German principalities. This system they desired to preserve in the name of peace. Its defence was the lodestar of contemporary statecraft and political philosophy. Thus in 1782 a Frenchman—only ten years before the Revolution—proposed the formation of a great alliance, in which the major States would predominate, and which would be supported by an arbitration court composed of the representatives of those States. Judgment against refractory nations was to be executed by the Great Powers. Scarcely ever has the exploitation of the peace ideal appeared so clearly as a disguise for national selfishness. But behind this motivation there lay in general the correct idea that the maintenance of an *absolute* right of self-determination by individual States would render difficult the maintenance of peace. There existed in fact already a conflict between the principle of sovereignty and the speculations of international law. But whether the strict principle of sovereignty was abandoned and intervention did take place

depended upon the motives behind it and on its purpose. The real question was: who could intervene in such a manner that the general interest would be respected? Should such intervention be by the Powers directly interested, or should others co-operate with them? At this point the whole problem of the international peace organisation in fact arose, as it again arose after the world-war. It was not yet clearly comprehended, but the events ushered in by the French Revolution were specially adapted to bring these questions to a head. The policy of intervention still appeared fully parallel with the policy of the balance of power. Voices were by no means lacking to urge a real political organisation and a search for new paths to peace. On the whole, however, the principle of the balance of power was maintained, and Napoleon's attempt to secure a dominating position was taken by statesmen as a classical example of so doing.

The task of the Peace Congress at Vienna in 1814–15 was to restore a real balance of power. The principle of the balance was the generally accepted criterion according to which it was sought to reconcile conflicting interests in the partition of territory. The immense efforts required to vanquish Napoleon, and the hardships of the prolonged war, made it natural that the plan should be revived of avoiding or composing new conflicts by general diplomatic conferences in times of peace and of taking common measures to counteract a disturbance of the balance of power in a pacified Europe. It is equally natural that it was the Great Powers allied against France, and no others, who, after the second Peace of Paris in 1815, formed an alliance for the purpose of safeguarding the hard-won peace and the balance against attempts to disturb it by France. One can also understand that these Great Powers regarded it as their primary duty, both in France and else-

where, to suppress by every possible means—if necessary by intervention—those revolutionary movements which had proved so great a danger to the old system. It was the violent Napoleonic crisis which created the alliance of 1815, though its origin and forms are to be sought in earlier developments.

It is to be especially noted that in the articles of the 1815 alliance nothing definite is to be found concerning, for example, arbitration in international disputes. Neither are there any mutual guarantees. Apart from the stipulations as to surveillance directed against France, the essential article of the alliance only provided that the representatives of the Great Powers should meet at definite times to confer on measures for the maintenance of European peace. It was a step forward towards organisation that such an alliance was formally constituted, but since full liberty of action was reserved to the Powers, it is evident that there was no question here of a really *systematic attempt to organise peace*. The alliance must be regarded as essentially an expression of the logical development of the principle of the balance of power. Nor is this view invalidated by the fact that France was some years later admitted to the alliance so far as the conferences were concerned. If one studies the circumstances under which the alliance was broken up when the worst war weariness was over and the great conflicts of interests reappeared, it becomes very clear that at bottom it was only an alliance on the basis of the balance of power. The Holy Alliance was the last attempt to preserve this principle [Landberg].

In the Holy Alliance there is without doubt material for drawing certain historical parallels with the situation to-day. In this connection it is of the utmost importance to point

out the features which were of such a kind that they must lead to disruption.

We have already attempted to indicate the forces by which the French Revolution left the rails and degenerated into annexationism, and how the Napoleonic megalomania reflects itself in subsequent developments and creates motives which set their stamp on European policy during the whole century, and still continue to do so. This ominous development must be considered as the result of a conflict between the new age of liberty and the legitimistic system of the balance of power described above—a doomed system which was struggling for supremacy. It was the same reactionary forces, hostile to liberty, which had formerly destroyed dreams of peace and liberty and which created the alliance of States known as the Holy Alliance. It aimed, it is true, at the maintenance of peace, but of a peace resting on untenable ground.

The irresistible movement born of the French Revolution, which princes and cabinets thought they could suppress, the democratic undercurrents running through the peoples, burst these artificial dams. Democracy would not permit itself to be fettered. The French Revolution led to the democratic bourgeois State. It also gave rise to movements which liberated oppressed peoples.

From the course of developments, especially in the last century, we are justified in drawing the conclusion that the chief reason why the various efforts made during that period to achieve the organisation of peace did not lead to any results was that these efforts were based on the maintenance of an antiquated system which was in conflict with the fundamental tendencies of progress. The originators rowed against a tide which increased in strength every day. These early attempts stranded and collapsed because they were *in conflict with the*

young democracy. They were an expression of a struggle against the peoples. They were unholy alliances. These are the principal lessons to be learned from events. If therefore in certain quarters, on the strength of previous failures, every attempt to-day to bring about an organisation of the peoples is designated as an impossibility, this is due to false assumptions. A combination for the organisation of peace can now count on the support of the majority of the peoples. The idea of combination no longer struggles against the undercurrent. It is the undercurrent which bears it along, however confusing the position on the surface may appear.

This would seem to be the most suitable place to discuss the general question of democracy as a guarantor of peace. The reactionaries deny that it can ever be of any importance as such. They assert the contrary.

It must be admitted that democracy as such is not a reliable upholder of peace. Possibly it might have been if it had not been exposed during its development to the violence of reactionaries. Owing to this fact the national movements for liberty developed into wars, and the liberated territories were drenched in blood. Moreover, it is scarcely necessary to point out that there exists no absolutely reliable guardian of the peace. If, therefore, we point to democracy as upholding the ideals of peace, and as the force by which the structure of peace must be erected, we only register a vote of *relative* confidence—relative, that is, to other forces and powers, and especially to the political force of reaction.

I doubt if democracy can be the guardian and organiser of peace, primarily owing to the fact that the masses are led by their passions, and these passions are in turn infected with the war spirit. In speaking of the masses we must nevertheless make certain distinctions. The masses in one nation are not

the same as the masses in another. But in regard to the peace of a civilised Europe it is the attitude of the European masses which we must consider and not, for example, that of the Basuto negroes or of the Cossacks. We must think in the first place of England, Germany, and France. Are the broad masses in those countries infected with the war spirit? Are those of Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, or, to go outside Europe, of the U.S.A. and the South American republics? We cannot reasonably say that they are. It is more difficult to speak of the peoples of Central Europe. But if "they" want war, then "they" are certainly not identical with the Croatian, Slovak, and Hungarian peasants or Bohemian artisans. We hear that the masses are the driving-force of an outbreak of war. Reference is made especially to 1870, and the cries on the streets of Paris are incessantly called in evidence against democracy. Nobody, however, can prove that the masses of the French people desired war with Germany. It is true that the boulevards were excited, but what did the boulevards represent? And where was democracy in the France of Napoleon III? What did the Empress Eugénie, the soul of the war party, know of democracy? Just as little as the Royal Chamberlain knows of the people living on the sixth floor across the yard. It is true that after 1870 the idea of *revanche* grew up among large sections of the French people. The masses were certainly saturated with it. But whose fault was that? Was it not German statecraft, which at the same time waged war on democracy at home? And this flame of revenge was fanned to the utmost by French circles which were anything but democratic.

Reactionary writers have the unfortunate habit, when they wish to prove anything against a democracy, of turning history upside down. In their evidence the cave man and modern civilised

man are much the same thing. The only evidence admissible, however, is the outbreak of the last war. There will have to be a great deal of jugglery before the blame for the developments leading to that war is placed on the broad masses, on the democracy. If we restrict ourselves to the outbreak, then the blame is clearly on Austria, the most pronounced autocracy of Europe. Emil Ludwig's remark in his book *July 1914* that "all the guilt was in the Cabinets and all the innocence among the people", is true though epigrammatic.

When the war came the masses fought in all countries alike, whether democratic or not. That is true. Also in the Entente countries, after four years of working up, there was a demand for the prosecution of the war to the bitter end. But had it not been said in a thousand forms that it was a war for liberty, for democracy, and "to make an end of war"?

We should be lacking in a sense of reality, however, if we were to pass judgment on the masses as guardians of peace at the moment of the outbreak of war or during a war. We are all the same when smitten by war-psychosis. We must form our opinions on observations made in time of peace. Let us adduce concrete examples. "By their fruits ye shall know them." What is the present situation? Which countries may be regarded as promoting the organisation of peace, and which countries resist it? Is Italy a friend of peace? There is no need to answer the question. Italy is essentially anti-democratic. How is it with Poland and other dictatorships? Do they take a prominent part at Geneva? Weigh them in the scales against such democracies as, for example, those of Scandinavia, Holland, and Switzerland. What would the position be if the anti-democratic forces in Germany again came into power? What would the reaction be in France? Let us imagine Hugenberg and the Steel Helmets as leaders on one bank of the Rhine and their

spiritual brethren on the other. Where would Europe have been if men of such democratic minds as Briand and Stresemann had not been its negotiators. Which are the forces in the different nations which are directed towards conciliation, binding international agreements, and reduction of armaments? Are they the Conservative parties? That, too, is an unnecessary question. It is just those who attack democracy with tooth and nail who oppose the developments which at last seem to promise relief for the afflicted nations. The change of policy in England, however, is the strongest evidence that it is democracy which is leading us away from the pitfalls and abysses. Is it possible to maintain, considering the results achieved since the fall of the Tory Government in the spring of 1929—the evacuation of the Rhine, the acceptance of the optional clause, agreement with the U.S.A., and the beginning of naval reduction—that, compared with the attitude of the last Government, democracy and anti-democracy are the same thing in questions relating to the organisation of peace? And what is the political position of all the prompters who more or less consciously provoke war? There can be no doubt about the answer. A whole series of questions has arisen which are just as much a recommendation of democracy as they are an impeachment of reaction. No historical conjuring can alter that. If, in spite of all, the U.S.A. should follow the path of imperialism and armaments, it will not be because it is a democracy, or is called one, but because its democracy has been submerged in a plutocracy which has no relation whatever to democracy.

Democracy has great faults, but it must be weighed against the alternative. The choice lies between a continued development of democracy and a most pronounced reaction. It is not without reason that the dictators lead the enemies of

democracy. Thereby the struggle has been intensified in the extreme. It is a "war" to the knife, for life and death. For it must be writ large that the coming organisation of a lasting peace depends primarily on the political work of the democratic forces. Peace cannot be achieved against democracy, but only by its help.

CHAPTER XVI

POWER FOR PEACE

In so far as it is possible to judge of the rôle of different forces in human development, it is mind which does the preparatory work and gives to an age its substance and character. At the present day thought revolves round the question of war and peace in a manner in some respects quite different from that of the XIXth century. This is fully evident. But we must not be blind to the fact that the change has come so late that the old ideas may, by virtue of the law of inertia, overcome the new before it has had time to produce any historical effect. The new thought has come late in the day. We must assume that it is *too* late unless it can quickly enlist certain powerful forces which may be converted into practical politics.

These forces must be of such a kind that they can be *organised* and will operate with their full weight in a given direction against certain definite and ascertainable political ends.

Intellectualism cannot be organised. It is its nature to move freely. That is at once its strength and its weakness. Intellectualism has a great part to play, now as ever, as a source of inspiration. It is, among other things, the creator of the literature which now concerns itself with international problems. The peace movement also, finding organised expression in the form of associations with an idealist programme, is of importance as a source of inspiration. But it lacks political striking power. The Churches are also organised, but, like the peace movement, they do not contemplate the slowness of the spiritual process. Their association with the State binds

them, so that frequently they take reactionary views. A flagrant example is the recent alliance of the Papal power with Fascist reaction.

The course of political events is at present shaping itself into a renewed struggle between democracy and reaction with the features of dictatorship. The question, as Nitti puts it, is whether this crisis is of a temporary nature or whether democracy will be set back indefinitely. The world-war, it is true, was followed by a democratic advance. But it was tinged with war, became eruptive, and gave rise to a counter-movement. It was a volcanic outbreak with thunder, fire, ashes, and lava, which, however, soon subsided and made the soil in parts sterile. The chances of democracy's securing quickly enough the necessary decisions are quite insufficient, principally because this democracy is so diffused, so lacking in homogeneity, that it cannot be organised for attack in a given direction. The individualism of liberalism—otherwise its strength —is a weakness where organisation for battle is in question. Moreover, liberalism has in places submerged itself in more or less unimportant questions. It has lost the tension which at a time of decision of world importance is alone capable of evoking great efforts. If the liberal bourgeois democracy is afraid to attack the great problem, then not only is liberalism threatened with extinction, but also its aim: political liberty.

Similarly, the working-class democracy is in a critical state. Even though its progress still continues in many places, yet it has not been able to escape the general weakness of democracy. During its youth, when nothing appeared to hinder the coming of the Marxist kingdom, Socialism worried itself very little with the solution of problems. They were regarded as solved once for all. Hard reality has corrected this optimism. Con-

fronted with post-war difficulties, Government control, and the more complicated economic problems, Socialism and the labour movement have been unable to maintain their dogmatic ground. The readjustment of values which is clearly in full progress is likely to weaken their power of attack. But if, on the other hand, this revaluation had not taken place, their doctrines would without doubt have destroyed the significance of the movement. If dogmatism—which is, of course, still in evidence—were to prevent self-examination the case would be equally bad. But there is reason to believe that it will not. To an outside observer it would appear that a significant revision of socialist dogma will result from the present process. The Marxist Russian Revolution constitutes the last word in this respect. The Marxist theory committed suicide during the catastrophe. Two things seem inevitable. Socialism must for good or evil accept the liberal demand for the maintenance of individual economic initiative. Otherwise it will cut its throat. Its own principle of State intervention, though modified, will on the other hand certainly prove correct and necessary in order to check the most dangerous and injurious effects of the capitalistic system. Socialism has probably already learned that when it proceeds to the regulation of the capitalistic system—in its present form no doubt untenable—it must advance with the caution which a deeper insight into the sensitiveness of world economics has begun to produce. Our view that reformed economic thought will in the future prevail in the labour movement is of the greatest importance in the following argumentation.

* * *

Present developments show a striking economic emphasis. There is little use in discussing whether this is a good thing

or a bad thing, except from the point of view of fundamentals. We must constantly take into account those forces which affect developments. We are compelled, whether we wish it or not, to take into account the forces of self-interest—that is to say, *the economic forces.*

Ever since the beginning of the labour movement the struggle of the working classes has been an economic struggle. Its political and cultural aims have been pressed into the background in order that the economic position of the masses might be improved; an improvement which must necessarily precede political or cultural progress. The attitude of Labour to war, though a plank in its political programme, has never been a main plank. Since the war, however, it has become more conspicuous. In proportion as it is more widely realised, both among the masses and their leaders, that the battle will be lost and that the fruits already harvested will be destroyed by war or by tendencies towards war, the struggle for peace must take a more prominent place in their thoughts. It does not help much to gain economic and political advantages if a progressive movement towards war nullifies them. We do not rent rooms in a house owned by a person notorious for arson. Of course it may be said that in a violent crisis the masses might seize power, including economic power, by force. That is the Bolshevik programme. But for the majority of the working classes of the West an acceptance of that programme would mean a complete transformation. Without doubt such a transformation will take place unless war developments are suppressed. It will also probably occur if the present owners of the means of production do not hear the ringing of the bell. Unhappily they have seldom a clear understanding of what is required for peaceful development. The question is whether they have now learned anything. There

are certain signs that they have. There is an indication of a change of mind in, for example, the Melchett discussions, though it is too early to say what their result will be. The effects on the labour movement of a *non possumus* attitude on the part of the employers cannot be foreseen, but without doubt they will be ominous.

With these reflections we approach one of the most important points in our argument, the possibility of setting in motion the economic forces in a common attempt to check developments tending to war.

Such common action is from certain points of view logical. The direction of war towards the destruction of the means of production—we emphasise this again as being one of the most important of present-day developments—a destruction which would affect not only the owners of the means of production but also the working classes, as well as the growing consciousness that the world is a single, self-contained economic unit, which war would destroy: these two considerations should prove decisive. And further, just as the labour movement overflows national frontiers, so also capital is assuming everywhere a more international form. Trusts, cartels, etc., know no national frontiers. The developments in this direction which took place before the war have gathered strength since. Indeed, this is one of the most characteristic features of post-war developments. In Germany and America the trust is an old institution. Germany still leads in Europe in this field, however. In 1905 it had 385 cartels; in 1911 there were 600; and in 1925 there were about 3,000. Of the German soda industry 98 per cent. belongs to cartels; of the chemical 96·3 per cent.; of coal 93 per cent.; of the electrical industry 87 per cent.; and of iron and steel 80 per cent. The greatest trust is in the colour and dyestuffs industry, with a capital

of more than one milliard marks. France has the fewest trusts. But it is moving slowly in the same direction. The new tendencies are, nevertheless, to be seen in their most pronounced form in post-war England. They are seen in practically every branch of industry: iron, steel, cotton, wool, machinery, cables, etc.; only in the coal industry is the movement slow. The path of development has been through national associations to international expansion. The example of Germany and the U.S.A. has proved invincible, and in the next few years we shall probably see new combinations on a gigantic scale (Lloyd George). The world-wide Swedish match trust and the ball-bearing fusion prove that the boundaries between large and small States are being erased. The whole of this development is certainly for good or evil. Its consequences cannot be foreseen. But it cannot be stopped. What interests us here is how this international development in the economic field will affect the question of war and peace. There are many obscure points. But if the two strongest groups of forces could be brought to co-operate, i.e. *the labour movement and parts of the world embracing capital, we should have at our disposal the strongest active force for the prevention of war.*

We do not assert that this is possible. We only pose the extremely important question. A number of objections can of course immediately be raised. Such a combination is in a sense unnatural. It may perhaps be described as a new "unholy alliance". The workers look upon capital as an enemy. The capitalist system, in combination with militarism and nationalism, is the deepest cause of war. All this is true. But it depends on the question whether evolution, everywhere in full progress, will also affect the attitude of capital towards war, and whether we are not justified, as we have already said, in distinguishing between capital and capital. There exists a

definite "war capital", and we have already described some of its conspicuous representatives. Against such capital there can only be war. But what is its extent? Where does it cease, and where does what we call "peace capital" begin—the capital which may be regarded as intimately bound up with peace? We do not believe in the dogma that capital as a whole is psychologically predisposed to war.

One manifestation of high finance and of its power to peace is to be seen in the regulation of reparations, which made it possible for the German Republican Government to prepare the way for a settlement with France. Wirth, the former German Chancellor, writes on this subject: "Financial authorities, even in ex-enemy countries, maintained (in 1921) emphatically that the burdens laid upon Germany would destroy its credit unless the terms of payment were altered. British financial circles soon realised that the solution of the reparations problem was in the interests of international economy, and was necessary for the restoration and improvement of the economic life even of the victors. It therefore began to strive for the separation of the reparations problem from politics and its removal to an economic basis. The result was the Dawes Plan." After examining the feasibility of the Dawes Plan, Wirth adds "that it is now absolutely necessary that world finance should as soon as possible calculate what Germany really can pay and thus place the problem on a sound economic basis. If this is done it will constitute a new proof that finance, instead of being an enemy to peace, is one of its most important champions." Then came the next step, the Young Plan.

The great re-orientation nevertheless necessary in finance can scarcely be achieved except by the inherent forces of finance under the pressure of the world situation. It is not, it is true, to be supposed for a moment that the old instigators

of war in capitalistic circles will renounce their shameful connections of their own free will. What it is necessary to investigate is thus the possibility of a rational cleavage between war capital on the one hand and peace capital and democracy on the other.

In a review of the original edition of this book, Dr. Bjerre, whose reputation is world-wide, writes on this point: "At the present day there is developing before our eyes, without our appreciating its significance, a new kind of 'nation'. The great trusts, cartels, corporations, and labour unions are developing more and more and more into international, or, as we would call them, *economic States*.

"England and America have had an intense struggle for oil. But at the same time as these two rival oil concerns reached an agreement, and thus as independent economic units emancipated themselves from their previous national status, there arose from their agreement a concentration of power to which the two Great Powers may eventually be compelled to yield. So long as they are in the process of formation it may be in the interest of the trusts to retain the support of the State. But when they have developed into world organisations the situation is changed. Neither are we exaggerating when we say that this position will be reached in a not too distant future by one combination after another. What would be the answer if we were to turn to the leaders of these economic units and to ask: 'Is the preservation of peace in your interests? If so, will you co-operate in abolishing war by stopping supplies or by ceasing work?' Probably they would answer: 'We have no time to bother with such speculations; we deal in matches, oil, chemicals, etc., but not in pacifism.' But if we should succeed in convincing them that war is inevitable, that in the near future they will be obliged to take up a position in regard to

these questions, and that if they desire peaceful developments they must prepare in advance; under such circumstances some of the more far-sighted ones would begin to pay attention, and to wonder whether the time was not already ripe to do so. Others would sit down and calculate whether it would be worth while turning over to war industry, and whether it would benefit their industry or not. Would they not in such case, with the experience of the world-war behind them, come to the conclusion that war is bad business? Is it inconceivable that interest might be awakened in the establishment of something new on the basis of these economic units? The labour movement is at present handicapped in its internationalism by the trusts. The advantage which the trusts have acquired by the fact that they can operate more or less independently of national strikes must lead the trade unions to complete internationalisation. Such a reconstituted and consolidated workers' international would also constitute an economic unit of vast dimensions. And it would probably stand in strong contrast to the trust units. On one point, however, these two giants might agree: in their desire to abolish war, the common enemy."

Doubtless there is much truth in the above remarks. A tremendous shifting of power is doubtless taking place, and we are on the threshold of a new era, characterised by the growth of what the above-mentioned author calls the "economic States". But we should certainly be wrong if we thought that this development will in the near future reach a stage at which the national States or the political Powers will be thrust aside. These latter will probably still long dominate the picture. Neither can we help fearing that the complete supremacy of the "economic States" over the political States will involve very great risks. Into whose hands will the concentrated power

come; or what form of power will direct developments? The whole question is too great to be discussed here. We only wish to point out and to emphasise the necessity of penetrating it.

Nevertheless, co-operation between the two great interests—labour and what we have called "peace capital"—is *the great coalition* against destructive war and its twin brother revolution. But this coalition is at best the great eventuality on which we cannot at present rely. Its realisation is remote, in spite of all in its favour.

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The organisation of peace must not be allowed to depend on any eventuality. It must therefore for the present primarily utilise the power which exists in the international labour movement, and which is based on the millions of industrial workers of Western Europe among whom hostility to war is pronounced and hatred to war intense.

The *question of peace is a question of power*. It is power for peace which is before all things necessary. We must make this clear to ourselves and to other peoples. Over and over again, when we examine proposals for the organisation of peace, we find that they cannot be adopted because there is not sufficient power to back them up. Theoretically the proposals are sufficiently clear, at any rate as regards the principal lines, but they cannot be made operative without power. The question of the limitation of armaments is a case in point. The forces which have created the vicious circle are still sufficiently powerful to prevent any breach in it. Most of the great questions resolve themselves finally into the problem of finding adequate power to enforce a decision. We expressed the view in the first chapter that above all things it will be necessary

to find a lever. Our argumentation has led us to the conclusion that *this lever is to be found in the working classes of Western Europe.*

Many objections may, of course, be made to this suggestion, and we shall ourselves enumerate three of the most important ones.

The first lies in the supposition that the workers of industrialised countries might look upon workers in other countries principally as competitors. This would involve the failure of internationalism. The stomach would determine the nature of developments. Such a world would not be impossible if the dictatorships should inspire developments. It is not improbable that the workers of Italy would accept such a view. If it were accepted by workers in general, then every possibility of abolishing war would be excluded. The suggestion only emphasises the thesis of the decisive importance of democracy in the future. In a military society armed to the teeth and with a dictatorship as its crown, developments are not in doubt. But if democracy is victorious there is little or no chance of converting the workers to the view that they should slay their comrades in other countries and destroy their industrial equipment in order to improve their own position.

The second important objection is that the Western worker has achieved a comparatively high standard of living, partly at the expense of his colonial brothers. Sooner or later this problem will become acute, though it is at present certainly not so. It is one of the troubles of to-morrow. It is not necessary to introduce this immense economic problem into this discussion on war and peace. And it is probable that if peace is secured it will be possible to grapple with this problem also.

The most serious objection to the rule of the working-class democracy is the fact that in 1914 the International

showed itself unable to resist the pressure of the outbreak of war. It did not stand the test. It fell like a house of cards. But the conclusions drawn from these facts appear to us misleading. The outbreak of 1914 was the first in the experience of the labour movement and the International. In 1870 the latter was scarcely organised. Can we really expect that it would resist the pressure of all that happened during a whole century and vanquish the immense forces which had been organised in readiness for half a century? That would be a naïve point of view. Moreover, the International in 1914 entirely lacked any organisation against war. It did not even know the nature of war-psychosis. The unorganised masses had to give way to organised power. And as things were, the world-war could not be prevented. (The well-known saying of Ballin that "one need not have been a Bismarck to prevent this most stupid of all wars" is not at all convincing.)

The labour movement, as well as democracy in general, is now confronted with a mass of great problems. One of them is how the Bolshevik movement, which has done it so much damage, can be conquered from within. Everything seems to indicate, however, that with a comparatively calm period of development this may be done. The workers' democracy must in this case be its own physician. The labour movement is also overrun with day-to-day problems. Everything depends upon whether or not it understands the world situation and its tension. If it does, the result must be a quickening of the working classes in the struggle against war. It is not possible for an outsider to judge what impulse is necessary to that end. But the world-war and the risk of a new one are and will remain the chief incitements. Nothing surpasses them in importance. In clearness the attitude of the International to war, as last expressed at the Brussels Conference in 1928

leaves nothing to be desired in principle. Yet there does not seem to exist any systematic plan of action, and resolutions alone certainly cannot achieve anything. The masses of labour are not yet an organised power for peace.

Whether or not the abolition of war can be expected by the "great coalition", the working-class democracy, with the help of other democratic forces, must assume power in the various countries. Only by Government action in intimate co-operation with other nations, especially at Geneva, can the necessary power be acquired. This assumption of power can only take place—unless the labour movement completely changes its present attitude—by parliamentary means. The power for peace must be granted—was it not Mr. MacDonald who said so?—at the ballot-boxes. The result of the German elections of 1928, by which the Social Democrats assumed the government of the republic, was of the utmost importance to the cause of peace in Europe. The last English elections, however, were vastly more significant. The change of Government in England in the spring of 1929 created at the psychological moment a great opportunity. Already important results have been achieved, too well known to require mention. If one regards developments from the point of view of war and peace the English elections may be considered the most important event since the rise of democracy. England has once again, after a long interval, resumed its rôle as the leader of political developments. What has happened may give an impulse —and has indeed already done so—to a new advance all along the line from the defensive positions which democracy has occupied of recent years.

There are two things—in addition to what has been said of economic adaptability—which a victorious working-class democracy must bear in mind if it is not to fail in its great

historic purpose. It must be able to combine with sound internationalism the sense of nationality, and be prepared by suitable means—before the international organisation of peace has advanced—to safeguard the right of the nations to security. It is only by methodical procedure, by increased consolidation and accumulation of strength, by the maintenance of outward and inward calm, that reaction can be prevented from recovering or strengthening its positions, and the necessary power for the organisation of peace be acquired.

CHAPTER XVII

THE FEDERATION OF THE PEOPLES

In his preface to Kenworthy's *Will Civilisation Crash?* H. G. Wells writes that he is not at all convinced that the path to peace advocated by the author—the outlawry of war—will lead to success. Or, more correctly, he says he does not believe it will lead anywhere. He adds that only a really permanent federation of the States which are now in a position to wage war can prevent it. Wells believes that Kenworthy knows this as well as he does, but adds sarcastically that Hull must be considered, and asks what would happen to the famous commander and his majority if he simply and clearly advocated the incorporation of the Empire in a larger world confederation.

The question may well be asked, even without reference to Hull.

Anything which appears to infringe the absolute sovereignty of a State always sets in motion a whole complex of hereditary conceptions. All historical monuments then become "sacred". The ancient ghosts of history rise up, are reincarnated, and make speeches. Our great Kings and Kaisers; our generals who fought at Malplaquet, Narva, Austerlitz, Leipsic, Waterloo, Vionville—all become more venerable than ever. And all this carries away numbers of people who know nothing of the question and who make no attempt to form their own opinion on it. All the Babbitts in all countries shriek for help in the belief that their nationality is in danger. All this and much more is stirred up so soon as the necessity arises of modifying the current conception of State sovereignty so that it

shall no longer signify the right to destroy Europe and the world.

The question of the organisation of the peoples and the limitation of the conception of sovereignty has arisen since the war in political thought and literature. There is scarcely anybody who has seriously studied the problems of war and peace who is not familiar with it. The Italian historian, Ferrero, adumbrates the subject in his last book *l'Unité du Monde*. His thought takes the form of a fusion of the whole world into a cultural, political, and economic unit. Ferrero does not see the new imperium as the absorption of one people by another, but rather as a world divided up into a number of States of essentially democratic character, in which each State, each race, and each civilisation lives its own life in co-operation and interchange with the others. He insists that in the broad masses of the people there already exists a sufficiently strong sense of justice, humanity, solidarity, and liberty—if not suffocated by the policy of power—to save civilisation. The French historian, Romier, follows much the same line of thought. He points out how at present the conflict between the ideas of civilisation and nationalism threatens to ruin the world because there exists no common civilising conception which can compete with the influence of the State power and neutralise it, especially when it contemplates war. Although modern civilisation is richer and more humane than that which preceded it, yet it is—says Romier—inferior to the poor and crude Middle Ages. The world-war revealed that. The belligerent States or complexes of States on both sides enlisted all the intellectual and moral forces: Science, Church, and Press. Romier sees the solution in an aristocracy of faith and idealism which would carry aloft, high above national

egoism and disputes, all that is essential and vital to civilisation. Romain Rolland's thoughts are much the same. So also are those of H. G. Wells, though both in his last book *The Open Conspiracy*, and especially in his work on the coming world peace, published in 1918, he emphasises more than the preceding authors the organisatory side. Russell comes to the same conclusion, and considers that in the end there cannot be more than one single State embracing the whole world. Professor Madariaga, formerly a member of the Secretariate of the League of Nations, in his book *Disarmament* advocates more strongly and more directly than anybody else the idea of the "World Community". These are specimens of ways of thinking which draw similar conclusions from history and events, and which seek to penetrate to the depths of present-day developments. That they have not yet set a deeper mark on actual politics, and that Parliaments are unaffected by them, is not strange. Was it not almost fifteen years before the maxims and thoughts of Adam Smith found any echo in the English Parliament?

But the weakness of thought concerning these problems is in most cases striking. Speculation moves in the clouds instead of resolutely associating itself with the present political situation. It conceives the organisation of the peoples as a dream of the future, a hope. It has not been clearly enough understood that the inspiration of the present situation pulls this vision down from the skies and transforms it into an actual political question. Present developments demand a solution of one kind or another. The organisation of the peoples has become an eminently practical, though gigantic, problem. The limitation of State sovereignty is one of the central problems of world politics.

We may ask ourselves what is the most characteristic subconscious feature of the age which is just opening. Is it to subdue nationalism and militarism or to force a federation of States? There can scarcely be any other answer than that it is both of these. In any case the one is not possible without the other. There are, indeed, some who see in disarmament the real solution of the problem of war and peace. For our part we deny the possibility of this solution, so far as is meant mere disarmament and nothing more. It is clear already that the disarmament question has been driven into a *cul-de-sac* by this limitation of view. It is not only the resistance of the reactionary forces and groups behind war which has hitherto prevented any rational progress on this question. The fundamental reason why nothing has been done and nothing is likely to be done is probably that the whole problem has been treated in so one-sided a manner, and has been torn out of its historical setting. To regard disarmament as the end is to show that the problem has not been clearly thought out. It is necessary that we should clearly realise this. There cannot be any disarmament, or even reduction of armaments worthy of the name, until the nations have begun, at least in principal, to prepare for some federation, or until some more effective form than the present League of Nations has been found. The absence of decisive measures for guarantees must be regarded as the principal reason why the solution of the disarmament problem does not make any progress. Only when it is made will the demand for security—which now cripples everything—begin to rest on a new foundation. No endeavour in this direction can be made, however, until present-day militarism has been defeated in principle and, together with nationalism, has been pressed into the background by the

nations. There must be a parallel development. Just in the same way as, formerly, armaments and the policy of power of the individual States influenced and sustained each other, so also must a system of guarantees and disarmament do the same thing. Many people regard it as a complication of the problem to combine with disarmament the successive and parallel limitation of sovereignty. But they are wrong, for the question is really complex. To make this clear is in a manner to simplify the problem and to sound the depths until bottom is reached.

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But for the war and the new cyclone which is possible, the idea of a real organisation of the peoples as practical politics would certainly have been regarded as Utopian. The reason why it *must* now find practical expression is that we are forced into a relatively narrow pass between two events: the war that was, and the war that is to be. It is this fact which forces developments and clothes this "phantom" in flesh and blood. The feature of Utopianism, which was so conspicuous until quite recently, is rapidly becoming obliterated by the realism of events. Of course, the question is not one of those which concern "actual" politics. But what, after all, do we mean by actual politics? Do we mean only small things and the sum total of small things? They doubtless do constitute actual politics in one sense. But in the real sense actual politics are concerned with the problems of to-morrow. In a few short moments the politics of to-day become those of yesterday. That which is developing, that which is approaching its final form, that which is of significance for the living and for those who will be born—these are actual politics. The saying that

"what Lancashire thinks to-day England will think to-morrow" is not limited to England in its application.

There is no question what Mr. Babbitt thinks of all this—if he thinks at all. Neither is there any doubt what the representatives of the conservative system think. We know that without asking. We know only too well that to such people all talk of limitation of sovereignty or of federation is pagan madness. But those who regard the federation of the peoples as a Utopian idea not worth a thought have not observed that something has happened which has already converted the dream into a tangible reality. We refer of course to the foundation of the League of Nations.

There are two categories of people who sit in judgment on Wilson's work. The one perceives in the League an intruder who endangers the developments which it has made its own, something which must be belittled or passed over in silence. This category did all in its power to prevent the consummation of the League, or, when it was actually founded, to embitter its life. The methods vary. Sometimes it is said that the League has no significance. Its inability to act is emphasised. At another time attention is called to the fact that it is an instrument of the Great Powers, a new "Holy Alliance". Its attempts to settle disputes are ridiculed and the whole basis of the League is, when necessary, declared bankrupt. It is difficult in these various forms of attack on the League to find a clear line of thought or any kind of logic. What is one day its merit is the next day a crime. The second category abuses the League as an instrument of power, and consequently also of imperialism. This is also the view of a number of pacifists. This category does not as a rule desire the destruction of the League, but it considers that it has failed, and has no justification for its

existence. There is little doubt that these latter critics have more justification than the former. But even if both categories are to a large extent right in regarding the League of Nations as the instrument of the Great Powers, yet the latter category has not sufficiently allowed for the difficulty of satisfying their demands all at once. They have forgotten that an organically developed system cannot be conjured away in a night, and a fairy castle take its place in the morning sunshine. They have underestimated the tangible difficulties which confronted, and still confront, the new organisation. They have not understood that in order to effect a change mighty forces must be set in motion. It is not sufficient to say that a thing must be done.

Within and around the League there are at present opposing forces. Imperialism and nationalism still have a strong hold on it. But despite all, the League of Nations is the axle around which future international developments must revolve. There is only one way. It is *to develop the League*.

There are two historical systems which are in conflict. Arguments and counter-arguments in countless numbers will be expressed with growing heat in the various forums: Literature, the Press, Parliaments. All that we wish to assert and to repeat here is that historical developments of their own momentum now take these questions out of the studies of thinkers and philosophers and into the realms of political reality, and that in the resulting confusion two things must be borne in mind: existing sovereign rights—especially the right to wage war—must be limited, and this limitation of sovereignty must lead to or coincide with the creation of a stronger organisation of the peoples than is found in the present League of Nations.

The chief importance of the Kellogg Pact lies, in our opinion, in the fact that its acceptance implies at least a theoretical limitation of sovereignty. A beginning has thus been made. A breach has been made in the wall of absolute sovereignty. The reservations to the Pact are an effort to repair the breach. They may be justified under existing conditions, but if the current of opinion operates, its pressure will wash away these loose stones.

It is of the greatest importance to show that the organisation of the peoples and the limitation of sovereignty are not distant visions, but that the course of developments is definitely towards them, though it is true that very great efforts and much time will be necessary to achieve them. It is not less important to show that the old system is in fact bankrupt. It is the same with it as with certain opinions which, says Birrell, though apparently strong and undamaged, are in reality empty shells which can be brought down with a single blow. In this case, however, numerous powerful blows will be necessary to pull down the old system. If it were a question of a business concern showing such results as the latter has shown, there is no doubt that a speedy liquidation and rational reorganisation would be required. A system which produces such a monstrosity as the world-war should in the name of reason be doomed, in order that next time it shall not bury the whole of human civilisation under its ruins.

The question of the organisation of the peoples is on much the same footing as the question of the Channel Tunnel. The latter was proposed at least a hundred years ago. It has stranded on technical difficulties, but also on political objections. The first proposals were put forward at a time when the state of technical knowledge could not guarantee success. It is about

the same with the organisation of the peoples. The sceptics point out that hitherto no success has been achieved. But there is in opposition to the Tunnel project also a compact mass of conservative opinion which sees danger springing up from the entrances to the Tunnel. So also in the development of the idea of international organisation. A thousand dangers will be imagined by its opponents and by all the forces seeking to prevent its fulfilment.

Adhesion to a federation must be voluntary. The right of self-determination must be held sacred. Instead of force, the advantages of the larger union must be held out. An illuminating example of the power of attraction of a federation is to be seen in the American federation. After the first union of thirteen States, one State after another joined the Union. They could not withstand the force of gravity which attracted them to the already established federation. The creation of the American super-State was easier, however, than it would be in other parts of the world. No comparison is possible with Europe and its sundered linguistic areas. In America it was as a rule linguistic units which were fused; and even if race mixture was considerable, yet race unity predominated. Suspicion and distrust nevertheless existed between the States which were prevailed upon to unite. The Americans solved their problem by appointing certain authorities with sovereign powers which were specified with a doubtful precision. The rights of the States were, moreover, left intact. New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia retained their legal independence. It was only after discussions lasting for years that they relinquished it. Fusion was complete in practice before it was codified. It was only after the Civil War that the full conclusion was drawn that sovereignty was vested in the

American people and not in the separate Governments. However this may be, if developments had been different, if Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln, and especially Alexander Hamilton, the protagonist and indefatigable propagandist of the federal idea—if these far-sighted men had not lived, perhaps America would at the present moment have been another Europe—a gigantic Transatlantic Balkans. We should have heard, as Gaston Riou says, "of obscure wars between Tennessee and Alabama, of a Caesar from Milwaukee or a Primo from Omaha or Nebraska". And possibly of fortifications along the Mississippi and the Missouri, the boundaries between an armed East and West corresponding to the banks of the Rhine. There is nothing improbable in these assumptions, though they nowadays appear fantastic.

The American precedent leads us to another question of principle: the limitation and determination of the power of the federation. The American States resolved to create a common Congress. Its powers were definitely fixed, as were those of the President. Their principal duties were to watch certain common interests, to treat with foreign Powers, and to establish a Supreme Court. Everything else—education, troops, power of life and death—was retained in the hands of the separate States. Even to-day, for example, the Federal Courts have no power to intervene to protect the life and property of foreigners in any part of the Union.

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That which nowadays drives our thoughts towards a vast organisation of the peoples is the threat of annihilation inherent in modern developments. War is the question which occupies the foreground in a discussion of the functions of a federal

organisation—the prohibition of war to a component State and the removal of every possibility of violating that prohibition. But it is not easy to limit these functions. If war is to be excluded from the equation, the political and economic problems which lie at the root of war must be attacked and a whole series of questions of world-wide importance will crop up which it will be the function of the Federal State to resolve. Nevertheless it is necessary here to emphasise the importance of limiting the proposed federal power to what is absolutely necessary.

We are therefore to some extent in disagreement, for that reason, with Madariaga when he says: "The World Community must be 'run' as a world community. The sixty nations which compose it must no longer be allowed to prowl in liberty for whatever they can filch from each other, be it territories, markets, raw materials, or dividends." To this point we may agree. But we must resist him when he continues: "A World Community must regulate the life from A to Z on the principle that the world is one." This is a most unhappy remark. There can never be a question of regulation from A to Z. If we were to attempt to make a uniform which would fit the whole world the result would be a strait-waistcoat which everybody would try to escape. There exists no tailor who could produce such a masterpiece, and those who wish to bring the idea of a world community into practical politics must resist such attempts. It is of extreme importance justly to stress from the beginning the *limitation* of power and influence of the World Community. We are not concerned here with a plan for a world socialist State, a kind of international boarding-school in which the pupils are deprived of all freedom of movement.

In conclusion, a system does not last for ever. Everything is in a state of flux. There must be progress or retrogression, advance or retreat, growth or decay. It is not possible to say for all time: Thus shall it be; these are the boundaries; these the raw-material markets, etc. An organisation of the peoples which is to have any prospect of preventing violent eruptions and wars must be so constituted that it can be adapted to organic growth. Otherwise we shall have another Treaty of Versailles, a new Holy Alliance, an enemy to progress instead of a protagonist and a guardian. The danger is evident. But the civilised nations should be ripe enough and experienced enough to be able to overcome it.

CHAPTER XVIII

PAN-EUROPE, UNITED STATES OF EUROPE, THE WORLD FEDERATION

Various plans for a Federal super-State are in existence, plans for a Pan-Europe and for the United States of Europe. Both are doubtless based on great conceptions. So great, indeed, that the majority of people certainly regard them as purely Utopian, in particular those who are not aware "that world history reveals more imagination than its marionettes, and that it is a succession of surprises". It is not because of their alleged grandiosity or Utopianism that the plans for a Pan-Europe or a United States of Europe must be ruled out as impracticable in the organisation of the peoples.

Coudenhove-Kalergi, in his *Pan-Europa*, proposes geographical Europe as a unit. He attempts to find a form of joint organisation for the European nations. But he has made a very remarkable exception in excluding England from his imaginary super-State, on the ground that that country, together with its extra-European possessions and dominions, constitutes a continent by itself. A continent cannot be left standing within the continent of Europe. The mere fact that there exists in Europe the centre of a world empire is sufficient to explode the Pan-European idea. This is the first and essential objection. But is there any other reasonable ground, except possibly geography, for regarding Europe as a unit? The differences of level in European civilisation are so great that it is not possible to speak of any congruity. Conditions in the Balkans, in Russia, show that there are still a number of barbarous States in Europe with which we Europeans have much less spiritual and economic affinity than with, for example, the

new Turkey, the new China, Japan, Australia, or North and South America. And can we, in their present political form, with advantage include Russia and Italy in a European federation which has as its primary object to organise peace and international solidarity? The idea both of a Pan-Europe and of the United States of Europe is—be it said with all respect —stillborn. Its selection of a continent as a unit implies that, so constructed, it might be possible to patch up a Europe, but at the same time there is every prospect that this new unit would be in conflict with other continents. With the present importance of economic interests there would be a danger that such a European union would take the form of an economic organisation and that the continent would be launched into even keener competition, primarily with the U.S.A., but possibly with a Pan-America and possibly with a Pan-Asia. The realisation of a Pan-Europe would seem to be the best means of promoting just that development which, in our survey of Asiatic developments, we described as the most dangerous of all. It opens up the future prospect of continent ranged against continent in a death-struggle. Sternberg, the German author whom we have already quoted, arrives at exactly the same conclusion concerning a Pan-Europe. He writes: "Let us suppose Pan-Europe a reality. What would be the consequences? In Europe a number of tariff walls would disappear. Industry would be concentrated in the most advantageous areas and places. Capitalistic penetration into the non-capitalistic areas in Europe would proceed apace. It would be followed by the imperialistic advance, operating with much greater weight. The result would be that the imperialistic forces would be strengthened and the new imperialistic war would be brought nearer." If in Kalergi's plan to exclude England from the European union there were

a suggestion of thereby building a bridge to the other continents we could understand him. But there is no such suggestion, and it is in any case impossible to understand how the British Empire could perform such a function. To all appearance the whole result of the plan would be to divide the world into four immense units: Pan-Europe, the British Empire, Pan-America, and Asia with Russia, or with Russia as the fifth member of the constellation. How anything of the kind could be the foundation of peaceful development we cannot, with the best will in the world, understand. The same applies to the proposed United States of Europe. An ill-considered policy of the U.S.A., as is reflected for example in its unreasonable and inconsiderate tariff proposals, might force Europe into an economic union in order to save itself from ruin. Wickham Steed, during the discussion of Briand's United States of Europe, has touched on this point. It is possible that something of the kind may prove necessary. But nevertheless we should then be pursuing a course of action which all the forces of good will on both sides of the Atlantic should do their uttermost to prevent. Neither the one project nor the other appears, despite Briand, to have been made with an eye to the characteristic feature of the new age.

The federation of the peoples must clearly be based on some other foundation than such plans. As speculative exercises they no doubt have their value. They have helped to actualise this question in circles interested in world problems. They have stimulated discussion. But whenever the question of the organisation of the nations is brought into the field of practical politics it must be placed on quite a different footing. The important starting-point is the fact that the League of Nations constitutes the framework of a federal organisation which is already breaking down the continental frontiers.

It may appear that the idea of a *World Federation* constitutes a too violent breach of historical continuity, and that continental fusions would constitute the natural connecting link between the present system and the future. But is this correct? Apart from the economic aspect of the problem, which has just been noted, there are also other reasons to the contrary. Continents offer no natural advantages for fusions aiming at consolidation. It is true that geographical frontiers and position have hitherto to a large extent determined the form of development of States and federations. But the geographical point of view has lost much of its significance. Two circumstances are responsible for the change: the one is that economics have become world-embracing, and cannot be restricted by geographical frontiers; the other, communications similarly ignore or overleap geographical obstacles. The whole of the geographical point of view is a part of the antiquated thought of a Europe in ruins. It is a part of strategy, and if we wish to make strategy our cartographer we are doubtless right in advocating the new continental system and in opposing one continent to another. But the sea now unites more than it divides, and the air is one and indivisible. The air offers no such geographical obstacles as strategy, and policy based on strategy, would desire. That is the immense rôle of the discovery of the air in bridging frontiers and promoting the idea of union.

The second foundation—apart from the League of Nations—is the Kellogg Pact. We have already pointed out that this Pact involves a breach of the principle of absolute sovereignty. But at the same time it involves something else of almost equal importance. After the defeat of Wilson in 1919 the U.S.A. stood aside from the League of Nations, from the institution which its President wished to establish, and en-

trenched itself behind the barbed wire of the Monroe Doctrine. The result was, in conjunction with the fact that Russia and the vanquished States were excluded, that the universal character of the new constitution was lost or seriously injured. By the admission of Germany and other States, however, a step forward was taken. Nevertheless the U.S.A. and Russia still stand out. It is not the least significance of the Kellogg Pact that it creates a bond, though a loose one, in addition to the one already created by the League of Nations, for both Russia and the U.S.A. are signatories. The Pact is consequently universal. We must be thankful that owing to American resistance Chamberlain's effort to exclude Russia and China was not successful.

These two *facts*—the existence of the League of Nations and of the Kellogg Pact—are evidence that it is *universality* which must characterise the coming organisation of the nations, and nothing less. There must be no "continental" system. The weak foundation already laid may indeed be broken up, leaving a heap of fragments and ruins. If war should break out, or if the development of internationalism should be checked, it is certain that this will happen. Out of the international collapse and out of the devastated swamps the strategic alliances will grow up again like great poisonous mushrooms.

The conception of universality is spreading. The great struggle of the future will rage round its organisation. Within a few years this conception will be the centre of international politics.

We cannot discuss further here the organs which will have to be created, or their functions, powers, and limitations. In the next chapter, however, we shall present some points of view concerning the creation of the *World Executive*—a term which we use, for lack of a better, to denote the general federal organ.

CHAPTER XIX

THE CREATION OF THE WORLD EXECUTIVE

In considering the question of a world federation it is necessary to bear in mind that only on the assumption that its historical necessity is clearly comprehended can we ever rely on its creation. We have endeavoured to prove this historical necessity.

We have further referred to the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact as the two existing and important realities which may constitute a starting-point for developments. In addition there exists also an instrument of international arbitration. What is still required is obligatory recourse to arbitration, and the creation of the force without which—where the interests of the Great Powers are concerned—any arbitration is merely platonic—mere wind and words. The League is at present a world federation in embryo, an immense nebula in which clear-cut lines are nevertheless beginning to appear. Considerable advances towards compulsory arbitration were made at the last Assembly. When England added its influential signature to the "optional clause," a number of States hastened to follow her example. But if the cause of arbitration has been advanced there is still no sign of federal power to give it sanction. During the present interval, during the period of exhaustion after the war, the League has succeeded in making important contributions to the cause of peace. But this by no means proves that it will be able to keep the peace in the future. So long as developments proceed under the auspices of military imperialism and armaments the League of Nations and other similar organisations will not be able to do so. Similarly, developments in the international field—as

in any other—cannot stand still. The position is not static. Either there will be a set-back from the present position, resulting in a collapse of the whole idea of international organisation, or else the nations must continue to advance along this path and develop the already existing League of Nations. There is no third course open. Even if at present things look brighter than they did a year ago, yet only one serious failure is necessary in some cardinal question (let us await the results of the Five-Power Conference of the New Year, 1930) to create an icy wind which will blow through the world and whip up fierce waves against the breakwater now being constructed.

At the moment of writing, Stresemann is dead, Briand's twelfth Ministry has fallen—partly owing to those who wish to destroy the work of conciliation—and on the other side of the Rhine the nationalists are moving to obtain a plebiscite which, if it succeeds in achieving the objects of its wild advocates, will lead Germany back to the policy which forced Europe to the slaughter-house. They will certainly not succeed as things now are. But everything may be thrown back, and the developments which we sketched in the first part of this book will be resumed with unchecked force. It is still a question of continued reconstruction or annihilation. Indeed, at the present point of the argument we may express ourselves even more definitely: *world organisation or world annihilation*—neither more nor less. The choice will be between the two. And if the greatest rock ahead is a new rivalry in armaments, to begin if the work of reconstruction fails, then we may say with Madariaga: "Let it be said, and not for the last time, the only solution of the problem of disarmament lies in the organisation of the World Community."

The organisation of the peoples cannot be undertaken by

any special interest, by any party, by any class, by any school of thought, by any nation. In the fusion of the peoples and the creation of a world federation all those who understand the meaning of a retreat must co-operate. But nevertheless the position is such, if we judge rightly, that the impulse to, and the preliminary work in the creation of, a real international organisation must originate in already existing international organised forces, otherwise it will be too late! There is no time to wait until the idea of international organisation has penetrated into other than already fertile soil. It is not common sense to expect that the international point of view will spread among the lower middle classes to such an extent that they will support it. That is a vain hope. Similarly to ask reactionary forces to co-operate would be like asking a polar bear to turn vegetarian.

Is it to be expected that the League of Nations will organically develop into a world federation, or systematically plan such a development? No definite answer can be given. Within the League, as within the member-nations, there exist strong forces definitely hostile to such a development. They would offer bitter resistance, more bitter in proportion as the question becomes more actual. There would be no lack of endeavours to sidetrack such developments at an early stage. We know that. Wilson's experiment at the Paris Congress was a costly one which must not be repeated.

The League of Nations necessarily works slowly. Its machinery is in the nature of things vast and clumsy. The number of conflicting wills and interests must always slow down its progress. "To the League a year is a century." We may agree with Titulescu when he emphasises the fact that time is a very important element in the situation. But until stabilisation has proceeded so far that we need no longer fear a collapse we

must exert ourselves to the utmost to hasten developments, and not merely cross our hands and wait.

If it should appear—we emphasise the fact that we are here discussing only an alternative—that resistance to the organic development of the League is so strong that it cannot be overcome, then we must have recourse to apparently formless and illogical means in order to hasten developments with forces outside the League. Whether it will be necessary to do so will appear during the next few years. We are on the threshold of great decisions, and peoples, parties, and groups will be compelled to avow their attitude. It would appear, to judge from many signs, that the decision will lie with the democracy of England and its leaders. If they should take an imperialistic turn and support British isolation, the federal idea will receive a mortal blow.

There is probably no power except the Workers' International which can effect developments in the manner indicated. What measures it may consider necessary to take in the event of a failure of the League we cannot discuss here. We would only express the view that systematic work outside the League is only apparently illogical. On the one hand such developments will manifest themselves in the assumption of parliamentary power by the forces directed to an effective organisation of the peoples. On the other hand this assumption of power would strengthen similar forces within the League. The increased influence of the League thus created would in its turn develop new sources of strength within the nations. At the moment when a majority is obtained within the League for an extension of its activities *The World Executive* will begin to develop organically out of the existing international organisation.

Even if the working-class democracy should gradually assume power in the various countries, yet, confronted with

the mass of problems upon which the peace of the world depends, it would be discomfited unless it had itself endeavoured to understand them. In such a scheme plans for The World Executive and its creation are necessary.

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At the present moment we are to all practical purposes empty-handed. The very form and conception of The World Executive Power is not clear. For most people it is a Utopian dream. Only by bringing it nearer to the refractor and to the eye will it become clearer. The peoples are confronted by a colossal task. But they must either attack it or be prepared for a colossal chaos. The problem is certainly not insoluble, and the more we realise the difficulties the less insoluble the problem becomes. Some important preliminary work has already been done. A number of reports have already been prepared on the initiative of the League of Nations and the International. That which is, above all, required is adequate power to continue the work begun, to convert theories into reality, to carry the necessary resolutions and to take the necessary steps. The foundation of this power must be laid, as Mr. MacDonald said in Canada, in the ballot-boxes. If the democracy should be defeated in the coming elections in different countries—especially in England and Germany—we can understand how quickly the present comparatively favourable situation would be changed, and the League of Nations with it. A League ruled by reaction and by dictators! The workers' democracy, and its instrument the International, must reckon with this eventuality. It cannot cross its hands on its breast and merely wait.

At this point, however, a very weighty question arises. Will the demand for a stronger international organisation lead to the dissolution of the League of Nations and the shattering

of the foundations already laid? Will an acceptance of the principle of The World Executive Power, with its inevitable reaction against imperialism and absolute sovereignty, lead certain States to abandon the League when outvoted and to isolate themselves? This eventuality must certainly be borne in mind. It is not possible to say in advance which these States are. Everything depends upon the development of internal politics in each country during the next few years. Unless the great nations, led by England and Germany, pledge themselves to a stronger international organisation it will—as has just been said—never be realised at all. But if they do so it will only be the less important States which will secede, especially those ruled by dictators. But the risk should not be very great. A change in the attitude of certain peoples towards these questions—the majority of the smaller nations may certainly be expected to co-operate—would imply such a tremendous change in public opinion that it is doubtful whether the dictatorial system would anywhere survive the shock. The nations ruled by dictators would, as a result of the *great reorientation of European politics*, receive a strong impulse to change their form of government in order that they might join the new movement. What might at present seem impossible would scarcely be so under the strong influence of a popular psychology thus created. Even if there were certain withdrawals from the League of Nations, they would only be temporary. (Indeed, it is better that there should be withdrawals than that certain States should remain within the League and endeavour to frustrate its purposes, and dictators in a democratically constituted League of Nations would be an anomaly.) The power at the disposal of the growing organisation—political power, economic power, and the power of public opinion—would exercise such an attraction that these isolated States would

find it difficult to resist it in the long run. Political isolation might lead to economic isolation, though it is impossible as yet to forecast to what extent. Much depends on the mode of operation of the great economic forces, on the influence which The World Executive Power will be able to exercise over them. Once again we glimpse the "great coalition" and its significance.

A question of supreme importance is, of course, how to induce the U.S.A. to come in. It is not possible here to express any opinion on this subject. There is a hope, however, that the Kellogg Pact may prove to be the instrument with which to knock a big hole in the Chinese wall erected by President Monroe in 1823. The case of Russia also requires special treatment. The great question is to determine the moment when Russia should be given an opportunity to join the League of Nations. (Everything seems to show that the League does not pay sufficient attention to the Russian problem. Why is there not, for example, an international commission to form an objective and unbiased opinion of the great mystery?)

Another question which requires thorough investigation is that of the power at the disposal of The World Executive—both before and after its creation—to influence the nations. This investigation is an important element in any plan of construction. There can be no question of renouncing such a means as is placed in its hands by modern large-scale propaganda. It would be unnatural if the instrument of propaganda were only used by the party which, in the event of a new war, would exploit it more intensively than during the world-war. The effects of organised and methodical propaganda were shown not least by the results of war propaganda. Was it not this, in fact, which finally decided the issue of the war? The creation of permanent and effective organs of propaganda

is one of the first measures required by the "General Staff" of the Executive.

The question of the international force, however, dominates all other questions and constitutes, it would appear, the most important precondition of real and universal disarmament. Only when it is clear how this force is to be created and what form it will assume will it be possible seriously to tackle the problem of the suppression of the present system of "security". The vital question remains, How are the nations to be protected? How are they to obtain an increased sense of security? Until these questions are answered there can be no release. They constitute the crux of a rationalisation of peace. We must immediately take up a position in principle in relation to them. This principle can be no other than the organisation by the nations of an adequate international force which will in due course replace existing national armaments. *For the present the whole idea of a rational organisation for peace stands or falls by the international force, which must in the last resort be an international military force.* The sooner this is understood the better.

It is no use entrenching ourselves behind talk of an international "police force". The use of such a term reveals ignorance of the degree of strength which The International Security Force must represent. It must be sufficient to prevent the outbreak of war, whether such war occurs within or without the organisation, in every case where such an outbreak threatens to spread. This requirement cannot be satisfied by a force which is not strong enough itself to conduct a war if other measures and sanctions, including a mere threat by such a force, are insufficient to compel respect for the Executive.

There is no doubt that the creation of The International Security Force will require, like other measures connected

with the creation of a world executive, a long period of preparation. For the present we must therefore fall back on the military organisations of those States which advocate peace. That is to say, on the solidarity of those States which in their domestic policy have already entered upon this path. We are thus confronted with the Geneva Protocol in a modified and, as regards a number of States, a restricted form. The original protocol represented a final goal. The modified agreement, on the other hand, is only a provisional, transitional form. Against this background—of the necessity for military protection for the nations by a system of guarantees created by the peaceful States—the idea of immediate *isolated disarmament* in certain countries is directly inimical to the whole idea and its development. If certain democratic nations were to abandon their defences they might prevent, or at any rate endanger, international solidarity—the only hope left of defeating war. This is the main argument against isolated disarmament, and it is decisive. The nation or nations who wish to escape all individual danger by refusing to share the risks associated with joint action have misjudged the situation. They adopt the dogmas of the ex-neutrals. But the position has changed since the war. Like so many other dogmas and doctrines, this one also has been cast aside in the great transformation. Such people only hasten the "great common adventure", or else to the best of their power they make it inevitable. They have not understood the necessity for joint efforts in the present situation.

The organisation of The International Security Force can only be suggested here. But if the views on warfare presented in the first section of this book are right—i.e. that a military decision, especially in the West, but also in certain other parts of the world, is in the main dependent on supremacy in the

air—then it would appear that the international force must, above all, consist of an *air force*. Here we encounter another, and a contrasting, result of the technical revolution in warfare —namely, the possibility of placing a strong weapon in the hands of those who wish to prevent the outbreak of war. In the hands of individual States the air arm threatens annihilation. In the hands of the international power it has every prospect of becoming a collateral guarantor of peace. In the last part of *The World Crisis*, Churchill dreams a dream in connection with the Peace Assembly. Among other things he sees a decision that the air arm shall not be employed by individual States, but shall be reserved for the League. It was a stroke of genius at that time, but at present the suggestion can be understood even by a fish porter. At the moment when this idea is realised—and it must be realised—war will have no future, at any rate in Western Europe, despite the possibility of transforming civil into military aeroplanes. Other military weapons will nevertheless certainly be required, even in the European zone.

It would seem that the developed international security system should not count on a centralised, but on a decentralised, organisation of its forces. We envisage various districts or zones in which a concentration of forces may be effected in such a manner that they can be rapidly moved to other scenes.

The composition of the international military force is a problem by itself of great magnitude. Nobody appears to have investigated the subject. There is, moreover, no practical use in speculating upon it here. It is, however, remarkable that the League of Nations possesses no organ for the investigation of this problem. The Disarmament Department of the Secretariate can scarcely be competent to handle it. Neither

the League of Nations nor The World Executive can dispense with a staff—or whatever we choose to call it—for this purpose.

It is not possible to sketch the development of The World Executive except in the broadest lines and within certain limits. All theory is grey. Where practice cannot be combined with theory, practice must decide and the necessary modifications must be made accordingly. Only the principle—i.e. the necessity of creating an organisation of the peoples on as firm a foundation as possible—must be firmly retained.

The democracy of workers must, irrespective of all other forces, groups, or tendencies, advance as directly as possible to the realisation of a world executive. If it does so it will seize and retain the initiative in world politics. This final purpose includes almost all other questions now under discussion. That these discussions have achieved so little is due to the fact that the problems have not been probed deeply enough, the foundations have not been reached, and the final goal has not been kept steadily in view. The lever must be brought into action at this point. We shall then see how the whole complex begins to move. The war against war will enter on a new stage.

Mussolini has remarked that a decision will be reached in Europe some time between 1935 and 1940. What he means by the word "decision" is sufficiently clear. He means the great military conflict. Marshal Foch said some years before his death that the next war would come within ten to fifteen years. He once said to some officers from foreign countries who were studying in France that perhaps they were surprised that France was making such intense preparations for war. "The explanation is very simple"—the Marshal himself answered the question—"we regard such a war as inevitable." We need not regard the Italian Dictator and the French Marshal

as infallible prophets. But on the other hand we should be on our guard against underestimating their opinions. There is good reason, at the point which we have now reached, for calling attention to these two utterances, and to the developments with which they confront us.

The difficulties which accumulate around the conception of a world federation and The World Executive, this mighty constructive "either", must be seen against the background of the equally mighty and destructive "or". They must not be regarded separately. Only by contrast does the relief appear with its light and shade. It is mere childish optimism and ignorance to suppose that we can escape the choice between them. That is the belief which we have endeavoured to undermine. We may ask with Ferrero in his *Speech to the Deaf*, will it be understood?

CHAPTER XX

THE ORGANISED REVOLT?

WHATEVER form the advance towards an organisation of the peoples may take, it will be slow. Collapse, on the other hand, may come suddenly, with lightning speed. Such is its nature. But if the collapse is to be prevented, it must, paradoxical as it may seem, be postponed. In order to do so, strong provisional protective measures must be taken wherever possible. Before we can plan and develop a system of defences against war, we must erect provisional palisades, create a temporary defence against the jungle. Whether we accept the argument put forward in this book or not—namely, that it is the international labour movement, preferably in conjunction with "peace capital", which will bring about the historic change—there can be no doubt that only the labour movement, representing the millions of industrial workers of the West, has the power to create the necessary provisional defence.

A provisional power which is to prevent the outbreak of war must constitute a dangerous threat. H. G. Wells writes somewhere that he hopes that there will be a mighty revolt. But we should realise that if we rely on hopes or the force of events we must expect bloody revolution and chaos in the West. (In accordance with the Bolshevist programme.) Otherwise these improvised revolts would be crushed at the outset by armed force. If such a revolt is not to waste away in revolution or to run the risk of suppression before it has had any effect, it must assume the form of *an organised revolt of the forces of production*. If such a revolt did not take place on the outbreak of war in 1914, the reason was partly the absence of

any real organisation of such a rising. Neither had the peoples at that time that knowledge of what war is which they have now acquired by terrible experience. Unorganised revolts and large-scale strikes can under no circumstances be an effective weapon against the vast accumulated forces of war. Only on the supposition that the attitude of the working classes towards war is in the main clear, and that their rising in order to stop production is well planned, well organised, and well led, can it constitute such a threat.

If the principle of the revolt of the peoples on the outbreak of war is at all to be approved, the revolt must be internationally organised, with a central direction. A revolt in one country threatened with war by an aggressor not similarly menaced would play into the hands of force and of those who wield it. Such a plan is impossible. Yet we can be reasonably sure as things are that spontaneous improvised revolts will occur when war breaks out. The only means of preventing such a development is for the Workers' International to perfect an organisation, so far as its forces and influence permit, for a systematic rising of the industrial masses against a *war of aggression*. Only such an organisation, with such a purpose, and carried out on a large scale, will be able to avoid not only revolutionary chaos but war itself.

Within a developed international organisation the revolt of the masses against a Government which overrides the decisions of The World Executive Power must be regarded as one of the most important means of dealing with an international law-breaker. Such a revolt would then be internationally legal. But even before such a system is created, and before such an international law is codified, revolt against war must be regarded as justified. Necessity, as we know, knows no law. And this is a case of necessity. The working classes have no other weapon,

in the event of war, against the mighty forces which, in the decisive moment, support war, than organised revolt.

What, then, is meant by revolt? That we do not mean what is commonly called revolution must be clear from the fact that we contrast revolt with revolution. Revolt against war implies *the stoppage of the machinery of production.* It is perhaps not possible to determine in advance how much work shall continue, or whether the whole machinery of production must be stopped. But systematic organisation in time of peace should lead to certain conclusions in this respect. It is obvious that the production of war material must be crippled wherever it may serve the purposes of a disturber of the peace or of an aggressor. But such a crippling presupposes a knowledge of the nature and methods of war industries, and such knowledge is only obtainable by continuous study, which must be provided for. In order to analyse these questions at all, and in order to make the necessary plans, a special organ must be created for the purpose within the international organisation. It will constitute, indeed, the most important reconnaissance work in the offensive against war.

The revolt of the masses against war is a revolt of crossed arms, of millions of crossed arms. It is the wheel which ceases to revolve, the silent machine, the discipline of crossed arms *versus* the discipline of bayonets. The latter was the expression of the Napoleonic age; the former is the expression of the mechanical, industrial age. This weapon is being sharpened in the progressive industrialisation of Western Europe. This industrialisation, which magnifies the causes of war, seems at the same time to create an anti-toxin within the body. The Kapp incident in Germany proved what forces the crossed arms had at their disposal. We must, of course, remember

that the use of the revolt on that occasion only showed the possibility of solving an internal political crisis.

In order to fix the responsibility for a threat of war or a breach of the peace, the only means at the disposal of the executive of the International is to demand the immediate submission of the dispute, via the League of Nations, to arbitration. The revolt must not, as we have already stated, be directed against the nation which is on its defence, which wishes to keep the peace, and which therefore accepts arbitration. On the contrary, one of the primary duties of the International must be to encourage the working classes in such a country not to yield, as also to organise international support of various kinds for such a threatened nation. The pressure of the working classes may in such case be directed towards securing assistance from recalcitrant Governments. We shall best realise that assistance to a peaceful nation must in principle be rendered by the workers' democracy by taking as an example the Fascist State, ruled by a dictator, as the aggressor. Submission to force would in such a case be equivalent to the destruction of liberty in the peaceful democratic State, and, as a corollary, the crushing of the labour movement. Such a solution can never be admitted. It would be easy to adduce illuminating examples from Europe.

In the revolt of the forces of production the International possesses an instrument of pressure, wherewith to enforce its demands at the decisive moment. It is a giant's club which, though withheld as long as possible, nevertheless exists and is ready for use. It would be foolish to seek to use it except on the approach of war.

The organisation of the mass revolt is the reply to the development of war and dictatorships. It is the reaction of the

XXth century—the century of industrialism—against the XIXth-century organisation of nations in arms against each other. It is the historic answer to the world-war and to the preparations for the next war. It is an answer and not a challenge. It is defence, not attack. Nevertheless, we shall hear loud lamentations from those quarters which claim the right to destroy the world. It may be said that we assume a vast responsibility in organising a revolt of Labour, in letting loose forces which cannot, once released, be controlled. That is true, but the objection is due to failure to realise that the revolt is an alternative to something which will infallibly create chaos. It is not only war which lurks behind the door, but also world revolution. We emphasise the fact that the revolt may be the only remaining means of preventing both. It is not a decisive objection against it that even the last word can be of no use.

Perhaps in view of the light which is dawning we may agree to a postponement of the organised revolt in order to see if the light grows stronger. The forces of reason have increased in power. If the position improves and safe measures are taken to defeat war and armaments, so much the better. In that case desperate remedies will be unnecessary. But, as we have said before, a set-back is equally possible. The forces of reaction are on the alert. They are by no means prostrate. The darkness may become blacker than ever. Let us not deceive ourselves on that point. The working classes and the International must be ready if other attempts to stop war do not succeed in the future. Preparations must not be made too late lest the new light prove nothing but a will-o'-the-wisp. Therein lies the danger of the postponement of the organisation of a counter-threat. The difficulty is to determine how much must be done now, and how much may be postponed

in the hope of better things. But nothing at all will be done unless the seriousness of the situation is fully appreciated by the peoples and unless they know what Fate has in store for them.

* * *

In most countries complaints are raised that men have lost much of their political interest and of their political activity. The political vacuum is quite natural after the exhaustion of the war and the storms which were experienced after it. But the passivity which is so pronounced in the younger generation cannot be satisfactorily explained as merely a reaction. Its origin is to be found rather in the fact that this generation feels and knows that present-day politics are not sufficiently far-seeing, that they seldom or never enter those fields in which the decision of the future of this generation will be made, and is even now being made. There is often a deep cleavage between those things with which contemporary politics are concerned and the reality which is in being. When the cleft between the politics of to-day and the politics of to-morrow has been bridged by knowledge we shall suddenly find ourselves in the midst of a struggle—spiritual, economic, and political—of such gigantic dimensions as have never been seen before. There will be fighting enough! Those who fear that the abolition of war will reduce the intensity of life need not be alarmed. A victory in the struggle which will decide the whole future of civilisation will require the exercise of all the qualities of heroism. Only by demanding its place in the line of battle, on the side of reconstruction, can the generation which has grown up since the war dispel its deep disillusionment in mankind.

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